I M Schur

THE Public Interest

NUMBER 105, FALL 1991, PRICE: $5.50

Day Care or Parental Care?
Richard T. Gill

Waste Disposal: A Miracle of Immaculate Consumption? — *Roger Starr*

America's Infant-Mortality Puzzle — *Nicholas Eberstadt*

Language Choice for Latino Students — *Rosalie Pedalino Porter*

Black and White at Stanford — *John H. Bunzel*

IQ and Science: The Mysterious Burt Affair — *Arthur R. Jensen*

Pro & Con:

"The Great Sharecropper Success Story" — *Nicholas Lemann vs. David Whitman*

Growth Economics vs. Macroeconomics
David P. Goldman

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE Public Interest

NUMBER 105, FALL 1991

CONTENTS

Day Care or Parental Care?	*Richard T. Gill*	3
Waste Disposal: A Miracle of Immaculate Consumption?	*Roger Starr*	17
America's Infant-Mortality Puzzle	*Nicholas Eberstadt*	30
Language Choice for Latino Students	*Rosalie Pedalino Porter*	48
Black and White at Stanford	*John H. Bunzel*	61
Growth Economics vs. Macroeconomics	*David P. Goldman*	78
IQ and Science: The Mysterious Burt Affair	*Arthur R. Jensen*	93
Pro & Con: "The Great Sharecropper Success Story"	*Nicholas Lemann vs. David Whitman*	107
Contributors		123

THE PUBLIC INTEREST (ISSN-0033-3557) is published quarterly by National Affairs, Inc., and appears in Winter, Spring, Summer, and Fall issues. Its office of publication is located at 1112 16th Street, NW, Suite 530, Washington, DC 20036. Telephone: (202) 785-8555. Subscription price: $21 for one year, $38 for two years, $54 for three years. Add $3 annually for Canadian and foreign subscriptions. Unsolicited material cannot be returned unless accompanied by sufficient return postage. Second-class postage is paid at Washington, DC, and at additional mailing offices. ©1991 by National Affairs, Inc. Postmaster: Please send all changes of address to *The Public Interest* Subscription Office, Dept. PI, P.O. Box 3000, Denville, NJ 07834. Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *P.A.I.S., Historical Abstracts, ABC Pol Sci, Social Science Index, Sociological Abstracts,* and *America: History and Life,* and are available on microfilm from University Microfilms International. *The Public Interest* is printed by William Byrd Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Editors
Irving Kristol and Nathan Glazer

Publication Committee
Martin Feldstein
Harry Kahn
H. J. Kaplan
Charles Krauthammer
Glenn C. Loury
Harry McPherson
Daniel P. Moynihan
Charles Murray
Isabel V. Sawhill
Martin E. Segal
Arthur L. Singer, Jr.
Roger Starr
Irwin M. Stelzer
James Q. Wilson

Executive Editor
Ben Wildavsky

Managing Editor
Vincent J. Cannato

Assistant Managing Editor
Agnes Sagan

Assistant to the Editors
Karis Kercher

Editorial Office
1112 16th Street, NW, Suite 530
Washington, DC 20036

Subscription Office
The Public Interest, Department PI
P.O. Box 3000
Denville, NJ 07834

Newsstand Distributors
Bernhard DeBoer, Inc.
113 Centre Street
Nutley, NJ 07110

Ingram Periodicals, Inc.
1117 Heil Quaker Boulevard
La Vergne, TN 37086

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Day care or parental care?

RICHARD T. GILL

THE 1990s MAY well prove to be the decade of child legislation. It is only 1991 and we have already seen the passage of a major child-care bill, a dramatic presidential proposal for educational reform, and two lengthy reports that recommend new children's policies: one from the National Research Council (NRC),[1] another, known as the "Rockefeller Report," from the National Commission on Children (NCC).[2] Senator John D. Rockefeller IV (D-WV), chairman of the NCC, echoed the prevailing mood when he declared in the Preface that the time has come to "save our children."

This concern is not surprising. Almost everyone agrees that the present younger generation has been subject to a curious and possibly shameful national neglect from infancy through adolescence. An abundance of disturbing statistics can be found on broken

[1] Cheryl D. Hayes, John L. Palmer, and Martha J. Zaslow (eds.), *Who Cares for America's Children? Child Care Policies for the 1990s* (National Academy Press, 1990).

[2] *Beyond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda for Children and Families* (Final Report of the National Commission on Children: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

homes, child poverty, emotional problems, teenage suicide, and inadequate, unstable, sometimes unsanitary infant- and child-care arrangements. Disastrous conditions threaten many of the nation's public schools.

Many serious decisions must be made, then, about our future child-care policies. One important question is this: Should the government actively promote out-of-home care as an alternative to parental care in the rearing of infants, toddlers, and preschoolers? This issue takes on special importance following the November 1990 passage of a significant piece of federal child-care legislation. With surprisingly little fanfare, Congress enacted a bill that provides for closer regulation and inspection of day-care facilities, a program of federal grants to the states aimed at making child care more affordable for working families, and funds for improving the quality of day-care services. Admittedly, the legislation was relatively modest in scale. For example, under Section 2 (Child Care and Development Block Grants), Congress authorized the expenditure of $750 million in 1991, $825 million in 1992, and $925 million in 1993 for child-care services. Still, both opponents and proponents could see the potential import of what was happening. The *Wall Street Journal*'s editorial page, no friend of the new law, said it might be "the most ambitious federal social experiment in 20 years." Representative Pat Schroeder (D-CO) was quoted as saying, "We'll take whatever it is and build on it next year."

Is an irresistible trend toward government-sponsored day care now underway in America? Consider the positions taken on this issue in the 1990 NRC report and the 1991 Rockefeller Report.

The NRC report

Although the NRC report frequently notes that "parental choice is fundamental" and that steps should be taken to enhance that choice, virtually the entire document is geared toward promoting one particular choice: quality out-of-home child care. Parental care is not even mentioned in the "overarching goals" listed in the report. These goals include achieving high-quality out-of-home child-care services and arrangements, and improving the accessibility and affordability of such services—especially for low- and moderate-income families.

The report's goals, in turn, lead to specific recommendations that if implemented would put the federal and state governments squarely in the business of providing for the care of America's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

youngest children. The first four (out of five) recommendations clearly point in this direction:

(1) The federal government, in partnership with the states, should expand subsidies to support quality child-care programs and arrangements for low-income families.

(2) Head Start and other compensatory preschool programs should be expanded.

(3) Government and business should invest in the infrastructure of the child-care system.

(4) The federal government should help develop national standards for child care.

Detailed comments under these recommendations confirm the report's general thrust in favor of out-of-home care. Innocent-sounding proposals—like investing in child-care infrastructure—reveal possibilities for enormous expansion. This recommendation involves not only improved planning, coordination, and expanded referral services, but such potentially large items as creating new training programs for child-care providers, increasing their wages, and expanding voucher programs linked to the use of regulated day care.

It is true that there are a few gestures in the direction of parents who wish to raise their own children. For example, the first recommendation includes the possibility of raising the personal tax exemption for children and increasing the Earned Income Tax Credit, steps that have a neutral effect on the choice between parental and out-of-home child care. However, the major discussion focuses on expanding the Dependent Care Tax Credit (tied to the use of out-of-home child-care services) and Social Services Block Grants (designed to subsidize nonparental child-care providers.)

Indeed, the only recommendation in the report that appears to give explicit support to the cause of parental care is the final one:

(5) The federal government should mandate unpaid, job-protected leave for employed parents of infants under age one.

Since this recommendation is limited to children under age one, its scope obviously does not compare with that of the other four recommendations. More significantly, it is the only one of the five in which no public monies are involved. The entire burden is placed on private industry, including the maintenance of health benefits during the leave period.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Most significantly of all, this recommendation could well lead to *less* rather than more parental care for young children. Guaranteed leaves may tie the mother more closely to the employing firm and encourage her to return to work as soon as possible. Historically, this has been true when benefits are included in the leave package. A study by Martin O'Connell of the Census Bureau found that between 1961 and 1984 the percentage of women returning to work within six months of their child's birth was substantially greater in the case of women who had received leave benefits than among those who had not. From 1981 to 1984, for example, 71 percent of women who had received maternity-leave benefits returned to work within six months of their child's birth, compared to 43 percent of women who had not received such benefits. O'Connell concluded that maternity benefits "are directly related to increases in the proportion of women returning to work shortly after childbirth, even after controlling for other factors that would affect the probability of working." Thus, while leave policies are more responsive to women's needs, and possibly desirable from the point of view of many corporations, they are not well designed to promote parental care in the home for more than very short periods.

In sum, the NRC report goes much further than the 1990 federal legislation ultimately did in recommending the subsidization of quality out-of-home child care while suggesting little or nothing to promote parental care.

The Rockefeller Report

Since it was two-and-a-half years in the making, and since its aim was to provide "a new American agenda for children and families," one might have expected that the Rockefeller Report would offer clear directions on the matter of parental versus out-of-home child care. However, the report was explicitly "bipartisan," effectively ruling out real agreement as to what direction future policy should take on this controversial issue.

The language of the report tends to be very pro-family. In boldfaced type we are told that "the family is and should remain society's primary institution for bringing children into the world and for supporting their growth and development throughout childhood." The report's central recommendation—establishing a $1,000 refundable tax credit for all children through the age of eighteen—is specifically designed to have the same effect on fami-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lies "struggling to afford high-quality child care" and those "in which one parent chooses to stay home and care for the children." This recommendation, which includes the elimination of the personal exemption for dependent children, is unanimously supported by the members of the NCC and is the most expensive item in their list of proposals, with an estimated cost of $40.3 billion for fiscal 1993.

Unanimity on this proposal is deceiving, however, for there is no agreement on how it is to be financed. In general, little detective work is required to discern two fundamentally different philosophies at work in the Rockefeller Report. A minority position—typically espoused by Republican members of the commission—explicitly rejects the majority recommendations for a large new health-care initiative and for a greatly expanded Head Start program. Several members also suggest that the refundable tax credit be financed largely by eliminating other government programs. The eliminated (or reduced) programs would include those involving subsidies to out-of-home child care, as in the Dependent Care Tax Credit or Social Services Block Grants. The minority position continually emphasizes the need to strengthen the family and the role of parental child care.

The majority position appears to be much more sympathetic to raising taxes to finance the refundable tax credit (as opposed to cutting other domestic expenditures). The majority also seems to favor expanding not only health-care and Head Start coverage, but also a variety of other programs, at all levels of government, that effectively subsidize out-of-home child care. The report applauds the 1990 federal child-care legislation, and urges that expenditures on the Child Care and Development Block Grant program be increased further. Despite initial appearances, then, the overall position taken by the majority in the Rockefeller Report comes fairly close to that of the NRC report.

An "inexorable" trend?

With respect to the issue of out-of-home versus parental care, the NRC takes a clear stand. If the report's recommendations were enacted, those choosing parental care would be severely penalized: a married couple in which one parent decided to forgo most or all of a second income to stay home and raise the couple's young children would have to pay taxes to build quality day-care infrastructure, raise provider salaries, maintain national standards

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of quality care, and provide direct subsidies to parents who, in the case of intact families, have the advantage of a second income earner. Why this remarkable stacking of the deck in favor of out-of-home child care?

Underlying the report is the implicit argument that the nation really has no alternative. One of the more significant sections of the NRC report, "Future Trends," features two graphs that project our future with respect to (1) the percentage of children with mothers in the labor force, and (2) household composition. These straight-line projections suggest to the authors that, by the year 2000, 80 percent of school-age children and 70 percent of preschool-age children will have mothers in the labor force, and that one-third of all U.S. children will be living in single-parent families. Under these circumstances, one can predict "with some certainty" that "the demand for out-of-home child-care services will continue to increase well into the 1990s." Since quality services are clearly desirable, and current services are often not of high quality, is it not obvious, implies the report, that the government must throw its full weight behind an effort to improve day-care quality and accessibility?

There are two problems with this logic. One is that trends can and do change, making such projections notoriously unreliable. In the post-World War II era, we have seen dramatic changes not only in fertility rates (baby boom followed by baby bust), but also in the median age of first marriages, and, for certain cohorts, even in divorce rates and women's labor-force participation rates. An important trend that once seemed inexorable—the gradual replacement of private institutions by public ones, following the Swedish model—no longer seems so clear in the United States (nor, for that matter, in Sweden).

The second main problem concerning these sweeping social and political trends is that, within limits, they definitely *are* "exorable"—that is, subject to human intervention. Public policy may try to augment the factors operating in the direction of such trends, to lessen them, or even to reverse them. The fact that socioeconomic forces are moving us in the direction of non-parental child care tells us nothing about the wisdom of using government policy to promote nonparental child care as opposed to parental child care. As policy guidelines, the trend charts in the NRC report are essentially beside the point.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Out-of-home care

What is not beside the point is a judgment about the relative desirability of day care versus parental care. Perhaps such a preference is what really lies behind the NRC report's recommendations. Does the document contain evidence to suggest that out-of-home care is preferable to—or at least just as good as—parental care in the raising of children age five and under?

The question is hard to answer. The report presents a number of defenses, or quasi-defenses, of day care, always assuming that it is quality care. However, some of these defenses are difficult to credit. We learn, for instance, that

> Mothers are not the only caregivers who can provide the essential experiences for healthy early development. Children can benefit from 'multiple mothering' *if* [emphasis in the original] it provides affection, warmth, responsiveness, and stimulation in the context of enduring relationships with a reasonably small number of caregivers ... who have come to know the child's individual needs and style.

And again:

> Environments that provide stable, warm, responsive, and stimulating relationships with several caregivers, if these relationships are limited in number, can encourage healthy psychological development.

What can be made of such statements? They seem both to state the obvious and to have no relationship to the subject of day care. Probably *the* major argument for parental as opposed to non-parental care is that the former is in most instances "enduring," "stable," and responsive to "the child's individual needs and style," while the latter is intrinsically characterized by transitory relationships, even when the care is of high quality. A National Center for Health Statistics study found that in 1988 one-fourth of the children in a regular child-care arrangement had had that arrangement changed at least once in the twelve months preceding the study interviews. This, of course, is quite apart from the change of caregivers within any given arrangement, and also the change of caregivers as the child moves from one age group to another. If one is looking for enduring and stable relationships, they will be hard to find in the context of out-of-home child care.

In general, the NRC report tends to make light of certain well-known day-care problems. For example, the report recognizes the particular vulnerability of children under age one and notes that a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

higher proportion of these children in day care "show anxious-avoidance attachment to their mothers than do home-reared infants"—thus the recommendation of mandated parental leave. On the other hand, the report notes that the increased incidence of anxious-avoidant behavior (normally interpreted to reflect insecure infant attachment to the mother) could conceivably indicate "a healthy adaptation of infants to child care," showing greater autonomy from their mothers. (Note that this is in reference to children under age one.)

The report also discusses the greater susceptibility of children in day care to respiratory infections and other childhood illnesses compared to home-raised children. A few years ago, an article in the Journal of the American Medical Association described conditions in some day-care centers as "reminiscent of the presanitation days of the 17th century"—yet the report happily concludes that "child-care attendance poses no major risk to the health status of young children in the United States."

Where it does acknowledge the difficulties associated with day care, the NRC report attributes most problems not to day care itself but to poorly regulated or unregulated settings and to underfunding. By contrast, the report portrays quality day care as possessing few defects and possibly even certain advantages for children—improved short-term cognitive development and greater social competence, for example.

Having said all this, however, one must add that the *main* assertion in the report about nonparental versus parental care for young children is that we do not yet have enough information to make a judgment. In the case of social competence, for example, the evidence available is "extremely limited." In the case of anxious-avoidant behavior, the study stresses that "studies to date have not yet followed day-care children showing anxious-avoidant attachment to assess directly the stability of the pattern or its developmental implications." Throughout the report, the authors express an appropriate recognition of the need for more research, noting that there is "insufficient evidence to predict the magnitude of effects of alternative policy and program proposals on children's development."

Yet despite its scholarly calls for more research, more studies, more time, the NRC report does not hesitate to enter the policy fray somewhat unprepared: "Building the knowledge base will take time, and the policy process—and the nation's children—will not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wait for scientists to produce complete and flawless data." Thus, policy recommendations are called for—now.

Given the NRC panel's failure to demonstrate that day care is generally superior to parental care, and given our admitted lack of knowledge about day care's lasting impact, one might have expected the panel to frame its recommendations rather cautiously. While urging steps to improve the quality of all child care in the United States, it might have carefully avoided favoring out-of-home over parental care. One might go even further and argue that in view of our long experience with parental child rearing, and the obvious ways—particularly with regard to enduring relationships—in which parental care has an advantage, the panel might have given just a slight nudge in the direction of encouraging parents to care for their children at home.

As we have seen, however, the NRC report does not do so. Its recommendations come down unequivocally on the side of encouraging child-care arrangements about which we know very little. These arrangements are already being fostered by socioeconomic trends toward single-parent families and the entry of mothers of very young children into the labor force, and could ultimately exacerbate the very problem the report was designed to solve—the inadequate care and upbringing of America's children.

Working mothers

Given the basic weakness of the arguments favoring out-of-home care over parental care, one begins to suspect that the objective of policies favoring the former is not so much the well-being of children—at least not in any direct sense—as the well-being of their parents. Some might defend day care by arguing that despite its potentially negative direct effects on children, it will ultimately help them by improving the prospects of their parents. According to this line of reasoning, one does not have to prove that day care is preferable to parental care, only that it will not hurt children all that much, particularly when indirect benefits (via parents) are taken into account.

Spelled out more fully, the argument might go like this: It is generally desirable to have the parents of very young children in the labor force. A second earner can be very important for the economic welfare of intact families, and in the case of single-parent families having a single earner is even more necessary. From this standpoint, the need for second- or single-parent earners

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

should be emphasized both for its immediate effects—more income to live on—and for its longer-range effects—continued accumulation of work experience, and a path of career advancement which uninterrupted attachment to the labor force makes possible.

From a societal point of view, these personal arguments can be augmented by three main considerations: (1) the looming "labor shortage" as the depleted baby-bust generation replaces the baby boomers; (2) concerns about labor productivity if young mothers (and/or fathers) drop out of the full-time labor force to raise their children, imperiling their work skills; and (3) the specific problem of single parents (usually mothers) becoming dependent on welfare instead of developing the labor-market skills that a workfare approach (with day care provided) allows.

The societal argument can be buttressed even further by considering the longer-term future. What will we do when it comes time for that huge baby-boom generation to retire? Surely we will need all the workers we can get. Also, we will want them to be experienced, productive workers with continuous labor-force attachments. Seen in this light, day care for children today could be viewed as a means to generate the income and develop the productivity skills we will need to support our retirees in 2010 and thereafter.

Such arguments—if they are what really lie behind the push for out-of-home care for very young children—pose various problems. First, as already noted, they focus less on the direct welfare of children than on possible indirect benefits that will accompany the improved economic status of the families into which those children have been born. Considering that, on the whole, families are far better off economically today than they were one hundred, fifty, or even thirty years ago, this economic emphasis seems somewhat puzzling.

Second, these arguments cast the "Future Trends" section of the NRC report into rather a different light. To emphasize the positive long-term fiscal effects of having more young mothers working is, of course, to suggest that the trend is a desirable one. From this point of view, the fact that subsidized out-of-home child care is likely to amplify this trend even further might be regarded as a plus rather than a minus of such a policy.

With regard to the other "future trend," toward single-parent families, few people would argue that this pattern should be actively encouraged. The fact that subsidized day care will, if any-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thing, tend to facilitate the functioning of single-parent families, might then be considered a mixed blessing. It could be judged positively insofar as the subsidy led to higher overall real incomes for such families (both directly and by permitting the single parent to work full time). But it could be judged negatively insofar as it led to the formation of more single-parent families, either through divorce and separation or, more likely, through facilitating parenthood on the part of unmarried mothers. Advocates of subsidized day care would presumably find its positive effects to be quite large while its negative effects—including the possibly negative effect of substituting out-of-home for parental child care—would be considered small, if in fact they exist at all.

Third, it should be noticed that much of the economic argument in favor of subsidizing out-of-home child care can also be used in exactly the opposite way—i.e., to justify subsidizing parental child care. Calling for a pro-family tax policy in the Winter 1989 issue of *The Public Interest*, Allan Carlson (himself a member of the NCC) suggested that a parent who stays at home faces a tremendous "opportunity cost": "such a parent must sacrifice extra income and possible future career advancement." In other words, both the short-term and long-term economic effects of staying at home tend to militate strongly against parental child care. If one believes that such in-home care is highly desirable, then one will use these economic arguments specifically to enact policies that compensate parents for their sacrifices in rearing their children, not penalize them by making them subject to an added burden—subsidizing out-of-home care for other families.

A lighter burden

Fourth and finally, it should be noted that these economic arguments in favor of relieving parents of the burden of caring for their preschool children are being put forward at a time when those burdens are probably more easily supportable than at any time in our history. This is not only because of the massive rise in America's per capita output over the past century and a half. It is also because of the dramatic changes in our underlying demographics. We have today only a quarter of the children we had at the beginning of the nineteenth century and only half the children we had thirty-five years ago. Not only that, but our life expectancies have increased enormously over this time span.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The combination of these two demographic factors has reduced drastically the percentage of our lives during which we are responsible for children age five and under. Some years ago, Mary Jo Bane of Harvard University studied the average number of years between the birth of the first child and when the last child reached age six, comparing women born in the middle of the nineteenth century to women born in the middle of the twentieth century. For the former group, the number of years was 18.5 and the percentage of their life spans was 30.5. For the latter group, the number of years was 7.5 and the percentage of their life spans was 9.7. For American women born in the last quarter of the twentieth century, this percentage will probably be even lower. The transformation is remarkable: well under 10 percent of the average parent's life is now devoted to sustaining child care, less than a third of the percentage required a century ago. How can it be said that the economic burden of raising small children now *requires* us to pass along this burden to society as opposed to the family?

When Samuel Preston made his famous comparison of old and young dependents in 1984, he emphasized that the government was subsidizing the elderly in a way that it had failed to do with children. From our point of view, a similar comparison can be made in terms of labor-force behavior. Two of the major labor-force developments of recent decades have been a) the large-scale entry of young mothers into the labor force, and b) the sharp and continuing lowering of the retirement age for older workers. We have been rapidly and dramatically substituting added retirement years for years spent giving parental attention to our infants, toddlers, and preschoolers. Is it any wonder that a real generational tragedy may be shaping up in our future?

The new agenda

What this analysis demonstrates is that the case for promoting out-of-home as opposed to parental child care has not been made on the grounds either of the welfare of children or of the overall economic requirements of families. We should be looking for ways to promote parental care, or, at a minimum, to counterbalance any existing or future day-care subsidies with equivalent subsidies to parents who choose to raise their own children.

Not that the parental-care path is free of serious obstacles. Poor single-parent families are an obvious problem. Just when many observers are calling for workfare rather than welfare to increase

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the independence, skills, and future earning capacities of single mothers, it is difficult to argue, simultaneously, that such mothers should characteristically be the primary care givers for their children. Moreover, all young mothers (and/or young fathers) who choose to stay home to raise their children face not only a current loss of income but, perhaps more seriously, an interruption in their employment histories with adverse consequences for future career advancement. How are we to get around these obstacles, both specific and general?

The answer is that we may not be able to do so, but that we now owe it to the nation's children to make a serious effort to see if some solutions can be found. A tremendous research effort has been expended exploring the possibilities of improving the quality and accessibility of day care for our children. A new agenda is needed: research on how we may resolve the obvious obstacles that exist to the exercise of parental child care.

To some extent, of course, the Rockefeller Report provides a potential blueprint for policies designed to promote parental care. If, as certain Commission members suggested, the refundable $1,000 child-care tax credit were to be financed in part by reducing the Dependent Care Tax Credit, Social Services Block Grants, and even the federal share of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, then such a policy would clearly involve a tilt back towards parental as opposed to out-of-home child care.

Such a policy would not, however, deal directly with either the specific or general obstacles we have just mentioned. What about the dependency of welfare-mothers—as opposed to workfare-mothers? What about the interrupted careers of all young parents who choose to stay at home to raise their children?

If such problems are to be solved, imaginative solutions will be needed. My own preference is to treat the relatively brief period when parents are responsible for young children in much the same way as we treated veterans after World War II. The G.I. Bill of Rights offered an opportunity for those whose education and/or employment had been interrupted by war to go to school to prepare themselves for reentry into civilian life. A suitably formulated Parental Bill of Rights might achieve much the same objective for all young parents, including welfare mothers, who were engaged in raising their own children. Their careers too have been interrupted or, in many cases, have never even been launched. An enlightened policy might well be to allow such stay-at-home parents to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

earn points toward future training—at high school, vocational school, college, professional school, or even post-professional school—when their children reach school age. Certainly such a policy could easily be justified if, in fact, the present drift toward subsidized out-of-home child care continues.

The essential point is that the time is now ripe for developing original and unexpected solutions to the problems facing parental child care. There is no need to throw out the parental option for young children or to make the price of exercising that option so high as to be unsustainable. Not only is there no need to do this, there is no warrant for so doing. Parental care for young children has a long and deep history behind it and should be given at least an equal chance to maintain itself in the years ahead.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Waste disposal: a miracle of immaculate consumption?

ROGER STARR

AS THE AGE of perfection approaches, the kindest and gentlest among us are irked not only by man's wasteful habits of consumption, but by the traces of extravagance such practices leave behind. Litter along the margins of our highways, broken and abandoned buildings in the cities, derelict vessels beached on the mudflats of our harbors, spilled oil on beaches and wetlands—these are a few footprints of mankind's passage, the relics of what is described as reckless consumption. Of even deeper significance is the vast tonnage of solid waste produced by Americans in their homes and commercial establishments—about 180 million tons a year—and mostly deposited in holes in the ground and in the air after incineration.

Historically, the criteria for disposing of solid waste were simple. America, like the rest of the world, used the cheapest methods that were reasonably consistent with human health and with the removal of nuisances. Materials that were readily reusable were salvaged by the operation of simple economics, and the rest, after being somewhat reduced in volume by primitive incinerators, filled holes. The smoke from incinerators violated an invisibility crite-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rion and gave incineration a bad name that lingers in the discussion of waste disposal to this day.

In the meantime, however, a new motivation entered waste-disposal engineering. A world that is beginning to excite itself over the importance of enforcing animals' rights had earlier discovered that it was important to defend nature as a whole from the threat of becoming a mere receptacle for man's trash. That effectively removed the criterion of protecting human health from its position as the prime purpose of a successful waste-disposal program, and replaced it with the achievement of the total disappearance of waste.[1]

In a world determined to obliterate all marks of imperfection, burying trash was deemed not to be concealment enough. No matter how carefully one covered over the filled holes in which trash had been finally deposited, these theorists assumed that there would be secret seepage of leachate (the product of rainfall passing through the filled waste) from underneath it, possibly filtering into aquifers and spoiling them, while from the upper side of the dump, however artfully covered with topsoil, grass, and trees, methane gas would seep into the air from decomposing organic compounds, carrying with it the noisome traces of decay. If man resorted to incineration, no matter how carefully he heated his flames and monitored his exhaust stacks to remove the slightest hint of smoke or odor, advocates feared that chemicals, perhaps dangerous to man, would leave their sullen poisons in the common air.

Walking without footprints

In recent years the yearning for consumption without residues has stimulated the activities of people and groups that, in turn, have pushed the techniques of waste disposal away from burial and

[1]Waste is not the only symptom of imperfection that Americans seek to make disappear. With the passage last year of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress was not merely trying to alleviate the hardships of people with physical disabilities, but endeavoring to eradicate the fact that disabilities make a difference. The act requires all new housing units in apartment houses to be built for occupancy by the physically handicapped, even though they constitute but a small part of the population. It insists that common public transportation be refitted to accommodate the handicapped, rather than providing them with substitute para-transit, which might well be more convenient than subways equipped with elevators. In schools, too, to hide failure, all students were, for a time at least, promoted equally every year. To hide quantifiable differences in test scoring, the practice of "race norming" was developed, though it has not been applied to athletic performances.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

incineration and into recycling. Recycling means reusing the materials of the waste stream over and over again. Its advocates modestly claim that recycling 50 percent of human waste is possible, but in their hearts, like New York governor Mario Cuomo (who has said that we need landfills only until recycling becomes truly effective), they dream of a world economy in which new materials will be needed only to satisfy undesired population growth: no new sand will have to be dug to make glass, no timber will have to be cut to make paper, and the sun will provide all the energy man will need—no more mining or drilling for oil or nuclear power plants. Thus reliance on the tactic of recycling will not only deal ultimately with almost all of human waste—it will reduce the demand for new, non-renewable raw materials. Thanks to a miracle of immaculate consumption man will be able to walk without footprints. In this peaceable kingdom, the rain forest will not be destroyed, and primitive peoples will no longer be asked to sacrifice their environments for the benefit of thoughtless consumers.

To close the circle on consumption and reuse, it is now being hinted that another measure will be required at another point in the cycle of use and reuse. There will have to be controls on the production of materials for human consumption. Supporters argue that they will be imposed merely to eliminate what is described as the "excess packaging" in which consumer goods are shipped. (Actually, packaging materials amount to only about 6 percent of the waste stream—not including corrugated board, which is largely reused. Packaging, incidentally, reduces the volume of municipal waste by cutting down on spoilage and permitting shippers to transport solely the edible parts of such items as fruits and vegetables.) Ultimately a war on packaging will tend to become much more onerous. If the shapes of new production items result in shippers' demands for bulky and excessive packaging, there will be conflict between a manufacturer interested in creating and then satisfying market demand and those charged with responsibility for seeing that recycling is not burdened with packaging materials that threaten its efficacy.

It is therefore only a small step from control of packaging to control of design. The latter, of course, would call into question the very concept of the independently manufactured item; it would require the elimination not only of products dangerous to health and safety but of those insufficiently recyclable. Only then will

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mankind look regretfully at the old-fashioned garbage dump, accepting everything for which there is no present use, and find that it is an essential component of the free market.

Alluring as many find the vision of immaculate consumption, not even its staunchest advocates suggest that it will come into being by a miracle. Recycling waste, finding uses for what mankind currently throws away, will necessarily be an economic process, requiring the dedication of capital and labor. And if it requires the expenditure of more capital and labor than present waste-handling technologies, it will necessarily force the displacement of other municipal activities or create additional demands on the part of the people employed directly and indirectly in accomplishing it. The question then will no longer be whether recycling will produce a kinder and gentler world. It will become instead how much more expanded recycling will cost as a waste-disposal method. Not to mention what unintended worldwide consequences (such as an increase in energy demand) might follow a major displacement of such raw materials as pulp lumber and silicon as basic stuffs of manufactured goods. The results so far, especially in major cities, suggest that recycling is, even within the limits of what is practical, more costly than landfilling and incineration.

Recycling for profit

First, let us understand that although most of the solid waste produced in our municipalities traditionally has been disposed of in landfills and, to a much lesser extent, by incineration, there have been and are exceptions. In traditional waste-disposal strategy, recycling spontaneously occurred with scrap iron, cinders, and a few other materials because their recyclable value exceeded the cost of extracting them from the waste stream and treating them to meet market standards.

In the case of scrap iron, treatment includes classifying and separating different grades of scrap according to type, cleaning them to market standards and delivering them in reasonable quantities and on prearranged schedules to the reuser, often halfway around the world. Cinders required a certain amount of screening and grading before they could be turned into cinder blocks or running tracks. Practically no one in the recycling movement talks much about the need to recycle scrap iron, since it is still routinely picked out of the waste stream and sold because it is profitable to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

do so. The same would probably still be true of cinders if the major remaining coal-burning, power-generating boilers were not fueled with powdered coal, which leaves no useful cinders behind. In various locales, still other materials are culled from household and construction wastes: rags and box springs, corrugated cardboard and scrap lumber in Manhattan; rags, scrap meats, and vegetables in Mexico City.

There are unquestionably other potentially valuable components to be extracted from the great mass of waste. Newsprint, the paper newspapers are printed on, can be recycled for reuse as newsprint four or five times before the fibers give way. There is a market for it. Though the spot price varies, a reasonable estimate of the average that re-processors of newsprint are willing to pay for clean, baled material delivered to their plants is $25 per ton. In New York City, 600,000 tons of newsprint enter the waste stream every year, making the total potentially recoupable value of this material about $15 million per year.

There is a difference, however, between this theoretical $15 million in proceeds and the net income that actually remains after collecting, baling, and shipping second-hand newspapers. In many large cities, people engaged in the scrap-paper business collect unsold newspapers from newsstands and other retailers, and from large complexes of offices and residential apartment houses. Superintendents in these buildings amass and segregate newspapers from the higher-grade office papers that are in even greater demand. It can be assumed that although building managers are happy to be relieved of the burden of old paper, they must be paid for their efforts.

Nationwide in 1988, according to the National Solid Waste Management Association, only one-third of the 13.3 million tons of newspapers in the U.S. waste stream was actually recycled. The rest remained part of the general waste because it benefited few householders to segregate the papers. In the event that they were separated from other trash by householders, no one collected them or kept them separate from the rest of the solid waste picked up by the trash collectors who take the waste to the landfill, the incinerator, or, where they exist, to recycling centers. And behind all these failures lay another problem: the capacity of plants that turn used newspapers into usable fibers is limited both by the supply of used newsprint typically offered to them and by the overall demand for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

used fibers, especially when, as is sometimes the case, some newspapers own their own forests and newsprint-producing facilities.

The reverse-distribution chain

Assume for the moment that there is a continuing demand for a greater and greater quantity of newsprint for reprocessing into a substitute for new wood pulp. How would it be collected? Collecting used newspapers for reprocessing is only a special case, though a formidable one, of collection of all recyclables, the heart of the recycling process. Collection can simply be defined as distribution run backwards. Starting with that definition and turning to the distribution of the foodstuffs and other household supplies that are handled by supermarkets, it is easy to see why distribution cannot simply be switched into reverse. In distribution run forward, the ingredients are packaged separately by many manufacturers and remain discrete up to the point when the customer pays the bill and takes bags filled with miscellaneous containers from the check-out counter. Foods are packaged so that they can be put in the same bag without contaminating each other, having previously benefited from the economies of homogeneous preparation, packaging, and transportation to the supermarket.

To reverse the process, the householder has the task of keeping incompatible recyclables from contaminating each other. Most recycling efforts require the householder to separate cans and bottles, and sometimes different types of cans and bottles, and to refrain from commingling them in a single bag as they were when first purchased. The process of recycling, then, requires the householder to segregate those elements in the waste stream that will require separation in order to be welcome in the process of reconstitution.

The householder can be given by the municipality (or be required to purchase) a number of containers, each for a class of recyclable that has to be isolated—cans kept with cans, bottles with bottles, and even aluminum cans with aluminum cans and green bottles with green bottles. The heart of the process has been the imposition on the homeowner of the job of sorting out recyclables from non-recyclables, and the range of recyclable items from each other. There is a practical limit, of course, on how many different containers for different classes of recyclables can be imposed on a householder. And having gone to the trouble of telling the house-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

holder to segregate recyclables, the municipality must then see to it that they remain separated to make their sale possible. What happens, then, after the containers are filled, and the distribution process goes into reverse gear?

Two major methods have emerged for reconcentrating the distributed recyclables from households. One is curbside collection, in which the municipality, with its own forces or through the agency of private haulers, simply goes from house to house, picking up not only the non-recyclable part of the waste stream, but the differentiated recyclables in separate containers as ordered by the municipality. Generally, the two types of waste are picked up by different trucks.

Where curbside collection is not practiced, the householder is expected to carry recyclables to a recycling center where likes are mingled with likes, cleaned, baled if appropriate, and prepared for shipment to the next processor in the reverse-distribution chain.

Obviously greater civic discipline is required by the second method than by the first. It works best in middle-class areas with high morale and community pride. But even the curbside collection system requires civic discipline to keep discarded dirty containers from contaminating discarded clean ones. The curbside system also works best in communities of one- and two-family houses where there is no concealing any one household's unsegregated recyclables in another home's containers. In urban and suburban apartment houses, and increasingly in condominiums of free-standing housing units, garbage is collected by the managing entity of the condominium and turned over en masse to the trash collector. Under those rules, a delinquent's refusal to segregate recyclables by the approved formula goes undetected by the municipality.

Changing incentives

None of the components of household trash has enough potential value in the quantities realized at the household level to make segregation, collection, and delivery economically attractive to the householder. An effort is being made in an increasing number of municipalities to provide an economic motive for householder recycling. Instead of charging each householder the same flat rate for picking up trash once a week, the trash collectors can be required to bill each householder separately on the basis of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quantity of trash actually put out, either by weight or volume. In that case, the householder receives a discount for leaving less non-recyclable material for the trash collector to pick up. But the trash collectors are not likely to offer what the householder will consider a generous price, since the reduced volume of collection at each stop does not necessarily reflect a saving in costs. (When each household's incremental load decreases in size, the trucker has to travel a longer route and make more time- and labor-consuming pick-ups to move the same quantity of trash.)

Several states have sought to add economic value to certain recyclables by requiring a deposit on beer and soft-drink containers, refundable when the containers are returned to a retailer. The results are somewhat ambiguous. The deposit has reduced visibly the number of cans and bottles that are dropped along the roadside and are left to litter those and other public places. In upstate New York, where low-rise housing is typical, the return rate for bottles and cans is very high, well above 80 percent. In New York City, where apartment houses are more generally the rule, and people walk rather than drive to the nearest supermarket, return rates are around 60 percent or less. Aluminum cans are a prime source of reusable aluminum, requiring far less energy than does the production of a like amount of metal from bauxite ore. By offering a five-cent reward for returning a can to the retailer, the state has, in effect, stripped the rest of the waste stream of one of its most desirable components and made the economic incentive of recycling other household trash less attractive than it might be.

Recognizing this dependence on the free labor of householders to segregate different kinds of recyclables in the home, some of the strongest boosters of the recycling movement, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, are now considering asking householders to do no more than separate all recyclables from the waste stream, and keep them in a commingled condition for pick-up by the trash collector. Supporters of commingled pick-ups feel that treating recyclables as an undifferentiated mass will reduce collection costs.

But the saving, if it materializes, will tend to be offset by added costs in preparing the commingled recyclables for market. They will be trucked to collection and processing centers where the separation procedure that was formerly expected to be carried on by the householder will be, so to speak, industrialized. In rural or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

semi-rural jurisdictions, a processing and collection center will serve a fairly large geographic area. In big cities, several or many such centers will have to be established, no mean feat as they are as unwelcome as incinerators and shelters for the homeless.

Assembly-line separation

It would be cheering to be able to report that high technology can be applied to the separation of the recyclables once they have arrived at the collection and processing station. Although some machines put automation to good use, such as those that slice polyethylene terephthalate plastic containers into small pellets for reprocessing into new containers, the basic machine in a processing center is a large, elevated belt. Truckloads of waste are dumped on the belt so that workers, wearing gloves and masks, can pick off the items to be segregated and toss them into designated bins across the belt from where the workers are standing.

Each bin is devoted to a component in the trash that is worth more when segregated from other dissimilar components—polyethylene terephthalate plastic bottles in one bin, high-density polyethylene plastic in another. While there is talk of flotation or other machine-driven devices for separating useful trash components automatically, the only devices so far developed are simple magnetic pulleys for separating steel cans from aluminum cans. As an indication of the manpower requirements of this sorting process, consider the Chambers Development Corporation, one of America's interstate waste-handling conglomerates. Its Pittsburgh recycling operation, one of the most efficient in the country, requires twenty-five workers per shift to recycle approximately fifty tons of materials by the methods described above.

The City of New York, by contrast, produces 26,000 tons of waste daily, collected by both government and private collectors. To recycle one-quarter of that amount, or roughly 6,500 tons a day, would require a work-force addition of 3,225 employees. To reach 50 percent recycling, which some members of the City Council of New York have set as their goal in the city's current recycling effort, would require 6,450 new workers—more than half the total present manpower requirement of the city's sanitation department. Recycling enthusiasts believe that the cost of this expansion of the work force would be paid for by selling recyclables at the market price and by savings in the cost of landfilling. But the city's pre-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sent sanitation commissioner, like his predecessor, finds the costs of an experimental recycling program soaring because of the inefficiencies of collecting and segregation, with no positive relief measures in sight and, in many cases, the marketing potential uncertain.

The present market price of recyclables, it is true, will doubtless be subject to change when truly large volumes of such materials come on the market. Savings in landfill cost would be considerable if recycling did away with landfilling altogether. But even at a 50 percent recycling rate, half of the waste stream would still have to be disposed of. The capital cost of landfills would remain relatively untouched and so the saving in landfill cost would be limited to the marginal savings on the material not filled.

The primary recyclables are glass, aluminum cans, plastic, paper products, and yard waste (which in semi-suburban and suburban areas can be made to disappear through private composting by homeowners). By the year 2000, they will constitute 83 percent of the waste stream, according to a study prepared by Franklin Associates under contract to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Harvey Alter, manager of resources policy for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, estimates that only 26.8 percent of the waste stream could—theoretically—be recycled in 1990.

The difficulties of making recycling profitable are due partly to the striking variety of materials that make up the U.S. waste stream. The four major components—yard waste, corrugated boxes, newspaper, and food waste—constitute, according to the EPA, about 45 percent of the total. The EPA classifies the remaining items under twenty-eight different headings. Some categories at first appear to duplicate others, but in fact they do not. Glass is a recoverable item, and beer and soft-drink bottles constitute about five million tons, or 3 percent of the waste stream. But some bottles are white and brown, others are green. To be acceptable to glass manufacturers, recycled bottles must not only be crushed, but the green bottles, used by European bottlers, must be separated from the rest.

Even assuming that Harvey Alter's estimate of the percentage of material that can be recycled is low, and that as much as 50 percent of recyclables can be extracted from the waste stream by manual efforts in the year 2000, that still leaves 50 percent of the waste to be dealt with in some other fashion. Actually, other dis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

posal methods are developed technologically to a much greater extent than recycling. They are the more traditional ways of dealing with waste; namely, incineration and landfilling.

The advantages of incineration

Incineration in high-temperature, stack-scrubbed incinerators uses heat produced by the burning of waste to produce steam that, in turn, generates electricity. This technology is used successfully in many parts of the United States. In Bridgeport, Connecticut, such an incinerator-cum-electric-generator produces 10 percent of the electric power used in the city of Bridgeport, substituting in part the burning of waste papers and other flammables for oil. The incinerator produces no smoke because of the high temperatures used in its burning process. It has been pronounced safe by Connecticut regulatory authorities and has been in operation for several years. There are no odors in the neighborhood of the plant. The residue of the burning consists of ash, amounting to about 10 percent of the volume of the incinerated wastes. The ash is buried in a sanitary landfill while experiments as to its usefulness as a component of concrete continue.

Despite the record of such incineration plants, opposition continues to rise whenever a new one is planned, usually on the grounds that it constitutes a menace to the surrounding population due to the alleged presence of dioxins and furans in the gaseous effluent. Dioxins and furans, however, although thought by many to constitute serious cancer menaces, are in the process of being stripped of that distinction; in any case, the quantities of these impurities in the emissions of a properly designed and operated incinerator are far below current standards of toleration.

Another reason for opposition to incineration is the fear that if paper is burned routinely, there will not be enough left to fill the demand for recyclable paper. But many kinds of paper, such as that used in illustrated magazines, are so heavily coated that recycling is not a real option. In fact, less than a quarter of the paper supply is realistically recyclable, which accounts for the demand for laws requiring paper users to employ at least minimal quantities of reused paper in the supplies they print on.[2]

[2]Such laws ignore economics. It is surely preferable to continue to allow paper users to decide for themselves whether it is better and cheaper to use recycled paper in their production line than to mandate a use that may actually be uneconomic. Some

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Landfills and the future

Just as the modern waste-to-energy incineration and electric-generation plant is a far cry from the old incinerator, so is the modern sanitary landfill a vast improvement over the familiar open dump. The modern landfill is developed on a geologically suitable site, not over an underground watercourse, and preferably above a naturally impermeable geological structure. The excavated landfill must be lined with a double layer of heavy plastic to prevent leachate from penetrating the earth at the sides or beneath the filled material. A system of perforated pipes gathers the leachate inside the heavy plastic membrane and conducts it to a water-purification plant.

Every day, the newly added waste material must be covered with at least ten inches of clean soil. Whenever a section of the filled material reaches the planned final elevation of the landfill, it must be covered with at least two feet of top soil, then planted with grass and trees. A system of pipes, separate from the leachate pipes, collects the methane gas created by the gradual digestion of the filled materials. In large landfills the gas is drained off and used as fuel to drive an electric-generating system serving the landfill's needs, including the power to operate the leachate purification plant.

Old landfills are being closed in many parts of the nation because they are unsatisfactory, while new, larger landfills are not being opened fast enough to replace them. The result is an apparent crisis as the older landfills still in use approach the limits of their capacity. New landfills are slow to open because prospective neighbors do not want them. The reasons for their opposition are two-fold. They fear that what they will get is the familiar open dump with all of its attendant nuisances and horrors. They also have a reason for opposition based on political-economic rationality: no one wants to live in the jurisdiction that takes in other people's garbage.

Some states, like Pennsylvania, have already passed laws that limit the acceptability of out-of-state waste in their landfills. Some localities have done the same. And at this writing Congress is con-

---

advocates of recycling argue that all they want is a level playing field on which recycling will be able to compete equally with incineration and landfilling. Obviously, the demand for legal minimums of recycled material is instead a plea for special consideration, as though the superior merit of recycling were a generally accepted given, which it is not.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sidering legislation that would permit states to impose tariffs on solid waste from other states that is disposed of within their boundaries. Much of the opposition is encouraged by the mistaken belief that, per capita, the stream of garbage is increasing at a rapid rate and threatens to become a major use of land all over the nation. Actually, the per capita rate of municipal-solid-waste production remained substantially unchanged at less than five pounds per person per day between 1960 and 1986, according to Franklin Associates' 1986 study for the EPA. Fears for the future are greatly exaggerated, according to an August 1990 article by A. Clark Wiseman in *Resources for the Future*. Wiseman predicted that all the municipal solid waste produced in the United States in the next 1,000 years could be buried to a depth of 120 feet in a square area with forty-four-mile-long sides, covering a little less than 2,000 square miles of the 3 million square miles of the United States. But the fear is real, and the resistance to the construction of modern landfills and the interstate shipment of solid waste is due at least in part to the false impression that recyling is a nice, clean—indeed, immaculate—way to get rid of all waste without leaving a trace behind.

Recycling certainly has a place in handling solid waste, and it should be the place marked out by economics, led by recycling paper, aluminum, plastics, and other products for which there is a practical market demand in the quantities that can be made available. For the balance of the waste stream, the combination of high-temperature incineration and modern landfilling is the only practical solution now in view. Any prescription that interferes with the natural economics of reuse, that favors recycling over other means of disposal on aesthetic grounds, fosters a misuse of the resources that will do mankind the most good when used in the most efficient way possible.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

America's infant-mortality puzzle

NICHOLAS EBERSTADT

DURING THE 1980s, America's infant-mortality rate (the number of children per thousand born who die in their first year of life) became a focus of increased attention, commentary, and public concern. Though the U.S. infant-mortality rate has declined steadily over the past several decades, dropping most recently from 12.6 in 1980 to 9.1 in 1990, America still has an unusually high rate in comparison with other countries.

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' *Health United States 1990* provides an official assessment of the problem. In 1987, the U.S. infant-mortality rate was reportedly higher than in twenty-three other countries or territories, including most of Western Europe, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the then-communist state of East Germany. Between 1981 and 1987, despite the continuing decline in its reported infant-mortality rate, America's international ranking fell by five places. By 1987, the U.S. infant-mortality rate was almost 20 percent higher than in Norway, nearly 50 percent higher than in the Netherlands, and fully twice as high as in Japan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

America's persistently high infant-mortality rate is conventionally attributed to two underlying factors: the prevalence of poverty and a corresponding lack of adequate health care. This view is accepted not only by many specialists in public health but also by a number of Washington policymakers. In March 1990, for instance, the chairman of the House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families opened a day of hearings on "Child Health: Lessons from Developed Nations" with this observation:

> [C]hildhood poverty, the greatest predictor of poor health among children, is worse in the United States than in most other industrialized countries. Financial barriers are the most common and significant reason that women and children do not receive the health care they need. By contrast, in Europe or Canada, no pregnant woman has to ask how, or where, she will receive prenatal care, or who will pay for it....

He suggested, moreover, that "the time ha[d] come to thoughtfully consider the practices of other comparable countries, which in many important areas are achieving better health and economic outcomes for their children and families, despite their smaller gross national product." As compelling as this may sound, however, there is reason to question whether it adequately describes the nature of the current infant-mortality problem in the United States.

Historical perspectives

In the late 1980s, America's infant-mortality rate did seem unusually high in relation to its level of per capita output (a broad but useful measure of the nation's prosperity). That circumstance, however, was by no means new. In the late 1920s, the United States had also registered an unusually high rate of infant mortality in relation to its per capita productivity. While the United States had the highest per capita output of any Western country during this time—one-third higher than Switzerland, the country with the second-highest level—its infant-mortality rate ranked near the middle. Sweden and Norway, with less than half of America's estimated level of per capita output, each reported lower rates of infant mortality than the United States between 1925 and 1929.

America's relatively high infant-mortality rate also predates the development of the modern welfare state, a fact that challenges the widespread perception that our poor performance can be traced directly to shortcomings in social services. In 1925, the welfare state was still in its infancy throughout the Western world. Sweden, the first modern state to establish such a system of social guaran-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tees, was barely through its first decade of experimentation by the mid-1920s. Social-welfare provisions were correspondingly more modest in other Western nations, yet several had distinctly lower reported infant-mortality rates than that of the United States. In the Netherlands, for example, the reported infant-mortality rate in the late 1920s was only about five-sixths the level registered in the United States, despite per capita government expenditures that were only three-fourths the contemporary American level.

It should be noted that the well-known disparity between black and white infant-mortality rates does not explain America's unfavorable standing among other Western countries throughout the century. The black infant-mortality rate in America is about twice the rate for whites. Yet the infant-mortality rate of U.S. whites alone, when compared to those of other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), dropped from sixth to fifteenth place between 1955 and 1985.

Reliability of data

How is America's comparatively high level of infant mortality to be explained? In some measure, the differential between the United States and other Western societies may be a statistical artifact.

World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines stipulate that all births showing any signs of life be included for the purposes of defining infant mortality, regardless of the duration of pregnancy or the size of the newborn. American procedures conform to these guidelines fairly rigorously. In 1988, for example, U.S. vital statistics registered almost 24,000 infants weighing less than one kilogram (about 2.2 pounds). Survival rates for this high-risk cohort are extremely low. Though the group accounted for just over one-half of one percent of that year's registered births, it accounted for over a third of registered infant deaths in 1986. In Switzerland, by contrast, an infant must be at least thirty centimeters long at birth to be counted as "living"; the restriction effectively excludes most infants weighing less than a kilogram. The country's relatively low reported rate of infant mortality reflects in part the categorical exclusion of these high-risk births.

Switzerland, moreover, is not the only Western country to enforce its own particular definition of infant deaths. In Italy, for example, there are at least three different definitions in use in different regions of the nation. A recent twenty-three-country study

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on European vital statistics concluded that "there are many indications of differences in recording and reporting live birth, fetal death, and infant death within the European region of the WHO. Even where [WHO] recommendations are adopted as the legal definition, some countries have incomplete registration or reporting...."

Further evidence of underreporting also seems apparent in the proportion of infant deaths different countries report for the first twenty-four hours after birth. In Australia, Canada, and the United States, over one-third of all infant deaths are reported to take place in the first day; in Sweden and Japan, where infant-mortality rates are currently lowest, such deaths account for about a quarter of the total. In other places, corresponding fractions are suspiciously low. Less than one-sixth of France's infant deaths are reported to occur in the first day of life. In Hong Kong, such deaths account for only one-twenty-fifth of all infant deaths.

Increased standardization of infant-mortality data would undoubtedly alter America's ranking within the OECD grouping. The potential impact of such revisions, however, should not be exaggerated. Better reporting might move the United States from the bottom third towards the middle, but no higher. Australia and Canada, whose distributions of infant death by age most closely match those of the United States, report rates markedly lower than those of America—lower, indeed, than for the U.S. white population. The comparatively poor health and survival prospects for American babies—white and black alike—still requires explanation.

Poverty and medical care

The conventional explanation for the high U.S. infant-mortality rate focuses upon poverty. According to this theory, high levels of infant mortality are a predictable consequence of the high proportion of children in poverty. Though plausible on its face, it appears to be less convincing when examined in detail.

Poverty in the United States is regularly measured by the "poverty rate," an official government index devised in the mid-1960s. (To this date, no other Western government calculates such an index for its population.) But the "poverty rate" is a poor measure of material deprivation. Deprivation is characterized, and indeed defined, by inadequate consumption. The "poverty rate," by contrast, is defined in relation to income—and then only to income in a given year. Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CES) con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics consistently indicate the actual consumption of households below the "poverty line" to be well above the average annual stated earnings and benefits—for the lowest income brackets, typically two, three, or even four times greater. This result should not be surprising: purchasing power in any given year depends not only on annual income, but upon savings, assets, loans, and a variety of other financial arrangements.

The actual spending patterns of the poor in America also raise questions about the extent to which the poor assess themselves to be materially needy. In 1988, less than one-fifth of the expenditures in households reporting annual incomes of $5,000 or less were allocated to food and beverages, even though all persons in this group were defined as "poor." A century of research on consumer spending patterns has shown that poor people tend to devote a higher percentage of their budget to food than do more affluent households. Yet the proportion of consumption allocated to food and non-alcoholic beverages was actually lower for this American "poverty" group than for the national populations of such places as Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, and Norway in 1985. All of those countries, however, had infant-mortality rates significantly lower than that reported for the United States in the mid- and late-1980s, despite spending patterns that suggest greater material need.

Whatever the limitations of the American "poverty line" as an index of deprivation, researchers have attempted to apply it to other Western societies. The results are intriguing. According to one such effort, child-poverty rates in 1980 were virtually identical in Australia and the United States, yet America's infant-mortality rate at the time was almost one-fifth higher. For white Americans, the child-poverty rate was lower than for Australians (13.6 percent versus 16.9 percent), yet the infant-mortality rate was higher (11 per 1,000 versus 10 per 1,000). Conversely, while white Americans in 1980 reported a much higher rate of child poverty than West Germans, their infant-mortality rate was actually slightly lower. In view of the purportedly strong correlation between child poverty and infant mortality, such inexact correspondences are surprising.

By the same token, the case against the availability and adequacy of American health care looks less compelling when examined in its particulars. An international comparison of perinatal mortality rates and their components attests to this.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Perinatal mortality refers to fetal deaths that occur after twenty-eight weeks or more gestation and to infant deaths that take place within seven days of birth. Data comparing birth-weight distribution and perinatal mortality in Japan, Norway, and the U.S. for the early 1980s are available from the International Collaborative Effort on Perinatal and Infant Mortality (ICE). These figures reveal a surprising finding: at any given birth weight, perinatal mortality rates in Norway and Japan were significantly higher than for American babies, whether white or black. If Japanese babies had enjoyed U.S. birth-weight-specific survival odds, their perinatal-mortality rate would have been cut by over a third. This fact is all the more striking because Japan already reports virtually the lowest perinatal-mortality rates in the world.

While biological, social, and economic factors undoubtedly affect the perinatal-mortality rate, the quality of medical care is commonly the decisive factor—especially for high-risk infants at low birth weights. Compared with other Western societies enjoying especially low rates of infant mortality, American babies at any given birth weight appear to have unusually good chances of surviving the perinatal period, regardless of race. All other things being equal, this would seem to suggest that medical care for infants in the United States is actually better than in some other advanced industrial societies.

Biological and behavioral factors

As is widely known, the proportion of low-birth-weight babies in the U.S. black population is extremely high compared to virtually every other Western population. What may be less known is the extent to which white babies in the United States suffer from low birth weight. Even though the median birth weight is currently lower in Japan than in the United States, white American babies have nearly twice as high an incidence of low birth weight. To understand the nature of the American mortality problem, then, one must account for the high incidence of high-risk, low-weight births for black and white Americans alike.

Although controversial, the theory that the extremely high incidence of low birth weight in the American black population may be due in part to biological factors cannot yet be dismissed. Even after controlling for mothers' age, education, and income, the proportion of low-birth-weight babies is roughly twice as high for blacks as for whites. Recent research suggests the same may be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

true when one controls for the number of visits for prenatal medical care.

Whatever the proportion of low-birth-weight differentials that proves to be attributable to biological factors, it is apparent that parental attitudes and behavior have an influence on a child's chances of being born at a low birth weight (see Table I). In 1982, the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) conducted an extensive survey on pregnancy and child health in the United States. Among its objectives was to collect data on the correlates of low birth weight. According to its findings, there was no measurable difference in the incidence of low birth weight for white infants born into families above or below an income line set at 150 percent of the poverty rate (though poverty was associated with higher low-birth-weight rates for blacks).

Table I. Estimated Proportion of Low-Birth-Weight Babies:[a] Single Live Births, 1982, by Selected Maternal Characteristics[b]

	All Races	White	Black
All births	6.6	5.6	12.2
Family Income			
—149 percent of poverty line or less	7.7	5.6	12.9
—150 percent or more of poverty line	6.2	5.6	11.4
Mother did not smoke during pregnancy	4.2	3.3	9.0
Fifteen or more cigarettes per day	12.9	12.6	18.6
Child wanted at time of conception	5.8	5.3	10.2
Mistimed or unwanted	7.9	6.2	13.6

[a]Low birth weight defined as 2500 grams or less.

[b]*Source*: E.R. Pamuk and W.D. Mosher, *Health Aspects of Pregnancy and Childbirth, United States, 1982* (Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics, Series 23, No. 16, 1988), pp. 52-53.

While no measurable differences in the incidence of low birth weight by income were reported for white infants, they were about one-sixth more likely to be born into this high-risk group if their parents described them as "mistimed or unwanted at conception" rather than "wanted at conception." Black babies who were described as "mistimed or unwanted" were one-third more likely to be born at low birth weight than those described as "wanted at conception."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Even greater differences were associated with cigarette smoking. Among women who reported smoking fifteen or more cigarettes per day during pregnancy, the incidence of low birth weight was two times greater for blacks and nearly four times greater for whites than among self-described non-smokers. At a time when American doctors routinely and forcefully recommend against smoking during pregnancy, the decision to smoke heavily during pregnancy may be taken as a proxy for a set of parental attitudes and practices that do not bode well for the infant's general well-being.

Illegitimacy

Another proxy for behavior and attitudes that affect the health of an infant may be the decision to bear a child out of wedlock. The incidence of low birth weight is consistently, and often considerably, higher for illegitimate babies, irrespective of the age or race of the mother. In fact, so substantial are the differentials associated with illegitimacy that an American baby born to a teenage mother is less likely to be born at low birth weight if the mother is married and black than if she is unmarried and white.

Among American public-health specialists, it is commonly held that the association between illegitimacy and higher rates of infant mortality is spurious. A 1990 "editorial note" in the Centers for Disease Control's *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report* (MMWR), stated that "the marital status of the mother confers neither risk nor protection to the infant; rather, the principal benefits of marriage to infant survival are economic and social support." In the recent past, when few data were available on the social correlates of illegitimacy in America, such a viewpoint was perhaps intuitively plausible. In light of newly gathered data, however, it no longer looks so tenable.

Since the early 1980s, the NCHS has been conducting a project linking births and infant deaths for the entire country, and tabulating data on infant deaths against various maternal characteristics. An eight-state pilot survey in 1982 cross-tabulated infant-mortality rates not only against the race and age of the mother, but also against her marital status and level of education (see Table II). According to these data, infant-mortality rates for white mothers over age twenty were higher for unmarried but college-educated women than for married high school—or even grade school—dropouts. The same pattern held true among black mothers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table II. Infant-Mortality Rates by Race, Education, and Marital Status for Women Age Twenty Years or Older: Eight Pilot States,[a] United States, 1982 Birth Cohort (per 1,000 live births)[b]

Years of Education	All Races	White	Black
All Women	**10.5**	**9.0**	**21.9**
— 0 to 8 years	13.0	12.0	27.5
— 9 to 11 years	16.7	12.9	29.1
— 12 years	10.1	8.8	20.0
— 13 to 15 years	9.5	8.1	18.6
— 16+ years	8.6	7.9	20.6
Married Women	**9.1**	**8.4**	**18.2**
— 0 to 8 years	11.1	10.6	24.5
— 9 to 11 years	12.4	11.1	24.9
— 12 years	8.9	8.4	16.4
— 13 to 15 years	8.5	7.8	16.8
— 16+ years	8.3	7.9	19.2
Unmarried Women	**20.7**	**16.2**	**25.2**
— 0 to 8 years	20.7	18.1	29.8
— 9 to 11 years	24.9	19.2	30.7
— 12 years	18.6	14.6	23.1
— 13 to 15 years	18.9	15.1	20.9
— 16+ years	18.4	11.6	26.8

[a]The eight pilot states include Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wisconsin. "All races" includes races other than white and black.

[b]*Source*: National Center for Health Statistics, Pilot Linked Birth and Infant Death File, unpublished data.

In the past, Census Bureau reports on poverty have not disaggregated poverty rates for various types of families by the educational level of the household head. For the first time, however, the 1988 report on poverty in America did. According to its findings, the 1988 poverty rate for households with children headed by a white woman with a year or more of college education was 18.1 percent. By contrast, the corresponding poverty rate for two-parent families headed by a person with less than a high school education was estimated to be 19.0 percent. For black Americans, the findings were similar: corresponding family-poverty rates were reported to be 24.3 percent and 28.0 percent, respectively. These categories do not correspond precisely with the categories outlined in Table II nor, of course, to the year in question. Even so, they would seem to challenge the presumption that poverty, as officially defined, would explain the high rates of infant mortality for educated but unmarried mothers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Parental practices and infant health

Such findings are broadly consistent with other recent data that have been compiled on the health of American children. In analyzing the results of the NCHS's 1988 *National Health Interview Survey on Child Health*, for example, NCHS researcher Deborah Dawson found that "health vulnerability ... scores were elevated" for children in single-parent homes, even after controlling for race, income, and maternal education.

Why should the health of infants and children in single-parent homes be worse than what race, age, education, or income would seem to predict? Such differentials may be partly explained by the attitude of single parents toward the care and treatment of offspring. For all mothers, the number of maternal visits for prenatal care during the course of pregnancy may be used as a serviceable, if imperfect, indicator of such attitudes. Unpublished data from the NCHS's "Linked Birth and Infant Death Files" show a strong correlation between infant-mortality rates and the numbers of prenatal medical visits by the pregnant mother (see Table III).

Table III. Infant-Mortality Rates by Race of Mother and Number of Prenatal Visits: United States, 1986 Birth Cohort (deaths per 1,000 live births)[a]

Number of Prenatal Visits	White	Black
Total	8.6	18.1
No Visits	31.2	56.5
1-4 Visits	39.2	49.8
5-8 Visits	15.8	20.2
9-12 Visits	5.2	8.8
13-16 Visits	4.1	7.4
17 Visits or More	6.3	8.2

[a]*Source*: National Center for Health Statistics, Linked Birth and Infant Death File, unpublished data.

In 1986, infant mortality among blacks who reported no visits for prenatal medical care was over three times the U.S. black national average. Among whites, the infant-mortality rate for such mothers was three-and-a-half times the corresponding national average. For both black and white infants, infant-mortality rates were over seven times higher among mothers who sought or received no prenatal care than for those reporting thirteen to sixteen prenatal visits. Although overall infant-mortality rates were over twice as high for blacks as whites in 1986, infant-mortality

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rates for black mothers who reported thirteen to sixteen prenatal medical visits were actually lower than the white national average.

Of course, education and income levels probably correlate positively with the number of prenatal medical visits a mother makes. Maternal age may also be a factor. And some high-risk premature births may be associated with fewer prenatal visits simply by virtue of their shorter gestation period. Nevertheless, the relationship between infant mortality and the frequency of prenatal medical visits is so robust that a strong correspondence may be expected to remain even after controlling for such exogenous influences.

A parent's interest in prenatal care suggests a broader set of outlooks and practices. Unmarried mothers are decidedly less likely to seek medical care for the infants they are bearing during the course of their pregnancy. In 1987 illegitimate black babies were nearly four times as likely to have received no prenatal care as black babies born in wedlock. Illegitimate white infants were about five times as likely to have received no prenatal care as white babies born in wedlock. Although further research will be required to answer the question conclusively, it seems unlikely that social and economic factors alone could account for such disparities.

Indeed, illegitimacy has played a role in retarding improved prenatal care. According to a recent supplement to the NCHS's *Monthly Vital Statistics Report* (MVSR), "much of the lack of improvement in early receipt of prenatal care (between 1979 and 1988) is associated with the increasing proportion of births to unmarried mothers who are less likely than married mothers to begin care early."

Since 1960, childbearing in the United States has been profoundly affected by a sweeping change in patterns of illegitimacy. Although fewer children were born in 1988 than in 1960, the number of births reported for unmarried mothers rose at an average pace of over 5 percent a year over this period. By 1988, over one-quarter of all births in America were to unmarried women. As the MVSR noted, the profile of the unmarried mother has changed with the increase in illegitimate births:

> [In 1988] increases were greater for white women, continuing a pattern that has been observed in recent years.... Rates of nonmarital childbearing and proportions of nonmarital births among black women continue to be substantially higher than among white women. In recent years, however, because the increases have been much more rapid for white than black women, the differentials by race have diminished.... In recent years ... the largest increases in nonmarital childbearing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> have occurred among relatively older women. One third of unmarried mothers were 25 years and older in 1988 as compared with 24 percent in 1980.... The pattern of more rapid increases in rates for older than for younger unmarried mothers is generally replicated in rates for white and black women, but the pace of increase has been greater for white women.

By 1988, black teenage mothers accounted for less than one-seventh of the illegitimate births in the United States. Nearly one-quarter of the children born to white women in their early twenties were out of wedlock. And although illegitimacy ratios varied considerably by state, in every state unmarried mothers accounted for at least 10 percent of the total white births.

Compared with some other Western societies, of course, illegit*imacy ratios in the United States today are not exceptional.* Illegitimacy has been reported on the rise in virtually all Western countries over the past generation. While the reported ratios in the United States in the late 1980s were over twice as high as in West Germany, and over four times as high as in Italy, they were roughly the same as in France and the United Kingdom and less than half that of Sweden—the society with the lowest reported infant-mortality rate in Europe.

Different patterns of parental behavior, however, appear to be associated with illegitimacy in Sweden and in the United States. In Sweden, despite a reported illegitimacy ratio of almost 50 percent, only 17 percent of family households in 1988 were single-parent households; consensual unions or cohabitation appear to be common. The United States, with 23 percent of all families with children in single-parent households in 1988, appears to have the highest proportion of such families of any major Western country—a pattern that has characterized the United States since the 1960s.

Local-level data

The contribution of parental behavior or life styles to higher levels of infant mortality is further emphasized by an examination of local-level data. Considerable variations both in socioeconomic characteristics and patterns of family formation are reported among the fifty states and the District of Columbia. These variations tend to highlight underlying nationwide patterns.

In the mid-1980s, the unweighted average rate of infant mortality for the five areas reporting the highest levels was over 60 percent higher than for the five lowest. Per capita personal income,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

however, was officially estimated to be greater in the areas with the higher reported rates of infant mortality than in the states with the lowest reported rates. Indeed, per capita personal income in the lowest infant-mortality states was officially estimated to be below the national average, and above the national average in the highest infant-mortality areas. On the other hand, differences in illegitimacy ratios correspond directly with state-level differences in infant mortality: the unweighted average illegitimacy rate for the five highest infant-mortality areas in the mid-1980s was over twice as high as for the five lowest infant-mortality states.

Data from the 1980 U.S. Census were somewhat more comprehensive. Characteristics conventionally thought to explain the health differential seem to offer little insight into the gap between high and low infant-mortality states. For 1979-1981, the estimated family-poverty rate for the five highest infant-mortality states was higher for the high infant-mortality group, but it was also above the national average for the states with the lowest infant-mortality rates. Similarly, although unemployment rates were on average slightly lower for the low infant-mortality states, they were no higher than the national average for the group with the highest rates of infant mortality. On the other hand, the proportion of children receiving government benefits through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program corresponds directly with infant-mortality differences. The AFDC program is itself significant, insofar as it has become a vehicle for financing illegitimacy and maintaining the families of unmarried mothers. By 1987, over half the children receiving AFDC benefits qualified for the program because their parents were unmarried; their total numbers would account for over nine-tenths of all children for American never-married mothers.

It is quite possible that race plays a confounding role in these state-level comparisons, given that black Americans—whose high infant-mortality rates might skew overall data considerably—constitute a widely varying proportion of the total population of the different states. 1980 Census data allow us to compare high and low infant-mortality areas within the American black population by itself (see Table IV). For the five states reporting the lowest rates of black infant mortality, the unweighted average was less than three-fifths the level of the high-mortality group. Median family income was virtually identical for the high and low infant-mortality groups, and above the black national average for both.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While the family-poverty rate was notably lower for the low infant-mortality group, it was also distinctly below the black national average in the high infant-mortality group. Median years of education of the household head was above the black national average for both groups. A distinct difference between the two groups, however, was in illegitimacy ratios: in 1980, the proportion of children born out of wedlock in the highest infant-mortality areas was 150 percent higher than in the lowest infant-mortality states. The illegitimacy ratio in the highest infant-mortality areas, moreover, was significantly higher than the black national average.

Table IV. Characteristics of Children, Families, and Persons in States with Highest and Lowest Reported Black Infant-Mortality Rates c. 1980[a]

	Infant Mortality (per 1,000)	Median Income (1980 dollars)	Family Poverty Rate (percent)	Median Education (years)	Illegitimacy Rate (percent)
Lowest					
Hawaii	11.4	12,764	11.5	12.9	11.4
Washington	14.9	15,833	17.3	12.7	40.7
Colorado	15.4	15,732	18.7	12.7	40.3
Mass.	16.4	13,249	23.8	12.4	52.9
California	17.1	14,887	26.7	12.6	52.8
Unweighted average	15.0	14,493	16.4	12.7	39.6
Highest					
Delaware	27.4	13,127	25.1	12.0	66.1
District of Columbia	26.3	16,362	18.6	12.2	64.3
Illinois	25.9	14,478	27.0	12.2	66.0
Michigan	24.0	15,817	23.5	12.2	52.7
W. Virginia	23.2	12,318	21.4	12.1	52.0
Unweighted average	25.4	14,420	23.1	12.1	60.2
U.S. average	21.0	12,598	26.5	12.0	55.3

[a]*Sources*: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 1979 Recipient Characteristics Study; Part 1: *Demographic and Program Statistics* (March 1982), p. 37; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *State and Metropolitan Area Data Book 1986*, p. 509; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Health United States 1984* (Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics, 1989), p. 55; U.S. Department of Commerce, *1980 Census of Population* (Washington, DC: Bureau of the Census, 1981), various volumes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The limits of policy interventions

If parental life styles and family-formation patterns play a direct and important role in determining infant survival chances, the prospects for reducing American infant-mortality rates through government income support and health-care policies may be less substantial than is sometimes supposed. Given the complex interactions between illegitimacy and infant mortality, for example, estimating the extent to which expanding AFDC eligibility might reduce infant-mortality rates would be an intricate calculation.

Parallel questions arise about the expansion of public health-care programs. It is widely argued today that poorer Americans have inadequate access to health care. In much of this discussion, however, a critical distinction has been obscured: the difference between availability and utilization. As long as health-care treatment is a voluntary option for the potential patient—or the potential patient's parents—utilization will depend not only upon availability, but also upon the attitudes, inclinations, and preferences of individual decisionmakers.

These attitudes and preferences bring an interesting perspective to the current debate about "affordability" of health care in contemporary America. In 1985-1987, according to a recently released NCHS study, white children averaged 4.5 physician contacts a year—over three-fifths more than black children (see Table V). The difference is not totally explained by "poverty" or income level. Black families were on average poorer than white families, and more affluent families tended to have more physician contact for their children. But the average number of physician contacts was higher for whites at every income level. For families with incomes of $35,000 or more, for example, white children averaged 5.0 contacts a year—50 percent more than black children in the same income grouping. Distinctions were even more dramatic for children whose health parents described as fair or poor. In this group, white children averaged two-and-a-half times more physician contacts than black children; in families with incomes above $35,000, white children averaged nearly three times as many contacts with physicians as their black counterparts. It is true that black families tend to have much lower net financial worth than white ones, and health-care decisions may be affected to some degree by a family's wealth. For whatever reason, though, it would appear that white parents found health care to be more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"affordable" for their children than relatively well-off black parents.

Table V. Average Number of Physician Contacts for American Children under Eighteen Years of Age by Selected Characteristics: 1985-1987[a]

	White	Black
All Children	4.5	2.8
Family Income		
— under $10,000	4.4	3.2
— $10,000 to $19,999	4.1	2.5
— $20,000 to $34,999	4.7	2.8
— $35,000 or more	5.0	3.3
Poverty Status		
— in poverty	3.9	3.1
— not in poverty	4.7	2.8
Children Assessed in Fair or Poor Health	15.5	6.5
Family Income		
— under $10,000	13.6	6.2
— $10,000 to $19,999	12.8	6.8
— $20,000 to $34,999	19.6	11.3
— $35,000 or more	21.0	7.1
Poverty Status		
— in poverty	13.0	7.0
— not in poverty	17.5	7.0

[a]*Source*: P. Ries, *Health of Black and White Americans, 1985-87* (Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics, Series 10, No. 171, 1990), pp. 58, 62.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) reveals still more about popular perceptions of the "affordability" of current health-care services. Table VI details reported expenditures in 1988 on health care, entertainment, alcohol, and tobacco for households reporting incomes of less than $20,000 by age of household head. Generally speaking, households in this lower half of the income scale indicated that they could "afford" to spend several times as much on entertainment, alcohol, and tobacco as on health care. It is hard to know exactly how much confidence to place in such reported expenditures; for one thing, many respondents have received free health care under the Medicaid program. But it would appear that among these households the income elasticity of expenditure was substantially higher

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for health care than for entertainment, alcohol, and tobacco. To judge by the preferences revealed in this survey, lower-income consumers seemed to treat health care as an optional but dispensable luxury good, whereas they appeared to regard entertainment, alcohol, and tobacco as necessities "affordable" at any level of household income.

Table VI. Patterns of Consumer Expenditure by Reported Household Income and Age of Head of Household (1988 U.S. Dollars)[a]

	Less than $5,000	$5,000-$9,999	$10,000-$14,999	$15,000-$19,000
Under 25 Years				
Health Expenditures	177	207	484	625
Entertainment	450	649	896	1,053
Alcohol and Tobacco	282	465	529	614
25 to 34 Years				
Health Expenditures	247	349	471	613
Entertainment	510	496	796	1,007
Alcohol and Tobacco	359	461	472	574
35 to 44 Years				
Health Expenditures	749	448	808	957
Entertainment	595	564	786	1,002
Alcohol and Tobacco	419	454	403	512
Ratio of Expenditures on Entertainment, Alcohol and Tobacco to Health Care (Health Care = 100)				
Under 25 Years	414	538	294	267
25 to 34 Years	352	274	269	258
35 to 44 Years	135	227	147	158

[a]*Source*: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, unpublished tables.

As long as health-care treatment is the prerogative of the patient—or the patient's parents—some fraction of the population will always deem treatment to be "unaffordable," regardless of its actual nominal cost. In such circumstances, the only way to ensure adequate coverage would be to deny the patient his or her option over treatment—for example, by making routine assessments mandatory, independent of the preference of the patient, and proscribing nonnegotiable therapies on their basis. One may doubt that such a proposal would be favorably received by the American public at large.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

More than in many other societies, Americans pay close attention to their individual freedoms and rights. For better or worse, one of those rights—within very broad limits—is the right to be a negligent parent. One may feel that too many parents and parents-to-be misuse this particular freedom. Yet simple governmental remedies to the injuries possible under these liberties are not immediately evident. Even when American parents are demonstrably abusive to their children, the state's options are limited and hardly ideal; can the state proceed more confidently against parents who merely expose their fetuses or infants to *potential* risks without malice aforethought? It is far from obvious what role public policy should play in this problem if it aims to avoid creating new injuries in the course of redressing existing ones.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Language choice for Latino students

ROSALIE PEDALINO PORTER

THE SCHOOL CHOICE movement has advanced throughout the nation in recent years, permitting more children to attend schools that appear best-suited to their needs. Despite this progress, however, the families of Latino students with limited English proficiency are still being denied a fundamental choice in their children's schooling—the right to choose programs featuring intensive English-language instruction rather than segregated classrooms where Spanish is the norm. Sadly, a coalition of Latino activists, bilingual-education advocates, and well-intentioned but misguided policymakers has either prevented Latino families from exercising any choice or has heavily pressured them to enroll their children in native-language programs that have proven to be largely unsuccessful.

Since 1968, the Bilingual Education Act has provided federal funds for special programs helping non-native speakers learn English for school purposes. The act typically has been implemented via an approach known as "transitional bilingual education," which requires that regular school subjects be taught in the students' native language for several years, with English lessons as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

part of the curriculum. This method, by most reliable measures, has neither improved the academic success of Latino students nor reduced their dropout rate, which is the highest in the country. Latino parents, nevertheless, are still generally denied access to the English-immersion programs that have shown success in addressing two of their children's most vital needs—acquiring English for social and academic purposes and integrating with their English-speaking peers in mainstream classrooms.

What is at issue here is not only the narrowing of educational opportunity for another generation of Latino students but also the resulting lack of English-literate citizens to satisfy the future economic needs of this country. While the link between poor English-language skills and low wages has been established by numerous studies, it is less well known that there are no important earnings differences between Hispanic males who are English-proficient and Anglo males. The damaging effects of not learning the national language early and well are confirmed by an analysis of 1980 Census data prepared by sociologists Frank Bean and Marta Tienda for the Russell Sage Foundation. They conclude that "non-English-speaking Hispanic students are three or four times more likely than Hispanics who speak English to drop out of school before graduation."

More recent support for this conclusion came in 1988 from the U.S. Department of Education's National Assessment of Educational Progress, which included an extensive study of Asian-American and Latino student achievement. The study reported that Latino students who claimed competence in English performed relatively well on the tests, even if they spoke Spanish at home. The study asserted that "whether or not one comes from a home where a different language is frequently spoken is not an important issue in itself, but whether or not one is competent in English is.... The development of English competency should be of high priority within school systems."

Are Latino students being offered the best options? In this area of public education, there are distinctly different school programs that produce different results for students and, more widely, different consequences for the future economic and sociopolitical development of this country. We need to know why real choice between predominantly Spanish- or English-language instruction is rarely offered and how this situation has been allowed to prevail.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Immersion's advantages

Advocates of bilingual education routinely argue that English-immersion programs place children in a classroom where they do not understand the language and receive no special help. This is a false claim. Responsible educators and parents nationwide agree that limited-English students need special help for a short period of time when they first enter a U.S. school, at whatever age, in order to acquire the language of the classroom well enough to learn school subjects taught in that language. Earlier generations of immigrants, myself included, were expected to "pick up" the new language without help, join in the lessons, or leave school for an unskilled job. Late twentieth-century industrial societies cannot afford such a laissez-faire educational policy.

Other multilingual countries—such as Germany, Sweden, the Soviet Union, Israel, Australia, and Canada—have tried various approaches to the schooling of their language-minority children to help them overcome the language barrier. Among the most successful efforts have been the French-immersion programs in Quebec. Hundreds of thousands of children from English-speaking homes have been educated in French under this system and become fluent and literate in this second language. Why has the Canadian experiment been more successful than bilingual-education programs in the United States? Are such immersion programs being offered in this country?

Early immersion in a second language, preferably between ages three and five, gives a child the greatest opportunity to learn native pronunciation as well as the potential to read and write competently in that language. Linguists agree that the longer the learning of a second language is delayed, the harder it is to achieve a high level of fluency. Two other educational principles also apply here. "Time-on-task" dictates that the rate of success in learning a subject is directly proportional to the time spent studying that particular subject; that is, students who are taught math for an hour daily will learn more math than students who are taught math for only thirty minutes three days a week. Learning school subjects in the new language, using simple English at first, allows the student to advance in subject matter and language skills at the same time, in what educators call "content-based language learning." This com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bination is the key element that English-immersion programs in the U.S. have borrowed from the successful Canadian experiment.

English-immersion programs require trained teachers, special textbooks, and a curriculum with the twin goals of rapid second-language learning and the active integration of all students in an English-speaking community. The combination of special opportunities for practicing English in both social and academic situations allows students to be immersed in the mainstream and to acquire skills appropriate to their age level within an average of two years. If the federal government had pursued an even-handed policy of funding different types of programs from the beginning—that is, from the passage of the first Bilingual Education Act in 1968—many more school districts would certainly have chosen to provide immersion programs. It was only in 1988 that Congress revised the original law to increase funding for alternative programs from 4 percent to 25 percent of federal bilingual-education funds.

Promising experiments

English-immersion programs in the United States are growing and have begun producing evidence that they work for Latino students. El Paso, Texas, began a five-year experimental immersion project in 1985. Twelve-hundred students were enrolled in the English-immersion classrooms and compared with a control group of the same number of students in a traditional bilingual program. All children in this study were of limited-English ability when they entered kindergarten. The immersion students outscored students in the bilingual program at every grade level in English reading and writing, both groups scored at the same level in math, and immersion students scored above grade level on state tests in science and social studies. A majority of teachers and principals involved in this experiment indicated that the immersion program was the more effective approach to educating language-minority students. Dr. Rosita Apodaca, former El Paso school administrator and designer of the immersion project, reported an additional, unanticipated benefit. When the immersion students in third grade were given Spanish reading lessons as an enrichment, they were quickly able to read in their native language, disproving the oft-repeated claim of bilingual-education supporters that immersion programs deprive minority children of their native language and culture.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since 1969, the most comprehensive study of English immersion for Latino students has been in progress in Uvalde, Texas. Spanish-speaking students from low-income families who participate in this program routinely achieve grade-level scores in English reading, writing, and math within three years, an unusual achievement for disadvantaged children even without the language barrier. Follow-up studies show that immersion students in grade six, three years after leaving the special program, are still maintaining good grades; in grade nine they maintain better-than-average attendance; and compared to students in the bilingual program they are more likely to complete high school and less likely to repeat a grade.

The Dade County, Florida, school district, with one of the largest concentrations of Latino students in the country, recently published the results of a three-year study that addressed the same basic question: Will first- and second-grade students with limited English skills when they start kindergarten have greater success in learning school subjects if they are taught in Spanish or in English? One-half of the 508 students were taught in an English-immersion program from the first day of kindergarten; the other half were enrolled in the existing bilingual program with most of the instruction in Spanish. Comparing test scores over the three-year period in math, science, and social studies, researchers found no difference in subject-matter learning between the two groups, demolishing the claim that teaching children in their native language is essential for their cognitive development. Not surprisingly, the English-immersion students were more advanced in their fluency and literacy in English. A student survey revealed that those who had been taught entirely in English had a very positive attitude towards school and had self-esteem levels similar to those of students taught in Spanish. Clearly, from both an educational and psychological standpoint, instruction in the native language added no benefits.

This measurement of student attitudes counters the contention of bilingual-education advocates that Latino children need to be taught in Spanish to promote self-esteem and to improve school achievement. No reliable studies have been published showing a clear causal connection between ethnic pride and better school performance, though this flawed hypothesis explains the current enthusiasm for curriculum revisions designed to reduce the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Eurocentric" focus of our schools. What has been proven, in fact, is the reverse: that school achievement leads to self-esteem.

Language and civil rights

One of the first school districts to challenge the assumption that bilingual education works best for students with limited English was Fairfax County, Virginia, which won a landmark decision from the Office of Civil Rights in 1980. With 133,000 students, it is one of the ten largest school districts in the United States and currently enrolls 5,000 limited-English students from seventy-five different language backgrounds. In the late 1960s Fairfax started native-language instruction for its Spanish-speaking and Korean students. After six years, it determined that children in these programs were not making adequate progress in learning English. Fairfax therefore decided to provide an intensive English-as-a-Second-Language (ESL) program instead and voluntarily reported its plan to the Office of Bilingual Education in Washington. The U.S. Office of Civil Rights (OCR) decided to monitor the Fairfax program to determine whether its language-minority students were being denied an equal education. (In 1974 the Supreme Court had ruled in *Lau* v. *Nichols* that school districts must help students with limited English participate in the educational system in order to comply with Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.) After five years of close scrutiny, the OCR decided that Fairfax was not violating the civil rights of its students, even though it was not teaching them in their native languages. This decision rests on the documented evidence that the students are learning both English and school subjects, that they are performing at grade level in the regular classroom after two years in the ESL program, and that the school district provides a trained professional staff, a well-developed curriculum, and a high level of funding for this program. The true measure of the program's effectiveness lies in the achievement of the students themselves and not in the single superficial litmus test of native-language use.

Notwithstanding the impressive results of these English immersion programs, Latino advocacy groups such as the National Council of La Raza, Multicultural Education, Training, and Advocacy (META), and Aspira (a Puerto Rican organization), persist in denouncing immersion programs for violating students' civil rights, harming the Latino child's self-respect, and destroying Latino cul-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ture. None of these claims is warranted. The heated rhetoric of the activists is evident in the opposition of the National Association for Bilingual Education (NABE) to Head Start programs for Latino children when the teaching is not done in Spanish. NABE actually warns Latino families not to allow their children to participate in this early childhood program for disadvantaged youngsters because, in the words of NABE's director, James Lyons, "the immersion of such children in English programs at the age of three or four presents the risk of grave psychological harm.... At root, they are being taught to disrespect their parents."

Since the Latino leadership fought for Spanish-language programs, federal funding and state laws have almost exclusively supported this approach. Teachers' lobbying groups have aggressively pushed this agenda in order to promote jobs and funding for bilingual programs. Finally, teachers and school authorities, on much hope and little evidence, have been convinced that bilingual education is especially suitable for Spanish-speaking children. These factors allowed the early establishment of an education bureaucracy—administrators, teachers, and specialists, all with a stake in maintaining and expanding programs—that became implacably resistant to change. Firmly entrenched, bilingual educators strongly oppose giving parents a choice between native-language and English-immersion programs.

Native language or nothing

Persuaded by some teachers and community leaders that native-language instruction is in their children's best interests, Latino parents enroll their children in these programs, often not knowing what bilingual education is, not knowing the poor results of bilingual programs over the past twenty years, and not knowing that other approaches are possible. Latino students with limited English proficiency are routinely assigned to classes where they will be taught mostly in Spanish for a number of years; their parents are notified only after the fact. In other cases, when parents actually ask for an English-language program for their children, they are told that if they do not choose the bilingual program their children will receive no special help at all and will have to suffer the consequences.

California is a stark example of a state where choice is purportedly available but in practice is only narrowly permitted. The state

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

law requiring bilingual education expired in 1987. Nevertheless, the California Department of Education continues to pressure school districts to provide native-language instruction for limited-English students, even when parents express a clear preference for alternative programs and the teachers themselves register their dissatisfaction with bilingual education. David Dolson of the California Bilingual Education Office, while denying that his office exerts any pressure for native-language instruction, acknowledges that out of 850 school districts enrolling limited-English students, only six have approval for alternative programs that do not use the native language.

In Los Angeles, authorities have ignored the recommendations of their own professional educators in making policy decisions. A 1988 member survey conducted by United Teachers of Los Angeles, the local teachers' union, revealed that teachers were opposed to bilingual education by more than three to one, preferring instead English-language programs. Despite the survey results, a new "Bilingual Master Plan" was imposed on the city's schools, requiring even more teaching in the native language and less use of English. Indeed, Los Angeles now recruits Spanish-speaking teachers from other countries and pays them a $5,000 bonus even though they may know little English and are often unable to pass the state teacher's exam. Hiring unqualified teachers on this preferential basis not only adversely affects the morale of other professionals but will, in the opinion of Los Angeles Teachers' Union president Helen Bernstein, "lower teaching standards and hurt students trying to learn English."

Bilingual monopoly

In sixteen states, education laws dictate bilingual programs exclusively. An example from Massachusetts is typical. The city of Lawrence, with a student population that is 60 percent Spanish-speaking, has provided a bilingual program for twenty years. It has failed to help students learn English and their school subjects adequately. School authorities are searching for new approaches, but the state has been uncooperative. When a state education official was asked if families could be allowed to choose a special English program instead of continuing Spanish-language instruction, her reply was, "We don't have to offer them a menu of choices. They can have the bilingual program or nothing." Mrs. Sylvia Mejia, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

first bilingual teacher hired in Lawrence in 1970, took a courageous step towards publicizing the Lawrence dilemma. She testified before a National Hispanic Task Force hearing in Boston in April 1990 that "students are spending too much time being taught in Spanish. Give them an intensive English program and maybe one or two courses in Spanish and I'll guarantee you they will be able to be mainstreamed into all-English classes within two years." There is little hope, however, that her recommendations will be adopted since the Massachusetts bilingual-education law is inflexible and the city of Lawrence, without state funds, does not have the resources to initiate English-immersion programs.

In contrast to the no-choice states there is the example of Maryland, where bilingual education does not yet dominate the system. Here parents and school authorities are choosing English-language instruction. In the Montgomery County public schools a few years ago, the growing number of limited-English students prompted the district to survey 130 Latino parents and 210 limited-English, Spanish-speaking high school students. When asked what they would choose if offered instruction mostly in their native language, instruction half in their native language and half in English, or instruction entirely in English, 99 percent of the parents and 96 percent of the students chose the all-English option. This outcome surprised the teaching staff, who expected more support for bilingual classes. Steven Frankel, who prepared the report for the school district, argued that the evidence showed very clearly that "students themselves favor English instruction and parents don't want their kids segregated into classes where they speak only their native language." The Montgomery County School District was able to follow the definitive choice of parents and students in its program planning because it is neither under state mandate nor answerable to a bilingual-education bureaucracy.

Limitations of choice

Of course, in some cases a choice-based program will not result in a preference for English-based instruction. The Berkeley, California, Unified School District is one of the few school systems in the country that offers a choice of two distinct programs. Here, bilingual-education teachers exert a strong influence on parental decisions. Responding to the expressed wishes of the language-minority community, Berkeley has offered a bilingual program

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from kindergarten through grade six for 200 Spanish-speaking students, and special English-immersion classes for another 400 students, mostly Asians. A 1987 parent-attitude survey of Latino families reveals why 75 percent of Latino limited-English students are enrolled in the bilingual program and not in English-immersion classes. One-third of the families wanted bilingual education for home language and culture maintenance, even though their children were mostly fluent in English; one-fourth wanted bilingual education because they were told it is the best way to learn English; and the rest said they did not want their children in bilingual programs for any reason. Although 55 percent chose bilingual education, an additional 20 percent of the families apparently bowed to teacher pressure and enrolled their children in the Spanish Bilingual Program despite initially favoring English immersion. It is my firm belief that if parents are provided with reliable information about the successes of English-immersion programs, over time many will favor such programs when given a choice.

Two recent cases in federal court, the critical one involving Berkeley, have begun to reverse the tide that favors native-language teaching. In 1987 META initiated a suit against Berkeley on behalf of twelve students. Its intent was to require native-language instruction for all limited-English students, from kindergarten to twelfth grade, whether the parents wanted such instruction or not. The plaintiffs' lawyers in the *Teresa P. et al.* v. *Berkeley Unified School District* case alleged that any approach other than native-language instruction violates civil-rights law. After a five-week trial in the fall of 1988, in which I and others testified as expert witnesses on behalf of the Berkeley schools, Judge D. Lowell Jensen ruled in favor of Berkeley's choice plan and concluded that the proponents of exclusive native-language instruction had "utterly failed to sustain their burden of proof."

Having observed the resolution of the Berkeley court case, the neighboring school district of Oakland copied the Berkeley model by offering the choice of English immersion as an alternative to its long-established bilingual program. To make such a change, permission had to be obtained from the state. Once again, the bilingual-only proponents brought a court suit to prevent Oakland from initiating English-based instruction. In June 1989 Chief Judge Michael Ballachey ruled against the plaintiffs and permitted

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oakland to expand its offerings and to end the bilingual-education monopoly.

These cases signal a hopeful turn in the rights of teachers and parents to choose the kind of education program they believe will work best in their local communities. Until recently, the few school districts that challenged the power of the state education bureaucracies suffered severely. The Newton, Massachusetts, public school system ran afoul of the state Bureau of Bilingual Education when it phased out its bilingual-education program because it failed to meet the needs of 400 limited-English students from thirty different language groups. An intensive English program was developed instead. The Bureau of Bilingual Education declared Newton to be "in massive non-compliance with the state bilingual education law," resulting in a loss of state funding for Newton's language-minority students. Newton produced evidence that after one or two years these students successfully learned English for the full range of educational purposes, performed well in regular classrooms, had a strong self-image, and were well-integrated with their English-speaking classmates. Parents of these children consistently expressed satisfaction with the achievement of their children and with the design of the program. Nevertheless, the Bureau dismissed the evidence of student achievement and parent approval as irrelevant, its single concern being the number of hours of native-language instruction being provided. It is clear that bureaucratic pressure was used to promote not an educational but a political goal—maintaining native-language teaching as an end in itself.

Differing views

The widespread tendency among policymakers to classify Latinos as a single cultural group with common attitudes is discredited by a ground-breaking national survey of Latino and Asian parents conducted in 1988 by the U.S. Department of Education. Twenty-eight hundred Asian-American, Cuban-American, Mexican-American, and Puerto Rican parents were interviewed. The survey's conclusions reveal the differing—often conflicting—views among language-minority groups:

(1) All parents first and foremost want their children to learn English and to achieve in school. All agreed on the need for special programs to help their children.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(2) Puerto Rican parents were least in favor of English-immersion programs. Between Asian-American, Mexican-American and Cuban-American parents, however, there was no significant difference on the desirability of English-immersion programs. This is a striking result because the survey also reports that English-immersion programs are most readily available to Asian-American students but not to the three Hispanic groups interviewed. Evidently, the Cuban-American and Mexican-American parents are interested in the idea of English immersion even though they have little experience with this type of program.

(3) A clear division in the preference for native-language programs emerged: Puerto Rican and Mexican-American families favored these programs while Cuban-American and Asian-American families did not consider these programs attractive.

Three basic policy implications emerge from this study: special-language programs must be available for limited-English children, parent preferences must be considered in the type of programs that are developed, and adequate funding must be provided to the chosen type of program.

Responsibility now falls to the Latino communities to press for true educational choices—to demand that their schools give as much attention to building English-immersion programs as they have given in the past to native-language programs. Latinos must hold their schools accountable for assigning resources to English-language programs—from the hiring and training of teachers to buying texts and materials—comparable to the resources provided to bilingual programs. Given a level playing field, native-language programs and English-immersion programs will fulfill the actual aspirations of our language-minority populations and not just the objectives of the bilingual-education bureaucracy.

The popular "school-based management" option may provide the best tool for teachers, parents, and students to exercise practical control over the kind of education they want. A key element of this plan is accountability, whereby the prime criterion for school funding is the demonstrated academic success of students—not some earnest concern that students will feel better about themselves or a narrow bureaucratic rule about the language of instruction. It should be possible for Latino parents in Lawrence, Massachusetts; Chicago, Illinois; and Santa Ana, California, to say to their school authorities, "We have not seen great success for our

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

children with the years of Spanish-language teaching. We now want our children's school to give them an effective English program and we want you to do whatever is necessary to achieve this end."

It is a revealing but little-known fact that in 1986, while Latino and Asian-American activists bitterly opposed California's Proposition 63, which made English the official language of the state, their communities voted for it. A *San Francisco Chronicle* poll found high support for having English as the state's official language—90 percent of Filipino-Americans, 78 percent of Chinese-Americans, and 70 percent of Latinos approved of the measure—even though barely half of those polled speak English at home. The survey, in fact, was conducted in Spanish, English, Cantonese, and Mandarin.

Polls conducted in California repeatedly reveal a strong affinity in the Latino community for mainstream America and for the national language, and a strong desire not to be segregated in separate communities. The desire for social mobility, for economic gain, for self-actualization, and for status among peers is, not surprisingly, as strong among Latinos as among other groups. It is therefore a major responsibility of the public schools to provide children with the tools to work towards fulfillment of these goals.

Informed Latinos, teachers, and business leaders must take the initiative to change state laws that restrict educational innovation and improvement. School administrators have the responsibility of involving both parents and teachers in defining and implementing the school's goals. Lighthouse districts like Fairfax and Newton show that alternatives to native-language teaching are impressively successful for language-minority students. Parental choice may not result in the instant popularity of English immersion in all areas, but it will undeniably improve the present situation. Options now need to be extended to Latino families whose unequal access to informed choice has perpetuated unequal access to full opportunity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Black and white at Stanford

JOHN H. BUNZEL

WHEN TWO WHITE students defaced a poster of Beethoven by giving the composer black features and an Afro, then hung the picture near the door of a black student in the same dormitory—the African-American theme house, Ujamaa—Stanford was immediately added to the growing list of campuses where white racism was said to be on the upswing. But the actual incident was rather different from the version given in many press accounts. One October evening, some undergraduates in Ujamaa had argued over a black student's claim that all music in America has African origins. When the discussion turned to Beethoven, the black student said that Beethoven was black. Several white students openly doubted the claim. The student who admitted to defacing the Beethoven poster

---

Adapted from a book on race relations at Stanford to be published in late autumn by the Portable Stanford Book Series. I wish to acknowledge the work of my research assistant, Jordan Seng, who conducted the personal interviews and provided other invaluable assistance. Jeanne J. Fleming of Flanders Associates drew the sample for the senior-class survey and coded the results.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

later said he had done it because it was "a good opportunity to show the black students how ridiculous it was to focus on race" and that it was intended as "satirical humor." Still, most newspapers reported the defacement as an act of racial aggression rather than a tasteless joke. Not for the first time the reporting of respected papers had dealt in simplistic generalizations. If American campuses are in the midst of a resurgence of racism—the single recurring theme of most media accounts—such alarmism might be justified. But the truth is more complicated. There is a pressing need for responsible investigation and analysis in the hope of generating more understanding of a difficult and complex problem.

To inquire into the nature of black-white relations on the Stanford campus, in-depth interviews with fifty-four undergraduates were conducted during the course of the 1988-1989 academic year. Of those interviewed, twenty were white and twenty-four were black, many of whom lived in the Ujamaa dormitory. No names were used and the promise of confidentiality was assured. In addition, a nine-page questionnaire was mailed to a sample of 862 students—half of the graduating class of 1989. Other source material was drawn from a report of the University Committee on Minority Issues (UCMI), as well as from informal group interviews with students in their dormitories. The purpose of this eighteen-month, student-oriented study was to gain some insight into a fundamental concern: Is there a "new" or different racism today—different, for example, from the racism that confronted civil-rights advocates in the 1960s—and, if so, how is it manifested in the behavior of students on the campus of a major university?

Defining racism

When Stanford students are asked what they mean by racism, it quickly becomes clear that their definitions vary enormously. No one denies that racism is morally unacceptable. But as it is used in conversation and discussion, the term "racism" is also a conceptualizing one and therefore very much a matter of language and perception. When it was used in the on-campus debate that followed the Beethoven incident in Ujamaa (which became known as Stanford's "racial incident"), students generally meant, as one Asian-American senior said, "the degrading or devaluing of other people because of their color." This is the definition of racism generally given by most students—that is, an irrational attitude of hostility

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

against individuals and groups because of their background or membership in one race or another. A significant number of white students stated that implicit in their idea of racism was the belief that people of all races can be racist. As one freshman woman said, "It's prejudice against another racial group. It can work both ways, blacks against whites and whites against blacks."

By contrast, a high percentage of black students defined racism in terms of its structural manifestations, repeatedly formulating the problem as one of "institutional racism." Half of them spoke of the oppression of one racial group by the racial group in power. Little was said about white prejudices and stereotypes; indeed, many black students maintain outright that racial stereotyping has little to do with racism. They talked about "a systematized oppression of a certain race," "oppression of specific ethnic groups," and "a system of rule and domination along the lines of race." In short, not only do more black than white students find racism at Stanford, but blacks are much more likely than whites to regard it as the exercise of institutional authority or (in a more familiar idiom) the "white power structure on campus."

In recent years, the demands of black organizations on campus have focused on issues they regard as fundamental if there is to be "real change" within the university—an Ethnic Studies graduation requirement, the hiring of more minority faculty, and the appointment of minority students to the Board of Trustees. It is through their political and organizational statements, which portray campus racism in terms of the collective struggle for power, that black student leaders at Stanford have found a voice. What is striking is that in their formal rhetoric there is little talk of interpersonal relations between blacks and whites, a recurrent theme in many of the speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr. Black student leaders today insist on changes in the "power relations" on campus, while white students are primarily concerned with interpersonal relations.

A special difference between those who think of racism in interpersonal terms, and those who define it as involving systematized behavior by the racial group in power, is that in the latter view only those "who control the levers of power" can be called racist. According to this latter definition, "white racism" is redundant. Many who used this definition frequently distinguished between prejudice and racism. "Prejudice is not really racism,"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

explained one white senior, "until you stick it into your standard power structure." While any and all groups may use stereotypes, make prejudgments, and discriminate, only whites truly can be racist because only they have the power to oppress. Many who hold this view maintain that racism is inherent in the American social and economic system, a system that was "created by whites and today is still run chiefly by whites." However, only a little over 20 percent of the black students interviewed say that Stanford is racist—and 40 percent of these students say this is so for no other reason than that the university is part of a larger racist society. Furthermore, only 12 percent of the senior class believe that Stanford is a racist institution.

Overt, subtle, and subconscious racism

It is relatively easy for students to talk about racism in fairly abstract terms. For example, half of the seniors surveyed say they have seen racism against minorities, and roughly half of all minorities say they have been the target of racism on campus.[†] However, getting students to specify concrete examples of racism based on events or incidents they have personally encountered is much more difficult. The number of those interviewed reporting firsthand experience with racist behavior is quite low—only 5 percent of the white students, for example, and under 30 percent of the blacks, most of whom describe the racism they ran up against as "subtle" and "hard to explain" to non-blacks.

When white students discuss the racism they have seen on campus, they tend to talk of negative views and comments—usually couched in the familiar language of racial stereotypes—that reflect either prejudice or acts of discrimination:

> A teacher signaled out a quiet black girl, telling her that as the sole representative of her race in the course, it was her responsibility to for-

[†]It should be noted that these reports correlate with students' self-identified political views. Thus 75 percent of "very liberal" seniors say they have seen racism on campus, compared to 14 percent of "very conservative" seniors. Seventy-seven percent of "very liberal" minority respondents say they have been the target of racism, whereas only 39 percent of "somewhat conservative" minority students make the same claim. Much larger percentages—over 80 percent of both minority and non-minority students—say they have either seen racism or been the target of racism before enrolling at Stanford. Only a few of the minority students and none of the white students cite personal observations or experiences of overt racism on Stanford's campus.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

get white misunderstanding, forcing the student into an uncomfortable and public position.

My friend, who normally is desperate to get a date, will turn down any black guy who asks her out, just because he's black.

A white and previously sheltered freshman was placed with a black freshman from the South Bronx and the white female was constantly criticizing the "crude ways" of her roommate. They hated each other by the end of the year.

An athletic coach referred to a national team from China as a bunch of "chinks."

I heard about an incident in a sorority on campus. The group was playing charades and a white girl guessed 'nigger.' The black girl in the group said nothing. The pledge trainer was black, and she didn't say or do anything. The whole incident was kept under the rug.

The accounts by black students of the racism they experience at Stanford are very different (particularly compared to the malicious racism they often faced before coming to Stanford). Most of the black students who said they had personally encountered racist behavior at the university were hard-pressed to describe what it was like or how it worked. As many of them said, the racism they confronted, although it pervaded the whole campus, was subtle and could not be effectively explained to others. "I've felt like an outcast in classes," a black senior woman noted. "The class breaks up into study groups and people don't want you in theirs." A black freshman said, "There's nothing that's actually been done to me, but there are things that have been hurtful—like people who don't think black writers have anything to say." Others just talked of subtle changes in the behavior of whites in the presence of a black, and a certain tension they felt in social situations. White students have repeatedly heard these complaints of subtle racism and are largely bewildered by them. As one senior put it, "It's hard to know how to react to charges of racism when there are no specific incidents or examples. That's pretty damn subtle."

If subtle racism is hard to define or analyze, "subconscious racism"—a term widely used on campus in recent years—raises all kinds of problems (especially for the researcher). Roughly one-third of the white and black students who were interviewed said that personal racism might be a matter of one's subconscious, "that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a person can be racist without ever fully knowing it," as one of them explained. A good many students said that negative stereotypes may be a problem of "the unconscious psyche." Yet how informatively can individuals discuss racism if they cannot be certain of their own actions? "I don't know, I might have some racist tendencies," confessed one white freshman, "but I really try to watch my step." Black students offer a limited catalog of insensitive statements or questionable actions, but seldom anything blatantly offensive. One white freshman could well have been speaking for many other white students when she said, "I've learned how easily comments that seem innocent to you can be misconstrued. But whether or not they are really intended to be racist—unfortunately, that seems almost irrelevant today." A question frequently raised is whether an individual can commit an act of racism without racist motives. "Yes," said one student, "if the person is subconsciously racist." But how can that be demonstrated, and by whom?

Reverse discrimination

When students talk about racism, in a significant number of cases they talk about "reverse racism"—discrimination against whites. While no questions were asked about it directly in the one-on-one interviews, a number of white students spoke about what one called "the sort of reverse racism that discriminates against whites in the undergraduate admissions process where minority applicants are granted affirmative action preferences." In the survey of graduating seniors, approximately one out of ten cited reverse discrimination or some form of prejudice against whites. In the UCMI survey, almost half of the white students said they had experienced some form of discrimination or devaluation because of their skin color. "My application [for a campus job] was denied because I was too late for the deadline," said a white senior. "But the committee was still seeking applications from 'people of color.'" Others tell of similar experiences. "Down in the dining hall," explained a white freshman, "when I go and sit at those 'black' tables, they look at me like, 'What's he doing here?'" Another student said she felt that "the Black Student Union's attitude toward whites is a racist view itself. I feel like I've been the target of racism since I am not a person of color."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

After the Beethoven poster incident, a number of students reported strong anti-white sentiment. "Some blacks distributed anti-white flyers in the dorm. Because I was one of the whites who spoke my mind and challenged some of the things they were saying, I got one slipped under my door," recounted one Ujamaa resident. A white freshman in Ujamaa also told of problems with the flyers:

> After the incident, some of the whites in Ujamaa who were concerned about the anti-white flyers had a meeting—I mean, we were offended by them. The Ujamaa staff asked us not to take the story about the anti-white flyers to the *Daily*, and promised us that they would make an official statement about it. They never made the statement. That offended me. It was the first time I ever had anyone attack my race. They said it was only a few people that produced the flyers, and that we had to keep it down. Well, two people doing the offensive Beethoven poster—that doesn't represent the feeling of most whites!

A number of the blacks interviewed also volunteered that discrimination was practiced by blacks against whites. Said one black freshman, "The only racism I've seen at Stanford is reverse racism. I get a lot of pressure because I'm dating a white man. The black upperclassmen don't like that." Another black woman explained, "Blacks and whites interact more on the other side of campus than they do on this [Ujamaa] side, because over there you're not being watched by other blacks. Have you ever heard the term 'miscellaneous'? It's what blacks get called when they hang out too much with whites. It's terrible. Once you get called that, you have to do something amazing to get away from it." In a world in which blacks are still confronted with racism, it is not difficult to understand a certain distrust they may feel toward whites. But this attitude has become a source of tension in campus race relations, including tension among blacks. The distrust of different races cuts both ways.

Changing perceptions

When students were asked if their ideas about racism had changed since they came to Stanford, 65 percent of whites and 44 percent of blacks acknowledged that their experience as undergraduates had often been a strong influence in changing the way they thought about the issue. One of the most telling findings is that since coming to Stanford, 30 percent of white students have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

become more suspicious of the "anti-racism" of minorities. In some manner (and in varying degrees), the struggle of blacks and other minority students is alienating a large number of whites, making them less likely to pursue understanding and reconciliation with the minority communities on campus. Results from the survey of the senior class support the findings of the personal interviews. Thus 57 percent of those graduating agree with the statement, "I'm tired of hearing about racism at Stanford." Almost half of them agree that "the black student leadership is made up of people with their own political agenda who are devoted to simply seeing racism." White students are more aware of the problem of racism, but a great many are alienated by the anti-racist efforts of blacks. "The university is providing more education on racism," observed one student, "but without much real improvement in race relations."

Indeed, the university has done its part to encourage students to think and talk about racism. Beginning in 1988, the administration has included programs on minority life at Stanford (collectively called "The Fire Within") in the activities of Freshman Orientation Week. In the fall of 1989, for example, one of the student speakers, Laura Gomez, delivered a message the incoming freshmen would hear many times in their undergraduate years from leaders of the various minority groups on campus. She declared that Stanford is a "post-European university that must be ready for a majority of California that is basically Third World." But, she noted, Stanford has not met the burden of "empowering those who have too long been disenfranchised from this nation's political and economic life" or of "adequately describing reality as long as the voices of African-Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, and Asians are excluded from this enterprise." She called on the university to recruit "a critical mass of minority scholars in all disciplines." These teachers, said Gomez, will no longer "hide behind the façade of the objective scholar who views his work as a value-free inquiry that aims only to clarify the world rather than to change it." Declaring that such an "objective scholar ... does not leave room for my voice, or for the voices of people like me," she added, "our scholarship and teaching" must be "subjective in terms of our position, our background and experience, and subjective in terms of what we see as the ends or purposes of our work." Thus, she emphasized, "we can openly embrace our values and politics

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and ... empower ourselves and the communities from which we come."

These "welcoming talks" by minority-group leaders have elicited varied reactions from freshmen. "I have a new appreciation for minorities," said one white freshman, "and I've learned more about my own stereotypes." However, criticism outnumbered praise by about three to one. Those who complained were bothered by what they regarded as inappropriate polemics in the representations on race relations. "Looking back on Freshman Orientation," reflected a white male freshman, "I feel like I got here, and from about day two I was made to feel that it was me and my values that were wrong. I felt so conciliatory and so I said, 'Oh, you guys are right'.... Having my ideas attacked and then not being able to defend them without getting in trouble—it doesn't make for a very positive environment." Another white freshman said, "When you come to Orientation, they kind of hit you over the head with it. It's like 'Hi, meet your roommate. Don't be a racist.'"

It is hardly surprising that more than three-quarters of the black students in the personal interviews, and an equal percentage of all minorities in the senior-class survey, reported some firsthand experience with racism prior to coming to Stanford, from racially motivated gang fights to battling high school teachers who did not believe that blacks could excel in the classroom. And yet, even with so much previous exposure to racist sentiments and behavior, almost half of the blacks said their views on racism had changed while they were students at the university. Clearly, some kind of "education in racism" had taken place in the black community—due in large part, the black students said, to interaction with their peers (about one-quarter of them specifically mentioned conversations with black upperclassmen) as well as to programs and dorm discussions in Ujamaa. It appears that blacks learn more about racism from each other than from actual racist offenses they experience at the university.

Coexistence and segregation

In a letter published in the *Stanford Daily*, a student wrote, "In spite of the many things that have been written and said about racial tension at Stanford, the real news is that most people on campus are fair to all racial and ethnic groups." That statement was printed in the senior survey, and 63 percent of the graduating class

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agreed. The UCMI concluded that over 90 percent of all Stanford students feel "quite" or "very" comfortable with those of other races or backgrounds, adding that they interact most frequently in the dormitories and other living groups. It further reported that about half of the whites had dated interracially and that the percentage of blacks who had done so was as high as 75 percent.

These are encouraging numbers, showing clearly that in recent years Stanford has experienced heartening developments in interracial relations. The university is generally an amicable community. Its students, by and large, are socially gifted and well-adjusted, as one would expect from a carefully selected elite. Yet to emphasize only the ample number of cross-racial acquaintances and the healthy degree of comfort Stanford students enjoy with one another would be to present an incomplete picture. The more complicated truth is that interracial interaction does not appear to occur at significant levels of friendship. Relationships are often reserved and circumspect, restrained by apathy, anxiety, and a certain amount of peer pressure. Many students acknowledge that they do not easily become close personal friends with other individuals of different races or ethnic groups. In the course of conversations with students, 16 percent volunteered the comment that blacks and whites do not join together in any lasting way on a social level. Ninety-six percent of the students interviewed who live in Ujamaa—where blacks and whites are constantly exposed to one another—reported routine racial segregation. When students in the senior survey were asked to comment on the statement, "There is a great deal of socializing between black and white students at parties and similar events," almost 70 percent said they either "somewhat" or "strongly" disagreed. Black and white students live in peace with each other—"we coexist," as another student put it—but they do not fully integrate in the most positive sense of the term. As still another student remarked, "We may learn a bit about each other, but we probably won't learn much from each other."

A large majority of white students (85 percent) said that blacks segregate themselves from the rest of the campus community into separate social spheres, which most whites felt were closed to them. Generally speaking, blacks were even more likely than whites to think that black students voluntarily isolate themselves from whites on campus. A sizeable number of students identify an impulse among their peers to remain apart from the wider

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stanford community, in large part because of the need, as one black student observed, "to fit into black social circles." Almost 70 percent of blacks talked of the pressure they felt from other black students to subscribe to a set of "black" positions and attitudes. "Oh yeah, that's everywhere," said a black sophomore. "It involves certain standards that you're supposed to adopt." A black freshman woman pointed out that "there are some things a real black person does. For instance, you have to dress 'black.'" A black junior added that "loud laughing, more aggressive displays of emotion, I guess—that's different than what whites do. We're told not to forget who we are."

In the personal interviews with black students, over two-thirds of them indicated that social affiliation with whites reduces their acceptance by their peers. "If you hang around with just white people, you might get dropped in status," noted one black student. Some were openly discouraged by this situation. One black freshman woman said, "Before, when someone did something wrong to me, race never crossed my mind as the reason. But then I had to change my way of thinking about people. I had to start worrying about the way they saw me because I'm black. I didn't want to change the way I saw people, but it's hard when all the blacks are saying beware of this and beware of that."

There is little disagreement that blacks segregate themselves from whites at Stanford. "Ask me why and my answer begins with our history of subjugation," explains a member of the Black Student Union. "Whites have had the power ever since this country got started, and they abused it. The rest of my answer is that they still have the power and they still abuse it." How do you fight against the misuse of power? "With your own power," he says.

> At a university like this, you fight against being manipulated by the system by gaining control yourself. For black students, a place managed by blacks is a safe place, free from the racial slurs and suspicions that exist everywhere else on campus ... in black-controlled arenas, blacks are freed from the pressure to evaluate themselves in comparison with whites.

Affirmative action and academic performance

One of the most troubling concerns of many blacks is the feeling that whites are regularly making comparisons and arriving at judgments about the academic abilities of black students. Twenty

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

percent of the whites interviewed believed that minority freshmen are less academically qualified to be at Stanford than white students. But in the senior survey, over 20 percent of the blacks agreed "somewhat" or "strongly" with the statement, "I often feel academically inferior to other students." UCMI figures show that almost one-quarter of the black students felt "less prepared for Stanford academically than most Stanford students." While only 7 percent of whites "mostly" or "strongly" agreed that "If I let up very much on my studying, I probably would end up on academic probation," four times as many blacks felt that way.

The degree to which many blacks lack confidence in their academic abilities is further underscored in the one-on-one interviews, where over 70 percent said they felt that doubts about their competence are widely held on campus. For example, over 40 percent thought that the faculty expected less from them than from white students. A black male sophomore said, "I've had teachers in classes say, 'Does everybody understand?', and then they'll ask me specifically, and the other blacks. They just kind of assume that we don't." The UCMI concluded that blacks are "particularly disturbed to hear their academic legitimacy at Stanford questioned." Yet the interviews also reveal that few whites actually have serious doubts about the qualifications of black students. Of the 20 percent who thought that minorities are less qualified when they enter Stanford, three-quarters of them said that given time, minority students easily make up ground academically.

In short, while most white students are wary of affirmative action policies, relatively few seem to believe there are many blacks at Stanford who are academically unqualified to be there. Still, as one black student put it, blacks perceive that "whites don't think we measure up." Blacks realize that some of them are beneficiaries of affirmative action, and are thus especially sensitive to charges of academic shortcomings. "That's a heavy load to carry," observes a faculty member, "and they sometimes try to escape the pressure by withdrawing into their own social circles."

Whites and black identity

Racism is a burning issue at Stanford, as it is on other campuses, and the term racist is intimidating. Whites do not want to be considered racist. Although they resent the aggressive verbal attacks and confrontational spirit of the black community, they are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sincere in wanting black students to feel comfortable at Stanford. They do not understand why so many black students seem to find the campus ungenerous and unfriendly. By virtue of black students' tendency to seclude themselves, it appears to whites that a sizeable number of them prefer isolation from the wider campus. Moreover, many students who have associated with blacks frequently admit that they have been haunted by the fear of doing or saying something wrong. "I'm scared to be called racist," said one student in a group interview in one of the dorms. "You've really got to be careful all the time." Another student stated that the word "racist" is so powerful an accusation that it gets used as a political weapon by minority groups, adding that "the motivation is often too little and the risk too great to spend the energy required to bridge a culture gap in interpersonal relations."

White students are quick to acknowledge that ethnic and group differences are an essential part of the rich and varied history of the United States. They frequently stress the need to listen to a "diversity of voices" in order to understand our common experience and heritage. Yet among black students the talk is increasingly about cultural differences—about reinforcing and maintaining a distinct cultural identity. They sometimes call for separate living quarters or a more Afrocentric curriculum, insisting that these are needed not only to raise blacks' self-esteem but to strengthen their bases of power in the university and ultimately free them from the "racism of America." While frequently hard-pressed to describe black culture in any formal or specific terms, black students often speak of differences in black humor or (the most often cited) "black English." As one black sophomore noted, "When we get together we talk in certain dialects, I guess you could call them. White people could understand it, but black people talk it." Some blacks explain black culture in even more personal terms. "It has a lot to do with who you feel you have common bonds with," said one black woman. "Our backgrounds are mainly similar. We like the same things." Another black freshman described one way that a concern for black culture is translated into self-segregation: "I don't mind if a black person wants to date a white person," he said. "What bothers me is the motivation. Society has given us the message that blacks can only help ourselves, and that's compromised when black men see white women as something better. If black

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people don't share a distinct, separate culture, there will be some real problems."

Since the earliest stirrings of the civil-rights movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s, from the day the bus boycott began in Montgomery, Alabama, black identity became synonymous with a new black dignity. But today, as a black senior observed, "black pride has a different meaning because there's a new definition of blackness." Separateness, he maintains, can become an important value for blacks as part of the exercise of defining "who we are and what we may become." Thus interracial dating is dangerous, as another black student claimed, "because it could end up compromising the black family and lead to a loss of racial identity." The extent to which an identity of difference and social segregation has come to be valued highly by many black students helps explain why over three-quarters of the blacks who were interviewed agreed that any university policy of color-blindness would be viewed as a form of prejudice.

The price of the power struggle

An additional dimension to the concern over the differences between blacks and whites is that some black students feel—and resent—the burden of educating whites. The UCMI reported that black students "who don't want to play the role of 'ethnic ambassador' can find this situation trying and difficult." White students entering Stanford as freshmen learn right away that blacks want to be viewed as blacks, that there are important differences between the black and white communities on campus, and that they must be sensitive to those differences. Often, however, specific differences remain ill-defined. What is clear is that a large section of the black community segregates itself. Whites who care enough to learn more about ethnic differences approach blacks in their dormitories, but frequently discover that blacks feel pressured when asked to speak on behalf of themselves. Not surprisingly, more tension is generally added to interpersonal relations. As one graduating white senior observed, "I would guess that if blacks and whites were really comfortable with each other at the outset, communication about ethnic differences would be easier. After all, students are good at finding answers to unspoken questions through the whole process of making friends."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Meanwhile, the separation continues, largely because many blacks regard the problem of racism on campus as a struggle for power to change the system of white control at Stanford. Thus, demands for more black students on the Board of Trustees, more black faculty members, and more classes about black history and culture have all been attempts to win a solid place in the structure of the university. As already noted, however, the blacks' pursuit of power does not presuppose improvements in interracial relationships. After the Beethoven incident, for example, the Students of Color Coalition demanded that the university drop the requirement that the student population living in Ujamaa must be at least 50 percent non-black. The call was for more black control, not for greater interracial understanding, for more power to protect blacks rather than for education and reconciliation. Virtually without exception, all formal declarations made by black organizations in recent years have called for increased black power on campus as one of their paramount goals. And with each advance in the fight for institutional change comes affirmation of the power that the black community has accrued for itself as a separate social entity. But at what cost? As race relations are routinely reduced to power equations, black and white students "will never relate easily and freely," observes a white senior. "It's entirely too easy to see power as a zero-sum game, which almost precludes any expectation of cooperation and mutual enhancement."

A fairly large number of whites are willing to share in a very general way the guilt assigned to all whites because of the pernicious treatment accorded to blacks in our nation's history, yet when they were asked about specific racist occurrences on campus, they were not willing to accept responsibility. Only 5 percent of the white seniors surveyed "strongly agreed" that "everyone on campus has to bear responsibility for the incident in Ujamaa," and fewer than 20 percent "somewhat agreed." Similarly, 75 percent "strongly agreed" that "all whites should not be grouped with those actually responsible every time a racial incident occurs." It is clear that whites want to be judged as individuals, and that most whites do not believe they have personally done anything to perpetuate a racist system. Furthermore, they are convinced, as one junior commented, that "only a vocal minority of blacks are extreme and engage in polemical attacks on whites." As a white freshman pointed out, "When I talk to those blacks who separate themselves

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the dining hall simply as individuals, there's no trouble. It's just when they're all together that they consider me white."

Tension and polarization

Seventy percent of those in the senior survey agreed with the statement that "Racial tension on campus has increased in the years I've been on campus." It is certainly true that racism is discussed more frequently today than in the past at student dining tables, in study groups, and on the front pages of the newspapers, suggesting that in some part the increased tension is a function of the widespread attention given to the whole issue. However, it is difficult to say if the rising tension is a result of the polarization between blacks and whites on campus, or whether the polarization is the result of the higher level of tension. The answer most likely would be different for each group, or even for each individual. For reasons of culture, racial identity, and self-perception, many blacks believe they have good reason to separate themselves. In the interviews done by Pacific Management Systems for the UCMI, a resounding 95 percent of blacks reported feeling that they do not fit into the Stanford community. And the interviews conducted by the Strategic Research Institute determined that 40 percent of blacks feel they must minimize their ethnic characteristics to fit in.

But why? In a university that is nationally known for its strong commitment to ethnic diversity in the student body and the curriculum, why do so many blacks feel they do not fit in? Why, with large ethnic organizations, ethnic theme houses, Ethnic Studies, new courses in the philosophy of the Third World, and new Freshmen Orientation programs focusing on the minority experience, do they feel the campus is such a hostile environment? And why, if Stanford is so inhospitable to their needs and interests, has the number of black students tripled in the last fifteen years? By now the questions are almost rhetorical. "The main cause of our ills," comments a graduating senior, "is the continued segregation between blacks and whites. We've learned coexistence, but not understanding." When the UCMI asked students, "To what extent, if at all, has your Stanford experience improved your ability to interact comfortably with people of different racial/ethnic groups from your own?", 50 percent of the blacks said "little" or "none at all." One-third of the whites gave the same response. In short, half of the blacks and over a third of the whites say they are not mak-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing significant progress in interracial relations. Many whites have become increasingly disenchanted with the accusations, tactics, and demands of the more activist black students. Blacks may believe they are winning important structural changes at Stanford, but there is also a discouraging sense that they are not winning a growing number of friends.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Growth economics vs. macroeconomics

DAVID P. GOLDMAN

[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.

— J. M. Keynes

QUESTION: WHY DO American policymakers subject their proposals to the judgment of macroeconometric models whose own defenders liken them to geocentric astronomy after Copernicus? Professor N. Gregory Mankiw of Harvard recently defended Keynesian macroeconomics as follows:

> At the time it was proposed and for many years thereafter, the Copernican system did not work as well as the Ptolemaic system. For predicting the positions of the planets, the Ptolemaic system was superior ... if you had been an applied astronomer, you would have continued to use the Ptolemaic system.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Well, you might have, if your sole concern was to predict the positions of the planets over the next month or two. But surely astronomy ought to have—and in fact does have—a larger and more interesting focus. As with astronomy, so with economics. America has just completed a decade of growth driven by entrepreneurial innovation. Yet both President Bush's Council of Economic Advisors and the Democrat-controlled Joint Economic Committee continue to use economic models that regard innovation as an alien force intruding into a static economic world. This anomalous state of affairs cannot last. Ultimately, the experience of the Reagan years will shape the thinking of economists as powerfully as the Great Depression influenced the disciples of Keynes. The time is ripe for a Copernican revolution in economics, which will do for innovation what Copernicus did for the sun—namely to place it at the center of the system.

The old macroeconomic model, unlike Ptolemy's geocentric astronomy, is not even all that good at short-term economic forecasting. More important, it cannot explain a variety of intangible phenomena. Still, its essential premise remains intact, i.e., that the course of economic development can be expressed in mathematical equations based upon the accounting identity between (a) savings, (b) investment, and (c) growth. But if we place the exercise of human creativity, namely innovation, at the center of the model, the pillars of macroeconomics come crashing down. Nothing less than such a drastic reversal of perspective is required today. In the process, economics will lose much of its pretension to the status of an exact science, but will gain a new dimension of usefulness for public policy.

The macroeconomists remain confident of their role as gurus to the policymakers, although they occasionally do acknowledge the damage inflicted by their critics. Harvard's Mankiw reports:

> The large-scale macroeconometric models are mentioned only occasionally at academic conferences, often with derision.... In contrast to this radical change in the way academic macroeconomists view their field of study, applied macroeconomists have not substantially changed the way they analyze the economy. The [standard macroeconomic model] ... continues to provide the best way to interpret the discussions of economic policy in the press and among policymakers.

American policymakers are thus in the peculiar position of using a macroeconomic model that excludes innovation altogether

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to judge policies designed to foster innovation. What accounts for the macroeconomic model's staying power? It stems from the way we have been conditioned to think about economics, from the Newtonian determinism implicit in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century classical economics (including Marx's writings), to the Keynesian and monetarist accounts during the interwar and post-war periods. To put it succinctly: In exchange for the consolations of supposed mathematical precision, we have permitted the macroeconomists to excise from the model what they could not measure, namely innovation.

At the core of both monetarist and Keynesian theory, like the classical economics of the Physiocrats and Adam Smith before them, is the notion that economies are driven by investment of a measurable volume of "capital," and that such investment derives from "savings of current income," i.e., a hoarded-up fund of "capital." But empirical measures of current savings and investment do not correlate well with economic growth. The macroeconomists have turned economic analysis on its head: They demand we place the economy in the Procrustean bed of their mathematical determinism, which cannot describe an economy in which "capital" is as varied as the ingenuity of individual capitalists. In order to give macroeconomics the aura of exactitude that pertains to the physical sciences, the macroeconomists must reduce individuals to so many identical entities, each acting in the same robotic fashion.

A case history: capital gains

Theoretical debates come to a head when societies must make decisive choices between alternative policies. The present debate over the merits of a lower capital-gains tax puts the differences between the old and new economics in clear relief. There are three views of the capital-gains issue at work in the national arena. One holds that a drastically reduced capital-gains tax is indispensable to the economy's health. Another argues that it is of no importance. In between these poles, there is the view that a lower capital-gains tax rate would be desirable, but not essential. For example, the macroeconomic model employed by the Council of Economic Advisors to estimate the economic benefits of a capital-gains tax cut shows only a negligible rise in output.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The difference between the vision of the economy embodied in the conventional econometric model and what might be called the growth model runs so deep that it is no exaggeration to say that the word "capital" in "capital gains" means entirely different things to different economists. Growth economists contend that high taxes on capital gains smother innovation and risk-taking, the real engines of economic growth. The concept of capital gains as a reward for innovation and risk-taking does not exist at all in Keynesian macroeconomics, simply because these actions cannot be quantified. For the same reason, the model employed by the Council of Economic Advisors recognizes "capital gains" only as delayed dividends, which stockholders realize when they sell equity that has appreciated in proportion to reinvested corporate earnings. Both Keynesians and the current administration, then, believe that the rate of economic growth is dictated by the rate of investment, which in turn is dictated by the savings rate.

This premise, in fact, is the centerpiece of Keynesian theory and the basis of all macroeconomic forecasting. In order to devise their mathematical equations, into which the factors of production can be neatly plugged, the macroeconomic models are forced to assume that "capital" and "labor" are homogeneous substances. A given increment of capital, added to a given increment of labor, will produce a given increment of output, according to a fixed relation specified by what is called the "production function." Yet there is no demonstrable relationship between investment, savings, and GNP growth during the past thirty years of economic history.

Neither private investment as a share of GNP, savings as a share of GNP, nor any other such measure reveals much correspondence with GNP growth in the United States economy. Only 16 percent of GNP growth might be attributed to changes in the savings rate—a statistical relation far too weak to permit inference of any sort. The fact that "common knowledge" in the financial community accepts this premise merely attests to the success of economic educators in teaching the premise as axiomatic.

As Robert Mundell of Columbia University writes:

> How much faith should be put in statistically measured savings ratios? There are several problems with the concept of savings derived from the national accounts: (1) consumer durables are not included, yet they constitute an important element in any theoretical definition of savings; (2) budget deficits are counted as dissaving regardless of the extent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to which government expenditure is directed at capital goods; (3) capital gains in the stock and bond markets are excluded from savings; and (4) expenditure on human capital formation is excluded.

Some economists, including Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Michael Boskin, have attempted to add a measure of reality to the Keynesian model by changing the definition of savings. Boskin and his colleagues have developed a broader measurement of "savings" that includes public non-military investment in fixed capital as well as consumer durables. No one has yet discovered a statistical measure of savings, though, that displays a significant empirical relationship to growth.

Building a better mousetrap

What is "capital?" The standard view sees capital as a "fund," accumulated from savings. This view was introduced into modern economic thinking with the production-flow tables of the French Physiocrats, and found its way into English classical economics through Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*. It pictures a warehouse in every community stockpiled with "capital," waiting to be drawn down like any other good that is saved and accumulated. But no such warehouse exists, except to accommodate the equations of the mathematical economists. Capital is limited by the number of adult human beings on the planet, the skill with which they work, and the number of hours in the day—but not by the accounting identities that fascinate so many economists.

When an entrepreneur wishes to raise $100 million to finance his new mousetrap company, part or all of the funds seem to be created out of thin air. They are created by the promise of an idea. The financial sector acts as intermediary between the mousetrap man and the rest of the economy. If it likes the idea, it arranges for the rest of the economic universe to give $100 million to the mousetrap man on credit, with payment coming after the mousetraps are sold. It does this by first assessing the likelihood of his success, and then arranging a suitable package of debt and equity instruments. Some of the factors of production (labor, natural resources, capital) used to produce the new mousetraps must be paid for immediately, at least within a weekly wage cycle or monthly billing cycle. Other factors—i.e., equity investors—are willing to forgo payment indefinitely, expecting eventual payoffs commensurate with their risk-taking. After the fact, government statisti-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cians will make a bookkeeping entry, noting that $100 million has been "saved" and invested by the rest of the economy in order to finance the mousetrap company.

It is crucial that we bear in mind, through this example, that what we ordinarily call savings may not have existed at the time the production was called forth. Where does the money come from to finance the new investment to produce the better mousetrap? Ultimately, of course, it comes from the world's central banks, which govern the creation of money and credit. Proximately, it comes from the willingness of people to mortgage their assets so as to allow a bank to make a well-collateralized loan.

Look at it this way: You buy a house for $100,000, acquiring a $75,000 twenty-year mortgage. Over those twenty years, you work and save and pay down the mortgage to zero. Those savings are indeed recognized, at the time, by the official statistics on the "savings rate." But the value of this mortgage-free house in the official statistics is nowhere counted as current "capital." It is, of course, an asset—but because it is not in the form of "money," it is not counted as "capital." Nevertheless, if you then wish to invest in a new mousetrap company, and ask the bank for a new mortgage of, say, $50,000, the bank will surely oblige. What was technically an illiquid asset has been partially converted into a liquid one—i.e., into "capital." The world is full of such assets, the fruit of past savings and past investments, and whether or not they become "capital" depends on what new investment opportunities emerge.

Another example: You invest $100,000 of your parents' savings in a college education that permits you to acquire a "good" job that pays, say, $40,000 a year. If you wish then to buy an automobile for $15,000, a finance company will be pleased to lend you the money. Your college education, translated into a "good" job, has become an asset, but is not counted as "capital." The loan against this asset, however, is classified by economists as a "dissaving," i.e., an increase in debt, a negative for the "savings rate."

Obviously, the central banks are the ultimate source of the newly created credits, responding to what they perceive as legitimate demands and prudent lending practices by the banks. But the degree to which assets are converted into "capital" has little to do with *today's* "savings rate."

It might be objected: "What if the economy is operating at absolute full employment, with no resources (assets) available to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

advance $100 million of output to the mousetrap man? In that case, the economy would have to save at least some part of the $100 million worth of goods, e.g., to pay the wages of the mousetrap workers." This objection, though, envisages an economy locked into a fixed level of technology—indeed, a fixed level of innovation—with no elasticity with respect to reward. Static analysis assumes that technological innovation is dropped into this imaginary economy as an "exogenous" event. If technological innovations were dropped at random intervals from flying saucers, such objections would hold water. In the real world, though, entrepreneurs introduce a continuous stream of innovations; the economy *never* experiences a fixed state, except as an aberration. In practice, hundreds or thousands of better mousetrap models appear every year. Each year's better mousetrap saves an additional 5 percent of the grain harvest from the mice, and the extra portion of harvested grain allows for the production of more bread, the sale of which in turn finances the purchase of the next generation of mousetraps, thus paying the wages of the workers who retool the mousetrap factory. In terms of "real" physical resources, innovation finances itself, with no recourse to what we (and economists) call savings.

The role of capital and savings

Economic growth has no need whatever of "savings" in the "real" economy of factors of production, as long as innovation provides a margin of "free goods" to sustain investment in further innovation. That is even more obvious when we consider that the "free goods" provided by innovation need not take the form of technological improvement, as we usually understand the word. Some of the most fruitful innovations require nothing more than an improvement in existing practices. Wal-Mart stores built America's largest private fortune by better retailing, effectively creating tens of millions of leisure hours for families in the South and Southwest. This contribution to household consumption required no greater capital investment than the less-successful efforts of its competitors, but generated increased utility in the form of more leisure time for shoppers.

It is perfectly possible for an economy to grow principally through saving, that is, by eschewing present consumption in return for investments, at a fixed level of technology. That is a good description of a Soviet five-year plan, for example.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Savings do, of course, have a role in the *financial economy*, for reasons that have nothing whatever to do with the old "capital fund" theory. If markets had perfect foresight, all investment could, theoretically, be financed by newly created money buying equity in anticipation of future income streams from innovation. Savings are necessary in the financial economy because the market does not have such perfect foresight and the result of investment is uncertain. In practice, only the longshots are financed with pure equity, with commensurate big payoffs. When innovation is not at issue, and when risk does not offer the promise of a jackpot, banks using debt instruments to finance an investment do require individuals to save. Banks will not finance 100 percent of the purchase price of a new home; they require individuals to save a down payment, which gives the bank a margin of safety in case the house must be foreclosed on and sold at a lower price. The financial market never wishes to put 100 percent of its collective assets at risk, i.e., in equity or equivalents. From this standpoint, the observed quantity of "savings" should indeed rise with economic growth, as more individuals make down payments for houses, for example. But the savings *rate* may properly fall under conditions of innovation-led economic growth.

When conventional economists look at the Eastern Bloc countries and the Soviet Union, they diagnose a "capital shortage." West Germany supposedly is going to have its capital warehouse drained dry to build East Germany. Poland wants a "Marshall Plan" to drain the capital warehouse of the Unites States. The Soviet Union has a "ruble overhang" and a "capital shortage." The Keynesian macroeconomists are baffled as to where all the capital is going to come from. To a growth economist, the situation is clearer: All the factors of production are ready, willing, and able to produce. The key missing ingredients in Eastern Europe are a banking system with a credible unit of account, i.e., with "hard" money that people can confidently use for transactions and investments, and freedom for individuals to engage in those transactions and investments.

To the extent that individuals create more wealth—that is, capital—in transferable form, the banking system is free to create more money for transactions. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan argues there should be no tax on capital gains, for he correctly sees it as a tax that bears directly on the system of wealth

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

creation. Eliminating the tax dramatically increases the value of all capital assets, as well as the value of future income streams derived from those assets. Resources and talent now "idle" would be put to work almost immediately, producing a growth spurt. Central banks can provide reserves to commercial banks, and commercial banks can lend money to customers at any rate they please without causing inflation, as long as such loans create marketable goods and services. It is interesting to note that Japan had the highest rate of money-supply growth among the four largest industrial economies during 1983-1989 (13.4 percent), as well as the lowest rate of inflation (1.6 percent) and the highest rate of output growth (6 percent). The Japanese yen, meanwhile, remained the world's strongest currency, as measured by its gold price.

Connecting Marx and Keynes

If we are to subject the economy to the mathematical determinism that applies to physical equations and dominates our macroeconomic models, we can no more permit a change in the composition of the economy than we could a change in the composition of DNA in a grain of corn. The great mathematician John von Neumann proved that this must be a limitation of any mathematical economic model in a famous article, published after Keynes's death. Von Neumann showed that it was only possible to describe a growing economy by a system of mathematical equations under the condition that every part of the economy grew in precisely the same proportion. Any change whatever in these proportions—of capital to labor, or nuts to bolts—would make the system of equations insoluble. Since innovation alters the mix of production factors, by implication no system of equations can measure its effect on an economy. Ironically, it was the Marxists among Keynes's Cambridge students, Pierro Sraffa and Joan Robinson, who rediscovered this 1936 paper that von Neumann had presented at Princeton University. In 1947, they republished it in English translation in the *Cambridge Review of Economic Studies*, with their own ideological agenda in mind. Incredibly, these Keynesian-Marxists of Cambridge University sought to demonstrate that real living-and-breathing economies must subject themselves to the constraints required for mathematical analysis!

In macroeconomic models, von Neumann's fixed relations of production are expressed in what is called an "input-output matrix."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This is simply a table stating how much product industries sell to one another. A macroeconomic model begins by adding or subtracting some amount of spending power. It employs some set of assumptions based on historical behavior to divide this new demand into "consumption" and "savings." The quantity of "consumption" buys consumer goods through the input-output matrix, and the quantity of "savings" buys investment goods. There are, of course, minor differences in the way econometricians look at demand; for example, demand arising from the creation of new money can be regarded as either the source of new output or merely of inflation. That issue remains at the center of the controversy between Keynesians and monetarists; otherwise, they agree on the model.

This sort of econometric model, which cannot forecast the effect of new technologies, would not be too bad if General Motors were the whole economy, and if GM reinvested its earnings (or invested the borrowed savings of its employees) in the same model of car, with the same raw materials, with the same machine tools. This is more or less the premise of the Soviet central plan. Because there is no competition in the Soviet Union, innovation is unnecessary. Also, macroeconomic models are inept at accounting for the appearance of new industries not specified on the input-output matrix (the models now in use still count data-processing under "electrical machinery," for example).

Once one accepts the constraints of macroeconomics, there are a very limited number of ways to answer the sort of problems inherent in the models. One way is to ignore it entirely. More intellectually honest, though, was the response of the Keynesian-Marxists, whose interest in von Neumann's work gave rise to modern econometrics in the first place, through the work of Nobel laureate Lawrence Klein at the University of Pennsylvania. The macroeconomic model's inability to deal with changes in the composition of the economy, Robinson and Sraffa observed, corresponds precisely to Karl Marx's theory of capitalist crisis. Marx believed that crises arose from a change in the proportions among industries in what we now call the input-output matrix. Robinson and Sraffa drew the extreme conclusions from the convergence between the Marxian and Keynesian models, equating the mathematical impossibility of solving the macroeconomic equations under conditions of technological progress with the real-world crises of capitalist economies. Robinson argued that a "Golden

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Age" of stability would ensue when the ratio of capital per unit of labor was fixed, that is, when the economy experienced no technological change. Innovation was to be avoided since it leads to disruptions and unemployment:

> [E]ven if output is constant, employment will decline, since the improvement in technique and the increase in capital per head will combine to increase output per unit of labor. Thus employment will be constant only if the situation is such that output increases. Since, in general, capital-using inventions have been the most frequent, there appears to be, from a long-period point of view, very strong grounds for the popular opinion that inventions tend to reduce employment.

The role of small business

The dynamic U.S. economy of the 1980s demonstrated the protean character of "capital." Throughout the 1980s, industries dominated by small businesses increased employment much faster than those dominated by big companies. Small business thus contributed disproportionately to economic growth. Yet the Small Business Administration also estimates that 60 percent of small businesses fail within their first five years of operation—that is, 60 percent of the capital invested in small business is washed down the drain. From the standpoint of the "production function," no investment could be less efficient than investment in small business. Yet the available data show that investment in small business was much more efficient in promoting growth than investment in big business. All this is another way of saying that the United States economy during the 1980s was driven by innovation and by the proliferation of new goods and services made possible by innovation.

During the Reagan expansion, small firms contributed disproportionately to GNP as well as to employment. The broadest measure of the small-firm phenomenon in America is real GNP per company—the lower the number, the smaller the size of the average firm. In 1981 this indicator stood at $234,000; by 1985 it had fallen to $214,000 (both in 1982 dollars). These data—in the context of a booming economy—make it clear that small, innovative businesses contributed much more to growth than large, mature businesses. In a December 25, 1990 editorial, the *New York Times* argued that a capital-gains tax would draw resources away from large businesses towards small businesses, such that any growth among small businesses would cause corresponding contraction

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

among large businesses. Like others, the *Times* mistakenly assumed that capital is a homogeneous "factor of production" that everywhere produces the same amount of output. But the data show, on the contrary, a close correlation between investor preference for small-business investments and the GNP growth rate.

No "production function" can come to terms with a world in which three-fifths of the small-business sector's capital disappears into insolvency, while the remaining two-fifths produces more growth than the big corporate sector. Most of the innovations in small business represent no improvement in technology whatsoever, but rather the ingenuity of entrepreneurs in applying well-known methods in a novel way. It was the "human capital" of the entrepreneur, the least measurable of all quantities, that played the decisive role during the economy of the 1980s.

Innovation and macroeconomic models

As noted earlier, the Keynesian macroeconomists mean something entirely different by capital gains than do growth economists. In their model, something called "capital gains" exists as a pure bookkeeping phenomenon. They argue that if a company reinvested some of its earnings rather than paying them out as dividends, this reinvestment would then be reflected in a rise in the price of its stock. The capital gains accruing to investors who sold this stock, in the econometrician's world, would be no different from the ordinary income earned from dividends. They simply would be postponed dividends. Such "capital gains" should therefore be taxed the same as dividends are taxed, macroeconomists argue.

Well, if the real world were a macroeconomic model, they would be right. But in the real world, reinvested earnings are frequently lost, while a capital gain is a profit that has been taken. The adage, "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush," expresses the distinction between dividends and capital gains that eludes the mathematical models.

If capital were simply deferred dividends, there would be no essential difference between debt and equity funding of corporations, as in the standard academic "cost of capital" theory propounded by Franco Modigliani. It would be immaterial to a firm whether it paid out current interest to its debtors, or "saved up" the equivalent of such interest in the form of reinvested earnings. Modigliani's argument hardly squares with the Japanese experi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ence, however. Firms in an economy that doubles in size every eleven years, as Japan's does, can persuade the public to purchase stock at an extremely high price-earnings ratio, since the public anticipates substantial capital gains. Such capital gains are taxed at roughly 1 percent in Japan.

Markets do not have perfect foresight because individual creativity is not predictable. Capital is not as homogeneous as fertilizer because the talents and motivations of the people who apply it determine how much output it will yield. A net capital gain is, by definition, an addition to wealth caused by a change in the market's expectations concerning future income streams. Changes in expectations, though, occur only in the case that an individual or firm does something that promises to create more wealth than the market has foreseen. This, broadly speaking, can be called "innovation." We can use the word, though, to include a better location for a muffler-repair shop as well as a faster microchip. Macroeconomic models can take innovation into account only after the fact, by changing the constant in the "production function," which states how much output arises from a given input of capital. The Commerce Department's input-output tables for the U.S. economy, from which the production function is estimated, are nearly twenty years out of date. The best current measure of the rate of innovation is the premium that the stock market places upon future income streams from innovative companies. This provides a useful, rough guide to future growth prospects.

Conservative Keynesians often make the argument that it is "unfair" to tax capital gains as long as capital losses cannot be deducted from gross income. The argument reflects the premise that capital is a blob of "savings," rather than an increased willingness to produce for investment. Actually, the system is working at maximum efficiency when capital gains are not taxed at all and investors must swallow all their capital losses. This provides maximum incentive to get capital to exactly where it produces the most good.

The decisive role of individual initiative is most obvious at the micro-level of the economy, i.e., in very small businesses. Here, the market cannot discount the future income stream of capital investment, because the success or failure of a small business depends on the abilities of an individual or a small group of proprietors. For this reason, the resale value of a successful small busi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ness is usually many times greater than the initial capital investment plus the salary-equivalent of the proprietor's time; by making a business work and establishing a market, the proprietor has beaten the odds, which show that three out of five small businesses fail within five years. He or she has thus created a true capital gain, a net addition to the economy's wealth over and above the time value of money and the time value of labor. The same is true of an entrepreneur who offers a new technology or idea or service which the market has not yet taken into account. Capital formation which arises through innovation, rather than by accretion of savings, contributes disproportionately to economic growth.

Growth economics rediscovered

A decade after the Reagan administration embodied what is known as "supply-side" theory (i.e., growth economics) in tax reform and related growth incentives, academic economists have rediscovered the economics of growth. Professors Paul Romer of the University of Chicago and Robert Barro of Harvard have formed a working group on "growth theory," under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research. *The Journal of Political Economy* recently devoted an issue to the subject. But the problems still to be solved are formidable. Empirical measures of the level of innovation are notoriously hard to find. Most inventions predate their commercial application by years if not decades, so that the "stock" of scientific discoveries available to entrepreneurs at any point in time appears arbitrarily large (ask any venture capitalist). Humanity's stock of scientific discoveries is always vastly greater than marketable applications of these discoveries. It is the entrepreneur who converts an invention into the supply of a good which creates a new kind of demand. For this reason, it is difficult to show how a measurable quantity of effort or investment translates into some measurable result. In the case of innovation, fixed relationships of this sort simply do not exist.

Practitioners of macroeconometric forecasting often ask growth economists: "What's your model?" If we cannot employ the old macroeconomic model to calculate the effect on the economy of, for example, a capital-gains tax cut, how are we to calculate it? It is the wrong question. The task of economics is not to predict the near future, but to foster conditions under which our most inventive and energetic citizens will surprise us. Policymakers need only

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an order-of-magnitude estimate as to the effects of their policy actions, and historical experience provides us with ample data to judge the urgent issues before us.

Is it even possible to design a better macroeconomic model on the basis of a different mathematics that might escape von Neumann's constraints? At this point, we can only speculate about the general nature of such a model. No deterministic model can succeed, because deterministic mathematics demands that capital be "preserved" (or at least depreciated at a predictable rate), like energy and matter in physics. One might imagine, though, the design of a probabilistic model, drawing on new research. A probabilistic model would have no pretense to the sort of forecasting precision that the macroeconomists once claimed for their models, but it might nonetheless provide useful information.

One thing is certain: It will be necessary to turn the "production function" inside out. The production function is deterministic by its very nature, that is, it treats all variables as if they were flows of some material substance. As we have seen, such a view of capital produces meaningless results. A better approach might be to work backwards from the financial market's valuation of the application of human capital. Markets do not have perfect foresight, but their "best guess" provides an estimate better than any other of the quality of human capital. It is, however, an estimate after the fact. Before the fact, the market cannot assign values to entrepreneurial creativity.

Economics offers, after all, nothing better than the economist's best guess about the impact of change. Such guesses will be very poor indeed if they ignore innovation merely because it is hard to quantify.[†]

[†]An earlier version of this article was summarized by Jude Wanniski in the *Wall Street Journal* on June 27, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IQ and science: the mysterious Burt affair

ARTHUR R. JENSEN

THE CASE OF Sir Cyril Burt is probably the most bizarre episode in the entire history of academic psychology. This can be attributed to a combination of elements—the controversial subject of Burt's major research, his unusual personality, his widely acknowledged accomplishments, and the damaging accusations leveled against him after his death. Indeed, Burt's posthumous notoriety exceeds even the considerable fame he enjoyed during his long career.

In his famous study of the IQs of fifty-three pairs of MZA twins—monozygotic (identical) twins reared apart—Burt had shown a high correlation (.77) between the general intelligence of separately raised twins. What became known as the "Burt scandal" surfaced in 1976, five years after Burt's death. The psychologist was accused of faking data and fabricating both research assistants and co-authors to lend his deception authenticity. The main thrust of the attackers' effort was to discredit Burt's major theory—that genetic factors are strongly involved in human intelligence—as well as the body of research that supports it. Still, Burt was not without his defenders. A number of scholars, mainly former asso-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ciates, rose to his defense, writing articles and letters to newspapers and making television appearances. The controversy continued for three years.

Then, in 1979, Burt's guilt was virtually clinched when Britain's most highly respected historian of psychology, Leslie Hearnshaw, published *Cyril Burt, Psychologist*, which appeared to be a carefully researched and impartial biography of Burt. Hearnshaw had exclusive access to Burt's private correspondence and diaries, which no one else had yet seen. Thus, the biography was almost universally accepted as the last word on the subject and even persuaded most of Burt's supporters. The devastation of Burt's once exalted reputation was a gleeful triumph to his detractors and a tragedy to his admirers. With sighs of relief all around, the matter appeared to be settled at last. Or so most of us thought.

Recently, the investigative efforts of two British scholars, psychologist Robert B. Joynson and sociologist Ronald Fletcher, have reopened the case. Neither man knew Burt personally or ever had any previous connection with Burt's research or the "IQ controversy." The two investigators, working entirely independently, devoted several years to carrying out what appears to be painstaking detective work on the Burt affair. Both Joynson's 1989 book, *The Burt Affair*, and Fletcher's 1991 work, *Science, Ideology, and the Media: The Cyril Burt Scandal*, critically question every accusation and meticulously sift through the evidence. Although their accounts differ markedly in organization and style, with regard to the main charges against Burt the two authors reach the same conclusion: *not proven*.

A brilliant eccentric

Before getting into the details of this perplexing case, it is important to know just who Burt was, personally and professionally. Certain features of Burt's personality, and especially his area of research, helped the scandal sprout and flourish.

Sir Cyril Lodovic Burt (1883-1971) was long regarded as a towering figure in the history of British psychology. The first British psychologist to be knighted (a distinction bestowed on only two other psychologists to date), Burt was renowned for his intellectual brilliance and scholarly industry. After graduating from Oxford University, where he studied classics, mathematics, physiology, and psychology, Burt worked for four years as an assistant to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

celebrated neurophysiologist Sir Charles Sherrington at Liverpool University. Following a stint as a lecturer in experimental psychology at Cambridge, he went to work for the London County Council in 1913. This job put Burt in charge of psychological research and applied psychology, including the development of mental and scholastic tests, for the entire London school system. In this setting he became one of the world's leading educational psychologists and psychometricians, developing new tests, conducting surveys, and founding child guidance clinics and a special school for the handicapped. Burt conducted pioneering research on juvenile delinquency and mental retardation. He reported some of these studies in beautifully written books that became classics in their field: *The Young Delinquent* (1925), *The Subnormal Mind* (1935), and *The Backward Child* (1937).

During much of the period that Burt held his appointment with the London County Council, he also occupied the chair in educational psychology at the University of London. In 1932, when Charles Spearman, one of the great pioneers of mental testing, retired as head of the Department of Psychology at University College, London, Burt was appointed to his position, probably the most influential in British psychology.

Burt retired from that post in 1950, at the age of sixty-eight. The last twenty years of his life were spent in a rather reclusive manner, living in a large London flat with a secretary-housekeeper, editing journals, and writing books and articles. He was remarkably prolific even in his old age. Following his retirement he published over 200 articles and reviews. And those were only the items published under his own name. In addition, as his most notable eccentricity, he wrote a considerable number of articles, mostly book reviews, under various pseudonyms or initials of unidentifiable names. He worked steadily almost until the day he died, at the age of eighty-eight.

The two areas of research for which Burt was best known were factor analysis and the genetics of intelligence, fields in which his mathematical aptitude could be used to great advantage. In both fields, Burt's work was ground-breaking. He expertly adapted new developments in quantitative genetics to the study of human behavioral traits. Kinship correlations are the essential data for quantitative genetic analysis. Beginning quite early in his career, while still working in the London schools, Burt started collecting IQ and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scholastic-achievement scores on twins and various other related groups. Between the years 1943 and 1966 he published many theoretical and empirical studies dealing with the inheritance of intelligence; another paper was published posthumously in 1972.

It was particularly this genetic aspect of Burt's psychometric studies of individual differences that seemed to have such controversial educational and social implications. Egalitarian intellectuals tended to view the so-called "nature-nurture" question as a political issue rather than a scientific one, and so the potential controversy extended to a much larger arena than just the field of behavioral genetics. Burt himself, however, seldom expressed any interest in politics and never joined any political party. His knighthood was awarded by a Labour government.

Burt's personality is a more puzzling matter. I knew Burt personally and enjoyed numerous visits with him in the last two years of his life. But it was obvious to Burt that I was an admirer, and probably his relationship to me, always friendly and generous, was not entirely typical of his dealings with his academic colleagues or students. Opinions of Burt vary widely among this group, ranging from the highest esteem to bitter denigration, at times both coming from the same observer. There are only three characteristics about which one finds complete agreement: Burt's exceptional intellectual brilliance, his extraordinary general erudition, and his untiring industry.

The less favorable impressions of Burt registered by a few of his former students, colleagues, and acquaintances mention his egocentrism and personal vanity, his autocratic manner in running his department, his insistence on getting his own way, and his obsessive need to have the last word in any argument. Also, as a noted colleague, Philip E. Vernon, wrote, "It seemed difficult for him to allow his past students or followers to branch out and publish contributions which went beyond his views." Added Vernon, "Although Burt gave immense amounts of help to students and others, he could not brook any opposition to his views, and often showed paranoiac tendencies in his relations with colleagues and critics."

Disappearing data

Perhaps the only means by which to evaluate Burt objectively is to judge him by the published work he left behind. His strictly theoretical work on factor analysis and on the polygenic theory of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intelligence was an important contribution to the field; it provided a heuristic methodology for the study of individual differences that many other researchers applied in subsequent studies. The reliability of Burt's empirical research, by contrast, has frequently been called into question.

A few days after the news of Burt's death in 1971, I wrote to Miss Gretl Archer, who was Burt's private secretary for over twenty years, to request that she preserve the two or three tea crates of old raw data that Burt had once told me he still possessed. I told Miss Archer that I would travel to London the following summer to go through this material. I supposed it included IQ test data on twins, in which I had an interest and which I thought could be used in certain newer kinds of genetic analysis that Burt had not attempted. Miss Archer replied that all of these data had been destroyed within days after Burt's death, on the advice of Dr. Liam Hudson, professor of educational psychology at Edinburgh University. He had come to Burt's home soon after the announcement of Burt's death. Miss Archer, distraught and anxious to vacate Burt's large and expensive flat in Hampstead, had already arranged for the disposition of Burt's library and correspondence files (which were turned over to his biographer, Hearnshaw), but expressed concern to Hudson about what to do with these boxes of old data. Hudson looked over their contents and advised that she burn them, as being no longer of any value. Miss Archer said she believed the boxes included the data on twins, and later expressed regret that she had acted on Hudson's advice. The account I received from Miss Archer of this event was corroborated by Hudson himself, in a 1976 interview with *Science* staff writer Nicholas Wade. Hudson explained that he thought Burt's old data sheets were probably unintelligible to anyone but Burt himself.

I was absolutely flabbergasted when I received this news of the destruction of whatever was left of Burt's data. I was especially shocked because it was obvious that, although Miss Archer knew that Hudson was a professor at Edinburgh, she had no idea that he was one of Burt's most ardent anti-hereditarian opponents. I had met Hudson in 1970 at Cambridge University in a debate for which he had been selected by the sponsors to oppose my position (and Burt's) regarding the heritability of intelligence. Hudson later published a book, *The Cult of the Fact* (1972), in which the "bad guys" are hereditarians, including Sir Francis Galton, Spearman, Burt,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hans Eysenck, and myself. Hudson's rush to Burt's flat right after his death and his advice to Miss Archer to burn the stored data seem stranger than fiction, among the more bizarre events in the whole Burt affair.

Accusations of fraud

The first public accusation of outright fraud appeared on October 24, 1976 in the London *Sunday Times*, under the striking headline: "Crucial Data Was Faked by Eminent Psychologist," written by Oliver Gillie, the *Times*'s medical correspondent. Within days the story was repeated in the mass media around the world. Gillie followed with other sensational articles under headlines such as "The Great IQ Fraud" and "The Scandal and the Cover-Up," writing of "outright fraud," and calling Burt a "plagiarist of long standing."

These charges were not based on anything new involving Burt's data, certain peculiarities of which I had already pointed out two years earlier in an article in *Behavioral Genetics*. Gillie's allegations rested solely on the claim that he had been unable either to locate in person or to find any trace of two women—Margaret Howard and J. Conway—who were credited with assisting Burt in his research on twins. Howard was a co-author of one of Burt's most important articles on twins and Conway was named as the sole author of an article that was actually written by Burt himself, according to his secretary. These two women could not be traced or even identified with certainty by anyone available for questioning who had been associated with Burt. The "missing ladies," as Gillie called them, gave him licence to claim that Burt's data were, as he put it, "faked."

Gillie credited Professor Jack Tizard (since deceased, but then a psychologist at London University's Institute of Education) with helping him search for the "missing ladies." Tizard, although he had scarcely known Burt personally, became an active participant in the attack, giving Gillie information and advice on how to go about it.

I was well acquainted with Tizard, having spent two years at London University's Psychology Department, where he also taught at the time. He was, as his wife explained to Joynson, a "passionate

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

egalitarian." Tizard was also quite outspokenly anti-hereditarian and anti-Burtian.†

The day after Gillie's sensational charges of fraud in the *Sunday Times*, there appeared in the *Times* an interview with Tizard, titled "Theories of IQ pioneer 'completely discredited.'" It began: "The theory of Sir Cyril Burt ... that man's intelligence is largely caused by heredity was now completely discredited, Professor Jack Tizard, Professor of Child Development at London University, said yesterday.... Professor Tizard said the discrediting of Burt's work cast doubt on his whole line of inquiry."

It seems highly likely that the main steam behind the attack on Burt may have been the fervent wish of environmentalists such as Tizard to discredit the theory of polygenic inheritance of mental ability and other behavioral traits of obvious personal, educational, and social importance. Such indeed was the leitmotif in the popular press and on television, both in England and America. (It even predominates in accounts of Burt in some psychology textbooks.) Since ideological propaganda depends not on facts, but on images, impressions, and prejudices, the anti-Burt campaign naturally avoided the fact that Burt's research was in line with the consensus of other expert studies on the heritability of IQ.

Hearnshaw's biography

When the scandal broke in the media, it was already known in psychological circles that Professor Hearnshaw had been working for several years on what would become the "official" biography of Burt. Because of Hearnshaw's well-recognized scholarly credentials as an historian of psychology, and the fact that he had no prior involvement in the IQ controversy or in any other aspect of Burt's activity, his objectivity and credibility in the Burt case were unblemished. Also, he had delivered a beautiful eulogy at Burt's memorial service and was commissioned to write the biography by Burt's sister, who made available Burt's diaries and correspon-

†Over the following years, I saw Tizard occasionally on my visits to London. On one such occasion, before Gillie's exposé of Burt, I asked Tizard if he knew anything about Burt's assistants, Howard and Conway. When I mentioned that I had not yet come across anyone who knew anything about these women, except for having seen their names in Burt's articles, Tizard's eyes lit up. He excitedly said something to the effect that perhaps these women never existed at all and loudly clapped his hands. His exclamation still rings vividly in my memory: "Wouldn't it be great if it could be shown that Burt was really just an old fraud!"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dence. It was everyone's reasonable expectation that Hearnshaw's forthcoming biography of Burt would become generally regarded as the last word on the matter.

Although Hearnshaw was already in the late stages of his writing, it was of course mandatory that his biography deal fully with the scandal. Several of Burt's detractors grabbed this opportunity and made further accusations that had not previously come to light. The most curiously assiduous in this effort were two psychologists at Hull University, Alan and Ann Clarke (husband and wife), both of whom got their Ph.D.'s under Burt back in 1950. They asserted that Burt had written and published articles based on their doctoral dissertations—using their names but with the conclusions "slanted" to serve his own purposes. This accusation further encouraged doubts about Burt's integrity. The Clarkes called Burt "unscrupulous," a "rogue," a "con man," and a "fraud." They repeated this charge many times in articles and on BBC radio. Hearnshaw seemingly accepted this defamatory claim at face value, without verifying it, and incorporated it wholesale into his biography as a flagrant example of Burt's devious character.

Burt's detractors were obviously successful in convincing Hearnshaw of Burt's guilt. When his massive and well-written biography was published in 1979, his conclusions of guilt on several counts were widely accepted, even by most of Burt's former defenders. The Council of the British Psychological Society (BPS) endorsed Hearnshaw's conclusions and officially declared Burt's guilt in a 1980 booklet entitled *A Balance Sheet on Burt*. The "balance sheet," however, was anything but balanced. Both Tizard and Alan Clarke were members of the BPS Council when it planned its official pronouncement on Burt. Among the seven presenters in the *Balance Sheet* were Hearnshaw, Gillie, Ann Clarke, and Alan Clarke. As expected, they all roundly condemned Burt, while the remaining three contributors, who had never visibly done any research on the Burt affair themselves, acquiesced in the official pronouncement and wrote only in general terms on research methodology and scientific fraud. As far as I know, there was no attempt to question any of the evidence used to support the various charges against Burt.

Why were so many so convinced by Hearnshaw's book? I had reviewed the manuscript for the publisher and praised it highly. Its cool-headed, judicious style evinced none of the rancor or anti-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hereditarian rhetoric typical of Burt's detractors. What seemed to be the crucial evidence in Hearnshaw's exclusive possession were Burt's diaries and correspondence. The diaries covered the much-examined period in Burt's career (1953-1960) during which he published articles suggesting that he had acquired data on new sets of twins. Hearnshaw gives the impression that the diaries were quite complete and detailed, recording even such insignificant things as Burt's having tea with a friend, taking a walk, or getting a haircut. Surely one would think that anything as important as locating and testing newly discovered sets of MZA twins would be mentioned in the diary, if this had actually occurred. Their complete absence in the diaries would seem to be damning evidence.

However, when the diaries are closely examined, as they were by Joynson and by Fletcher (whose book also reproduces all the entries in Burt's diary for one month), this negative evidence of not having collected any new sets of twins (at least after 1953) suddenly becomes unimpressive. The reason is that Burt's diaries seem to record *nothing* but utter trivia; for example, there is no mention at all of the death of Burt's personal secretary of many years or of Burt's attending her funeral, which other records show he did. The diaries read more like a simple date book, with the briefest possible notations. Furthermore, some 55 percent of all the dates during the whole period covered by the diaries show no entries at all, and there are a number of periods of several consecutive months without a single entry. So the absence of entries on MZAs (or other kinship data) in the diaries, and the lack of any mention of his former assistants, Howard and Conway, become unconvincing evidence for the charge that Burt faked his data. Yet Hearnshaw's rather misleading report of the nature of these diaries had finally convinced almost everyone that Burt had committed fraud.

The nearest thing to a "smoking gun" in Burt's diaries is the single entry, "calculating data on twins for Jencks." This item does give the reader pause. In 1968, Christopher Jencks, a Harvard sociologist, had requested from Burt a listing of the IQs and socioeconomic ratings of each of the fifty-three MZA twin pairs on which the correlations were based in an important article Burt published in 1966. The crucial question here is: Does "calculating data" mean deliberately *concocting* data to fit the already published correlations and other statistics? Or could it mean something else, perhaps just assembling data from various other tables or test

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sheets, or matching up the socioeconomic information on the subjects from separate data files? No one really knows. There is indisputable evidence from Burt's correspondence that he told "white lies" to Jencks and other correspondents about the reasons for his delayed replies to their inquiries (such as claiming to have been out of town), but this can hardly be construed as evidence that he fabricated the MZA data he sent to them.

Another source of suspicion is the fact that Burt wrote in 1971 to Sandra Scarr, a noted behavioral geneticist then at the University of Minnesota, in reply to her request for a copy of his data on fifty-three sets of MZA twins. In his letter, he also gave the IQ scores and other details on three new sets of MZA twins. (Scarr had sent me a copy of this letter, which I passed on to Hearnshaw.) I was especially puzzled by this, because about two months after Burt wrote that letter, I had personally discussed twin research with him, and had even mentioned the possibility of looking for more sets of MZAs in London. Yet he never mentioned having found the three new sets of twins he had described to Scarr. It seems improbable to me to attribute Burt's silence on this point to a lapse of memory. Although he was then eighty-eight years old, his memory was phenomenal for a great many other things, including the technical details of one of my own studies that I had described in conversations with him two weeks previously. Again, however, Burt's failure to mention the three new sets of twins to anyone but Scarr remains negative evidence—apparently damning, but still inconclusive.

The case for the defense

It is impossible in this brief account to do justice either to the great wealth of detail in Hearnshaw's biography or to the extensive and fine-grained investigation presented by Burt's defenders, Joynson and Fletcher. Consequently, the case for the defense can only be characterized in the most general terms. The line of defense argued by Joynson and Fletcher consists of two main tactics: (1) They show the previously unsuspected flimsiness, misrepresentation, and even in some cases factual nonexistence, of the supposedly damning evidence; and (2) They closely examine the points that had aroused suspicion and provide alternative innocent explanations that seem at least as plausible as the "guilty" explanations promoted by Burt's accusers. For example:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Point One. Burt's assistants Howard and Conway could not be found, nor could their existence at any time be definitely established.

Counterpoint. Howard and Conway presumably worked for Burt only prior to World War II and, assuming they were still alive when sought in 1976, they would have been quite elderly. Burt's secretary informed me that Burt had told her that Conway had emigrated, perhaps to Australia. Other persons that Burt mentioned in his articles and who at first were also suspected of being fictitious were later identified. Burt's articles were not explicit about exactly when Howard and Conway actually collected the data on twins, and he was perhaps deceptive in leaving the impression that they were still giving IQ tests to twins even after 1955. My own hunch is that his personal vanity made him want to appear more actively engaged in ongoing research in his old age than he actually was, and so he obscured the "when and how" of his data collection, an implicit deception that later engendered doubts about the data's authenticity.

Point Two. Neither Burt's diaries nor correspondence provide evidence that Burt or any identifiable former assistants tested any new sets of MZA twins after Burt officially retired in 1950. Yet he added new twin data to his studies published in 1955 and again in 1966.

Counterpoint. Virtually all of Burt's data were collected before World War II. After the first blitzkrieg on London, University College had to be rapidly evacuated. All of Burt's data were hastily thrown into various boxes and stored in the basement; his department was moved to Wales for the duration. In a later bombing raid, the College suffered a direct hit. One of Burt's longtime associates, Charlotte Banks, testified that the twin data were retrieved piecemeal after the war. They were found in different boxes and at different times. Some had been misplaced and turned up only much later. Although Burt's articles implicitly made it appear that he was collecting new data, the fact was that he only analyzed and reported for the first time old data that had been collected many years before. Burt's odd furtiveness in this regard justifiably undermined his posthumous reputation; regardless of whether or not one accepts Joynson and Fletcher's explanation about misplaced data, one must conclude that Burt's deception is inexcusable for a scientist.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Point Three. In a 1978 feature article in *Science*, an American psychologist, Donald Dorfman, attempted to demonstrate statistically the fraudulent nature of data from one of Burt's articles on social mobility and IQ, which showed results consistent with the hypothesis that the average social-class differences in IQ reflect genetic differences. Dorfman argued that the tables in the article fit the normal curve so closely as to be almost certainly faked. In other words, it was improbable that random subject samples would show the high degree of regularity seen in Burt's tables.

Counterpoint. Apparently Dorfman's haste to prove Burt a fraud precluded his reading Burt's article carefully. Burt explicitly indicated that he normalized the data in his tables. Two professors of mathematical statistics, at Harvard and the University of Chicago, refuted Dorfman's effort. They pointed out that Burt's procedure of normalizing the frequencies, or fixing the marginal totals, was a statistically acceptable and not uncommon practice for this type of analysis. Jointly, they further stated that "using Dorfman's inappropriate statistical techniques to detect fraudulent data would be to condemn a major portion, if not all, of empirical science as fabrication."

Point Four. In a claim they later repeated many times in print and on radio, Ann and Alan Clarke wrote to Hearnshaw disclosing that Burt had published articles under their names, based on their doctoral dissertations, and that he distorted their views, in particular "implicitly attacking Eysenck."

Counterpoint. These alleged "articles" turn out to be nothing more than brief abstracts of the Clarkes' Ph.D. dissertations. It was customary for professors to submit their students' dissertation abstracts for publication in the *British Journal of Educational Psychology*. Burt's editing of the abstracts for publication consisted only of stylistic improvements; there is no misrepresentation of their substantive content. The motivation of the Clarkes' prominent role in the Burt affair is still an enigma. It is all the more puzzling since, unlike most of Burt's detractors, they are avowedly not anti-hereditarian and do not appear to be extremists on any of the related scientific issues.

Interestingly, Hearnshaw does not address in detail one of the most serious charges commonly leveled against Burt—that his calculations themselves were fraudulent. My own 1974 examination of Burt's studies did find a number of peculiarities in his data.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Almost all of the errors, however, amounted to the kind of careless copying or proofreading mistakes one could reasonably attribute to Burt's advanced age—he wrote most of the articles in question after the age of seventy-five. Moreover, as Joynson notes in *The Burt Affair*, a number of the apparently erroneous twin and sibling correlations in fact suggest a *decrease* in the heritability coefficient, strengthening the argument for environmental causation of IQ differences. Burt would hardly engage in deliberate fraud in order to bolster a conclusion completely opposite to his own.

Conclusion

What is the moral of this curious story? A talented scientist who works largely alone makes a good many personal enemies. He is sometimes careless and eccentric in his presentation of his studies. He becomes a prominent public figure. Most important, he develops politically incorrect theories on socially sensitive topics. This combination of factors gives his opponents—aided by sympathetic journalists—ample ammunition to attack his reputation.

Such is the essence of the Burt affair. Joynson and Fletcher have disproved some of the accusations and suspicions leveled against Burt, but not all, and not completely. There is room left for doubt. Whether one gives the benefit of the doubt to Burt or to his detractors is still another matter. A convincing defense of Burt is handicapped by his undisputed personal eccentricities and petty foibles, as well as by his failings as an empirical scientist. Since it is next to impossible to prove a negative, no one can confidently proclaim Burt's complete innocence of all charges. He may be guilty of simple carelessness. But the burden of proof rests squarely on those who have proclaimed Burt guilty of fraud. Their evidence has proven so flimsy that I believe an impartial jury would rule out the verdict of fraud, not just on the grounds of "not proven," but simply as not plausible.

A final judgment on Burt would probably not much interest historians of psychology if it had turned out that his conclusions about the heritability of intelligence were wrong. But in the twenty years since Burt died, many scientifically rigorous studies—including a recent MZA-twin replication virtually identical to Burt's—have substantiated the theory that individual differences in intelligence are strongly conditioned by genetic factors. Experts in behavioral genetics now generally agree on this central point. As all the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

smoke and fumes of the Burt affair dissipate, this should be cause for optimism: the field of behavioral genetics appears increasingly ready—controversy notwithstanding—to behave as a science like any other.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Underclass and the Great Migration

NICHOLAS LEMANN

ALL THE TIME that I was working on *The Promised Land*, I was looking for someone who had an absolute command of the data and the technical literature on the great black migration I was writing about. At one point I even tried, unsuccessfully, to hire a sociology graduate student to conduct regression analyses for me. It was only after the book was published that I met the person I had been hoping to find all along: David Whitman, who is more familiar with quantitative social science that any journalist I know of, and more familiar with the literature on the black migration than any academic I have met. At several points in his essay about my book ["The Great Sharecropper Success Story," Summer 1991] he cites studies that I was not aware of until he told me about them. As should be clear, I wish I had known him five years ago.

I think Whitman misleads, however, in implying that he has gone far beyond spotting some lacunae in my book, and disproved its main point. His essay exaggerates what I say in the book about the link between sharecroppers and the underclass, which has the effect of shutting off an important line of inquiry by making it sound ridiculous. Whitman then presents as refutation of my work data on the overall success of the great migration to the North, which I never said was a failure. And Whitman seems to me to take an economically deterministic, culture-denying view of human behavior that American intellectuals ought to put behind them.

Whitman says that in *The Promised Land*, I "contend ... that the modern-day black underclass is composed of ex-sharecroppers and their descendants, still trapped in the backward mores of the southern plantation." Actually, I made a special point of not mak-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing such a bald contention in the book—that is why Whitman has to rely primarily on reviews, rather than the text of the book itself, to provide the straw man that he knocks down in his essay. Five years ago, when my two-article series, "Origins of the Underclass," was published in the *Atlantic Monthly*, William Julius Wilson of the University of Chicago and other social scientists strenuously objected to the "sharecropper thesis" as I presented it there. In response, I thought about the thesis a lot more and did a good deal of additional research on the sharecropper system. I concluded that I could not present hard data to support a sharecropper-to-underclass link; instead I would write a historical narrative that encompassed the sharecropper system (and the vagaries of politics and government policy, direct racism, institutional racism, deindustrialization, and the other forces behind the creation of the underclass that Whitman says I ignored), but expressly would not push a single all-explanatory theory.

I do find the sharecropper-underclass similarities to be so pronounced that dismissing them as irrelevant seems odd. Black sharecropper life, by all accounts, was characterized by very high rates of out-of-wedlock pregnancy and violent crime, a nearly nonexistent educational system, and a corrupt economic arrangement with plantation owners that encouraged cynicism, instability, and dependency. My strong impression as a reporter is that former sharecroppers and their children are overrepresented in the ranks of the underclass. But this is quite different from the ideas that Whitman attributes to me and then refutes: that the underclass is entirely made up of former sharecroppers, and that the sharecropper-to-underclass link was paradigmatic of the great black migration as a whole.

SHARECROPPERS were a minority in southern black society (even in rural areas like the Mississippi Delta) before the great migration, and they were a minority of the migrants to the North. The alarmist 1960s popular literature about the great migration quoted by Whitman is obviously wrong, but I do not think it is fair to say my work is of a piece with it. During the alarmist phase, there was no distinction made among black migrants to the cities: all were described as poor, illiterate rural peasants. I have never presented the migration in this way. The central characters in "Origins of the Underclass" were members of a single high school class in Mississippi, most of whom moved to Chicago soon after graduation and did well there; in *The Promised Land* I lay out in detail the complexities of the black class system pre- and post-migration, and include sharecroppers and non-sharecroppers in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cast of migrant characters. For example, in describing the mood in Clarksdale, Mississippi, in the early 1940s, I write, "There really wasn't any young black person in Clarksdale who wasn't thinking about Chicago"; and, in a section about Chicago, I say, "in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it seemed as if the whole black society of Clarksdale ... had transferred itself to Chicago." This hardly makes the migration sound like it was all-poor, all-sharecropper, or a colossal failure.

Therefore the quantitative literature showing that black migrants as an undifferentiated group did slightly better economically than non-migrants does not deliver some sort of intellectual *coup de grace* to *The Promised Land*. (The title *The Public Interest* used, "The Great Sharecropper Success Story," is misleading—Whitman is making a case for a great *migrant* success story and presents no data about sharecroppers in particular.) Even the finer-grained studies Whitman cites (to prove, for example, that the migration was selective even among "impoverished tenants") do not directly address the issue of how sharecroppers did in the North. To disprove the sharecropper thesis, you would have to gather data on the family histories of blacks in the underclass and show that there was not an unusually high proportion who had roots in the sharecropper system.

In my own mind as I was working, the success or failure of the great migration was not an issue; the question I kept asking people over the years was, "Of those who migrated, who were most likely to wind up succeeding in the North, and who were most likely not to?" The answer I heard most often was that people with more education and more stable family backgrounds—and an independent economic life, as opposed to growing up in quasi-slavery—tended to do better. (I realize that the Occupational Change in a Generation (OCG) data set directly contradicts this observation, indicating that no background factor much affected migrants' fates in the North. Is it possible that the OCG data could be wrong?) To put it in terms of the characters in my book, it did not surprise me that George Hicks, with a college degree and a middle-class upbringing in Mississippi (though Whitman, oddly, calls him one of "the plantation laborers that Lemann follows") had an easier time of it in Chicago than Ruby Haynes, who made it part way through elementary school and had a tough childhood spent in a succession of sharecropper shacks.

In the quantitative literature on black migration, there are a few studies that show some support for the idea that factors in migrants' backgrounds affected their economic outcomes in the North. Karl and Alma Taueber's 1964 paper, "The Changing Char-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

acter of Negro Migration," compares black migrants of non-metropolitan and "other SMSA" origin, and finds the former category much less well educated and less likely to have white-collar employment. The Office of Economic Opportunity's 1967 "Survey of Economic Opportunity" divided black migrants into "rural-to-urban" and "urban-to-urban" categories, and found the rural-to-urbans (the category that would presumably include more share-croppers) to have lower—though not much lower—rates of labor-force participation. In his 1950 work, *Recent Migration to Chicago*, Ronald Freedman describes migrants from the rural South as occupying the lowest rungs of black Chicago. In any event, as Robert Hauser and David Featherman have pointed out, the likelihood is that over time, as the purely racial barriers to black progress came down, background factors would have become more important for black migrants.

WHITMAN DOES not offer his own theory of the creation of the underclass, but his essay begs a question: if black migrants did do better than non-migrants, what was it about the northern cities that put blacks who grew up there at a disadvantage? When I have put this to Whitman in conversation, he has brought up E. Franklin Frazier's "City of Destruction" theory—which posits the unwholesomeness of the big-city ghettos for rural black migrants and their children in particular. It seems to me that a true Frazier adherent would say that the underclass was created by the one-two punch of the rural black "folk culture" (Frazier's term) of the South being abruptly transferred to big cities where the church was much less the dominant institution, and where poor educational performance and the break-up of nuclear families were much more severely punished economically.

More broadly, it seems a little obtuse to imply, as I think Whitman does, that migration simply was not a factor in the development of the sociology of the big urban ghettos. The black population of Chicago went from less than 300,000 in 1940 to more than a million in 1970. Even allowing for natural increase, it is fair to say that the great migration was an overwhelmingly important event in the life of the city, and also that black Chicago was profoundly shaped by the overall transition of black America from being three-quarters rural to three-quarters urban in the half-century from 1910 to 1960. White perceptions (which often were misperceptions) about the migration contributed to the strictness of residential segregation in Chicago and to the design of anti-poverty programs in Washington, and these policies strongly affected black urban life. Whatever it was about city upbringing that was hurting

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the life-chances of blacks was, in part, surely the result of the white fear and hostility that the migration engendered.

Also, many of the non-migrants in the studies must have been children of migrants, whose difficulties can be understood in part in the context of the great migration. To give an example from my book: Ruby Haynes's younger children, who grew up in the high-rise Robert Taylor Homes, had extremely difficult passages to adulthood, featuring drug problems, brushes with the law, out-of-wedlock childbearing, dropping out of school, and sporadic work histories. They were non-migrants, but they were actors in the migration tableau. Nobody on either side of their family, to my knowledge, had ever attended high school. Nobody had maintained an intact marriage. Nobody had a stable work history. These patterns, which were of southern origin, were maintained in the North. And if the housing project in which Mrs. Haynes's children grew up had its own culture, distinct from the rural South's, it should be remembered that it was built explicitly to keep as many southern migrants as possible contained within the ghetto.

I DECIDED TO write about the great migration in part for reasons having nothing to do with social science: I am a reporter working in a tradition of book-length narrative nonfiction, and I saw the migration as a great (and, so far, undercovered) American saga. Also, though, I began my work steeped in the intellectual debate of the mid-1980s about the underclass, and I was attracted to the migration as a subject because of my frustration with the way the issue was being discussed.

When the national underclass discussion got underway, there was a feeling of great relief among intellectuals: finally, the controversy over the Moynihan report on the black family was beginning to fade, and such severe ghetto problems as out-of-wedlock birth ratios, crime, labor-force non-participation, and school dropout rates could be discussed again. But the Moynihan report still cast a long shadow. Liberals and conservatives were careful to present the problems of the ghettos as being of fairly recent vintage and as having been created strictly by economic forces—unemployment for liberals, the "reverse incentives" of welfare and other government programs for conservatives. These non-historical, non-individual, non-cultural theories went hand in hand with a particular style of research: intensive field work of the kind that Robert E. Park championed at the University of Chicago was out, and regression analysis was in.

As soon as I began reporting in ghettos, I heard constantly from people there about the great migration as a force that had shaped

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their lives. The prevailing underclass theories were less than completely satisfying to me anyway, for two reasons. First, they failed to account for the substantial differences in the experiences of various ethnic groups (all of whom presumably were confronted by similar economic incentive structures) in the same cities. And second, although most experts emphasized the disastrous effects of deindustrialization or the War on Poverty on the ghettos, descriptions of the ghettos prior to these developments mention the same social problems. (Kenneth Clark's *Dark Ghetto*, which was published as a kind of starter's gun for the War on Poverty, is absolutely fresh today, for example.) I thought it would be useful to try to add African-American history to the mix of factors explaining the creation of the underclass. Also, I decided to try to understand the underclass primarily through first-hand research; I believe the overwhelmingly statistical nature of the underclass debate causes the public to lose empathy and sympathy for, and ultimately even interest in, the people involved, and pushes researchers toward overly rigid, mechanical models of human behavior.

Next I started doing research on the pre-migration South, and it was immediately apparent that there was a veritable avalanche of commentary about the existence there of what we now think of as urban underclass problems—illegitimacy, black-on-black crime, poor education, and sporadic employment. These problems were routinely identified mostly with poor rural people living under the sharecropper system. As Whitman points out, the same phenomena existed in the poorest black sections of the northern cities throughout the twentieth century, but first-hand observers of the early twentieth-century ghettos, such as Frazier, W.E.B. DuBois, and Charles S. Johnson, invariably presented them as being products of the southern plantation system, rather than (Whitman's word) "home-grown." The Urban League was founded on the assumption that the social problems of the ghettos could be solved in part by helping rural southern migrants adapt to city life.

FURTHER RESEARCH could settle, better than I have been able to, the issue of how important the southern roots of the black family are. There is a gap in the history of the black family that needs to be filled in: How can the picture we now have of the slave family as intact be squared with the accounts of the sharecropper family, half a century later, as disorganized? And sociologists might look into the question of whether any background factors help to account for whether black migrants wound up in the middle class or the underclass. One reason we lack such information now is a fear that it might be misused in some way. Whitman,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in his essay, raises this fear in several different ways: He says I make it sound as if the problems of ex-sharecropper Ruby Haynes, the book's heroine, are her own fault; he wonders why liberals have not noticed how similar my views are to Edward Banfield's; he says I make the great migration look like a failure; and he says I emphasize the need for anti-poverty programs instead of economic growth. All these points proceed from the following assumption: If you are going to be a liberal, you have to deny the importance of culture and individual behavior.

I strenuously object to this way of thinking. In general, the reaction to the book has been just what I hoped it would be: more sympathy for the underclass, more resolve to confront the problem. Mrs. Haynes has been heaped with accolades since *The Promised Land* was published—the most recent being a large event in her honor at the Clarksdale Civic Auditorium, with all the local dignitaries in attendance. There is a long tradition of works about inner-city ghetto life that have not flinched from portraying out-of-wedlock childbearing and criminality and yet have had the effect of increasing, not deadening, the concern of the public: think of *Native Son*, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*, and, more recently, "Boyz N the Hood." If you sugar-coat, you lose credibility. If you present only bourgeois success stories, the argument that there is a severe problem for society to address loses force. If you traffic exclusively in statistics rather than in the details of real lives, you lose the attention of a general audience.

Because culture is susceptible to change, not some kind of immutable quasi-genetic coding, the political implication of the sharecropper thesis is that we need anti-poverty programs—social services, not cash grants—that will push along the acculturation process for people in the underclass. Whitman is correct in saying that the Afterword in which I call for such programs is quite sketchy. I plan to do more detailed work on this theme for the *Atlantic* in the near future. But his implication that I have distracted attention from the importance of "economic growth and tight labor markets" is unfair. We should conceive of programs as something done side by side with, not as a substitute for, stimulating economic growth. Moreover, in black America, social programs that are ambitious in scope do have a macroeconomic dimension, because the government social-welfare apparatus is such a major employer for the black middle class.

It is impossible to gauge precisely the effect that a book is having, but my strong impression since *The Promised Land* was published is that readers see its tone as hopeful, not despairing. In intellectual life, I think the book is part of an important ongoing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

process: getting past the feeling that race relations is a minefield subject, full of issues that cannot be discussed. David Whitman seems to have precisely the opposite impression of the book's effect. I hope he is wrong.

Nicholas Lemann is a national correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly.

The Migrants' Tale and Ghetto Culture

DAVID WHITMAN

I FIND IT hard to argue with an author, especially one as thoughtful as Nicholas Lemann, who claims that I have misrepresented his book. After all, who better than Lemann can serve as a guide to *The Promised Land* after more than five years of research and interviews? The truth is that I concur with many of the points he makes in the preceding pages. *The Promised Land* is less mono-causal than his earlier *Atlantic Monthly* articles about a sharecropper-to-underclass link; he does present alternative explanations in his book for the formation of the black underclass, besides a heritage of backward, rural mores; he never seeks to portray the migration as a failure; and he does recount the stories of several migrants who prospered in the North. In fact, I plainly made each of these points in my essay on Lemann's book. And yet I still conclude both that the sharecropper-underclass link is an important, dubious tenet of *The Promised Land*, and that many readers will close the book with the understanding that the great migration backfired.

Before explaining my reasoning, let me first make a point that only bolsters the objections Lemann raises to my review. Notwithstanding my previous critique, *The Promised Land* contains just an abbreviated discussion of a link between the sharecroppers of yesteryear and the ghetto residents of today. That discussion is worth briefly reviewing, particularly since Lemann believes my objections to his book hinge on its reviews, not its text. Essentially, Lemann writes about a historical tie between the two groups on two occasions. On page 31, at the end of a fifteen-page section on the ills of the sharecropper system, Lemann concludes that "black

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sharecropper society ... was the equivalent of big-city ghetto society today in many ways." He then goes on, in the next two paragraphs, to say that on the eve of the migration in the 1940s, the sharecropper system was the national center of illegitimacy, the female-headed family, and violent crime. W.E.B. DuBois and E. Franklin Frazier, he notes, attributed family breakdown at the time among urban blacks to migrants from the rural South.[1] Then, Lemann does not mention the sharecropper-underclass link for another 254 pages.

At that point, amidst a discussion of the origins of the underclass, Lemann raises the possibility that the black migration contributed to the "social disorganization" of the inner city. Again, he limits his discussion to two paragraphs. This time he asserts that there is little hard data on the experiences of the migrants. The studies that do exist, he says, show that most southern migrants fared better than nonmigrants in northern cities, although two background factors purportedly correlated with a "lack of success"—farm-origin and broken-family—synonyms, in his view, for the ex-sharecroppers.

Besides these two sections of the book (totalling just four paragraphs) Lemann never again mentions a sharecropper-underclass link, except parenthetically. In short, were a reader to thumb through *The Promised Land* or glance through its index, he would find dozens of other subjects that receive more extended treatment than the sharecropper heritage of the underclass. And I think he would also conclude, as Lemann has, that I exaggerated in my review, spotted nonessential lacunae in his research, and then built up and knocked down a "straw man."

There is, however, one obvious hitch in the straw-man indictment. Put simply, if the sharecropper-underclass link is such a tenuous accessory to *The Promised Land,* why has reviewer after reviewer seized on this very notion as Lemann's special contribution to the debate over ghetto poverty? The answer to that question cannot be found in the overly fertile imaginations of book reviewers nor even in ideological pack-journalism, since reviewers on both the political left and right have lauded Lemann for exposing the connection between the underclass and ex-sharecroppers. The explanation, I think, must lie elsewhere, namely in the unusual narrative structure of *The Promised Land.* In fact, the sparse pas-

[1] It is unclear why Lemann cites W.E.B. DuBois's *The Philadelphia Negro* at this juncture in *The Promised Land.* DuBois's classic was published in 1899, long before the great waves of the 1940-1970 migration or the introduction of the mechanical cotton picker.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sages cited above take on quite a different significance when Lemann's book is read cover-to-cover.

UNLIKE MOST books on race and politics, *The Promised Land* is structured more like a novel than a social-science monograph or essay. Most of the book traces the odyssey of several sharecroppers from Clarksdale, Mississippi, to Chicago (and in some cases back to Clarksdale); interspersed with their stories, Lemann also delivers a vivid case study of the War on Poverty. Thus, his narrative formula is essentially copied from fiction. The juxtaposition of the tales of obscure individuals caught up in a great upheaval and the response of government officials to that upheaval is as familiar as Hugo's *Les Misérables* or Tolstoy's *War and Peace.* And in Lemann's case, the design of the narrative was deliberate—in fact, he has long championed such "novelistic" nonfiction.[2]

I happen to share Lemann's preference for books such as J. Anthony Lukas's *Common Ground* or Tom Wolfe's *The Right Stuff.* But such a narrative formula also creates its own expectations, ones that Lemann here does not seem prepared to fully shoulder. Let me be the first to acknowledge that in effective nonfiction tales like *The Promised Land* the protagonists are not just symbols, perfect embodiments of a social trend. Part of what makes the life histories of individuals compelling is that they tend to confound theories, or at least illustrate ways in which they must be modified. At the same time, the lives of the protagonists in "novelistic" nonfiction ideally should be emblematic of some fundamental historical truths—and the reader reasonably expects as much of the author. When Lukas wrote *Common Ground*, he aspired to say something important about busing, class, and race in America—not just recount the story of three families in Boston who happened to have some experience with busing. And I think that most readers of *The Promised Land* presume that Lemann set out to tell the essential tale of the black migration and its aftermath, not just the story of a few sharecroppers who happened to end up in Chicago's projects. Lemann's ambitious subtitle, after all, is "The Great Black Migration and How it Changed America."

In short, it is hardly surprising that reviews of *The Promised Land* have assumed that Lemann's protagonists stand for something larger than themselves. No reader, for example, who perse-

[2]See Nicholas Lemann, "Today's Best Journalism: Better Than Fiction," *Washington Monthly*, March 1983, pp. 24-29, and "Missed Moorings: American Novelists Lose Touch," *Washington Monthly*, February 1986, pp. 43-50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vered through fifty pages of Ruby Haynes's sad odyssey in Chicago's slums could reasonably conclude that Lemann wrote so extensively on Haynes and her sharecropper roots because her heritage may merely be incidental to the formation of the underclass. For Lemann to suggest otherwise is a little like Theodore Dreiser warning his readers to draw no inferences about the industrial revolution from the twists and turns of 450 pages of *Sister Carrie*. The fact that Lemann—however briefly—also *says* there is a link between the ex-sharecroppers and the modern-day underclass only underscores and magnifies the implicit message that his book delivers chapter after chapter.

Lemann's narrative formula raises one other obvious expectation in the reader's mind: namely, that *The Promised Land* will illuminate the fundamental outline and story of the great migration. I say that not just because of the book's subtitle but because the "plot" of the book is itself a kind of migration, following ex-residents of Clarksdale from one address to another over a period of several decades. And viewed as a book about migration, *The Promised Land* raises an immediate question: Did it all succeed?

In the preceding essay, Lemann makes the case that the migration indirectly sped the development of an underclass because northern whites perceived rural blacks as a threat and therefore responded by creating racially segregated housing projects in the slums. He also says some migrants did better than others, with those from urban areas being more likely than migrants from non-metropolitan origins to go to school and hold white-collar jobs. I agree with him on both counts. Yet, with all respect, I think he is raising collateral issues. The paramount question prompted by his book is whether the migrants flopped or succeeded—not who among them was most likely to succeed.

AS I WROTE in my review, the tale of the 1940-1970 black migration is a remarkable and little-known success story. Despite almost routine warnings that rural black migrants were fomenting riots, creating crime waves, and lining up for welfare, these unsophisticated, poorly-educated newcomers adjusted better to city life than black urban natives. In 1960, 1970, and 1980, southern-born black male migrants were less likely after a few years of living in the North to drop out of the labor force, live in poverty, reside in a broken family, or rely on welfare than were northern-born blacks. And at a time when much of the public has now either given up on the War on Poverty or is asking "why can't blacks get ahead like other immigrants," this largely untold success

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

story deserves retelling. *The Promised Land*, in my view, does not do it justice.

As Lemann point outs, many of the studies I cited in my article dealt with black migrants as a whole, rather than just the sharecroppers. But I do not want to leave the impression that social science has had nothing to say about the status of the ex-sharecroppers or that the remarkable performance of the majority of black migrants somehow concealed the dismal performance of the smaller group of sharecroppers. As noted in my essay, the large-scale 1962 and 1973 OCG surveys did allow researchers to control for farm origins among blacks—and in neither of the two survey years did black migrants from farm backgrounds suffer in the northern job market. I am puzzled as to why Lemann now says that I present "no data about sharecroppers in particular," since in his book he cites this same data, using it in fact as his only statistical evidence to prove the exact opposite point: that the sharecroppers fared poorly in the North. (He has since acknowledged misreading the data.) It also seems odd that he would now wonder whether "it is possible that [the survey results] could be wrong" after expressing no such qualms in his book.

The only other broad-based sample of black rural-urban migrants is a 1967 Census Bureau survey (mentioned by Lemann in the preceding essay). It, too, fails to show any meaningful disparity between migrants from rural non-farm origins and those from agricultural backgrounds. (Unpublished data from the study show that black migrants from farm backgrounds had a slightly higher poverty rate than migrants from non-farm backgrounds—30.4 percent versus 24.5 percent.) I also cited two smaller surveys of black rural-urban migrants that Lemann overlooked in *The Promised Land*, including one of migrants from the Mississippi Delta who moved to Chicago. These studies (as well as two that I did not cite) also found that the newcomers adjusted surprisingly well in the North. As Lemann notes, the economic performance of black migrants from rural origins is at best a crude proxy for the ex-sharecroppers, since the group includes many migrants from non-farm backgrounds. Still, these studies provide little, if any, support for *The Promised Land*'s sharecropper-underclass thesis. All of their basic findings—much to the surprise of the scholars who oversaw them—run in the direction of confirming the "great sharecropper success story," not the other way around. That fact is missing from *The Promised Land*—and seems to represent more than just a trivial lacuna.

It is important to underline that I am not second-guessing Lemann's intentions. After discussing his book with him, I am

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

convinced he believes that the migration, on the whole, was a success and that he wanted *The Promised Land* to deliver a hopeful message. Had his book emphatically declared the migration a triumph, or underscored that he believed he was really concentrating on only a small, unrepresentative segment of the migrants, his message would have been clearer and less controversial. But in the text of *The Promised Land*, he never can quite bring himself to make either assertion—perhaps because both acknowledgements, in the parlance of journalists, are akin to "stepping on your lead."

LASTLY, I WANT to address the question of cultural influences. Lemann attributes to me "an economically deterministic, culture-denying view of human behavior" that became fashionable after the Moynihan report on the black family. He implies that I criticized his book because I felt it unfair of him to spend so much time exposing the faults of the ghetto poor when he could have instead sugar-coated the migration by presenting a series of bourgeois success stories. Undergirding my review, he concludes, is the assumption that "If you are going to be a liberal, you have to deny the importance of culture and individual behavior."

Having long ago publicly deplored the hostile response to the Moynihan report, and having spent most of the last decade writing about homeless alcoholics, welfare mothers, prisoners with AIDS, members of the black underclass, illegal immigrants, and assorted social misfits, I can't take the sugar-coating implication too seriously. But Lemann does raise a pertinent question about the role that I assign to culture and individual behavior. My own view is that both forces are central pieces of the inner-city poverty puzzle. In fact, while it is not clear from Lemann's essay, I actually lauded his candor about individual responsibility and feel it is equally admirable for him to write openly about ghetto culture. Where I differ from Lemann is in my belief that it is worthwhile to clearly distinguish culture per se from a "culture of poverty" that lingers from generation to generation.

While news accounts of the slums typically depict them as desperate, dangerous worlds unto themselves, cultural trends in society at large still plainly influence the lives of ghetto residents. To be sure, in every ghetto one can find the exotic and the alien: Uzi-toting gang members, promiscuous girls hooked on crack, and youths who shoot ruthlessly into crowded playgrounds. But my own experience in interviewing slum residents is that they (to borrow a phrase from Lemann's description of *Common Ground*) generally show the "ordinariness and nobility [that] resides in everyone." For

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the most part, life in the slums is really rather dreary and dull. The stores are often boarded up, there are few recreation areas or safe playgrounds, and inside dilapidated apartments, televisions run all day as children watch from worn-out couches. Most able-bodied men work menial jobs, and those who hustle usually barely scrape by. Welfare mothers are more often depressed than raging against "the system." All in all, the ghetto feels more like an old age home than a war zone.

To my mind, this "ordinariness" of ghetto residents helps explain one of the great mysteries of the inner city; namely, how, in the space of twenty-five years, the black lower-class family could have so abruptly collapsed. The explanation cannot just lie in the culture of poverty and the "pathological" nature of the lower-class black family since, as Lemann points out, the two-parent family was the norm among blacks until relatively recently. Nor, as numerous studies have shown, is the structural explanation fully adequate—i.e., that there are not enough employed (and hence marriageable) men in the ghetto because of shifts in low-wage, urban job markets.

Instead, part of the problem may be that members of the underclass have been particularly ill-prepared to absorb ever-more-casual public attitudes toward marriage. Unwed motherhood and single-parenthood have, in comparative terms, exploded in recent years among middle- and working-class families, not just poor ones, be they black or white. Yet not many welfare mothers can, like Farrah Fawcett, depend on a Ryan O'Neal to live with them and support children conceived out-of-wedlock. Moreover, social trends that made single parenthood more economically feasible (like the increased availability of welfare, no-fault divorces, the pill, and abortion) have been especially detrimental to the ghetto poor. Other urban cultural shifts—including the decline of organized religion, the decrease in personal savings, the explosion of violence on television and in the movies, and the sexual revolution—have all had a doubly onerous impact in the inner city. The old adage, "when white America gets a cold, black America gets pneumonia," still resonates.

Although Lemann occasionally writes about cultural influences in just these terms,[3] through most of *The Promised Land* he talks

[3]In his Afterword, Lemann acknowledges that "The ghettos are bound up in the fluidity of American society ... as the country changes, the ghettos will keep changing too. They continue to lose population. Their condition improves in tight labor markets and worsens in more competitive ones. They react to changing mores." On page 286, Lemann also reports that sociologist Christopher Jencks believes the underclass was created by recent society-wide economic and cultural trends.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about culture in the classic terms of the culture-of-poverty theorists. When first introducing the sharecroppers, Lemann approvingly cites Charles Johnson's observation that they constituted a group with "unique moral codes" that had "taken form outside the dominant current of the American culture." Later, when writing about the northern slums, Lemann says that the ghettoes in the early 1960s seemed like an ideal place to introduce social-service programs to acculturate blacks since the ex-sharecroppers fit the culture-of-poverty paradigm "perfectly."

IT IS TRUE, of course, that cultural mores in the slums have gone awry; no one can fail anymore to miss the sense of isolation that characterizes ghetto residents, and the fact that it is harder to do "the right thing" when surrounded by society's dropouts. Yet any first-hand experience with the world of the poor teaches one to be extremely skeptical of generalizations about it. Even the experts whose theories shaped the policies of the past twenty years are now prepared to say that the culture of poverty is not monolithic, and that they don't really understand what gets some people out and not others. The two preceding sentences reflect my views exactly, but they also once mirrored Nicholas Lemann's: in fact, they are the verbatim conclusion of an article entitled "The Culture of Poverty" that Lemann wrote for the *Atlantic* in September 1984, two years before his controversial series on the sharecroppers. Lemann may now call his more recent convictions about the potency of the culture of poverty "liberal" if he chooses, although I doubt he would find many modern-day liberals or conservatives who would second his self-assessment. While the culture-of-poverty thesis has a left-wing birthright, most liberals have rejected the notion of a self-perpetuating ghetto culture since the mid-1960s.

Lemann fits more snugly in the liberal tradition when he concludes that since "culture is susceptible to change" social-service programs can alter ghetto culture. But his conclusion does not follow from his premise. In fact, precisely because culture and individual choices *do* matter, reforming the ghettos will be all the more difficult. If there is anything that the federal government is lousy at, it is acculturating the poor. The point is best illustrated by looking at one simple solution to the underclass: have more low-income black and Puerto Rican fathers marry the mothers of their children. Just about every pathology in the ghetto is far more common among unwed mothers than among married, divorced, or separated women. The hitch, of course, is that policymakers haven't the slightest idea of how to stop the trend toward single-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parenthood, despite decades of government intervention in matters like taxes, birth control, and divorce laws.

While I believe *The Promised Land* has flaws, let me close by emphasizing that I would commend the book to anyone interested in the nation's race problem. *The Promised Land* is an elegant, panoramic yarn, and one of the best books written about the slums in recent years. It has already won a *Los Angeles Times* Book Award for history and doubtlessly will win other honors, perhaps even a Pulitzer. As I noted in my review, there is much to admire in Lemann's tale: he provides a riveting case study of the War on Poverty and writes with characteristic dispassion, lucidity, and big-heartedness about the ghetto poor. On that, at least, we can agree.

David Whitman is a senior editor at U.S. News & World Report.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTRIBUTORS

JOHN H. BUNZEL is a senior research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. He is a past president of San Jose State University and has served on the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.

NICHOLAS EBERSTADT is a researcher with the Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies and with the American Enterprise Institute. He is writing a book on the U.S. infant-mortality problem.

RICHARD T. GILL has taught economics at Harvard University and was the economic analyst for the television series *Economics U$A*. He is co-author of *Our Changing Population*, forthcoming from Prentice Hall.

DAVID P. GOLDMAN is a senior economist with Polyconomics, Inc.

ARTHUR R. JENSEN is professor of educational psychology at the University of California, Berkeley.

ROSALIE PEDALINO PORTER is executive director of the Institute for Research in English Acquisition and Development (READ) in Washington, DC. She is the author of *Forked Tongue: The Politics of Bilingual Education* (Basic Books).

ROGER STARR, former commissioner of New York City's Housing and Development Administration, is a member of the *New York Times* editorial board.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Back Issues Available at $6.00

No. 95 (Spring 1989)

Jackson Toby Of Dropouts and Stay-ins: The Gershwin Approach
Alan Wolfe The Day-Care Dilemma: A Scandinavian Perspective
David J. Armor After Busing: Education and Choice
Daniel Bell 'American Exceptionalism' Revisited: The Role of Civil Society
Lino A. Graglia Judicial Activism: Even on the Right, It's Wrong
James Bovard Farm Policy Follies
David O. Beim Beyond the Savings-and-Loan Crisis
Robert W. Hahn & Randall S. Kroszner The Mismanagement of Air Transport: A Supply-Side Analysis

The Alcoholism Controversy:
William Madsen Thin Thinking About Heavy Drinking
Herbert Fingarette A Rejoinder to Madsen

No. 96 (Summer 1989)

The Underclass:
Isabel V. Sawhill An Overview
Daniel P. Moynihan Toward a Post-Industrial Social Policy
John J. DiIulio, Jr. The Impact of Inner-City Crime

AIDS—Policies and Prospects:
William E. Dannemeyer & Michael G. Franc The Failure of AIDS-Prevention Education
David L. Kirp The AIDS Perplex
David Vogel AIDS and the Politics of Drug Lag

Peter Skerry Borders and Quotas: Immigration and the Affirmative-Action State
Thomas W. Hazlett The Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment
Caleb Nelson The Paradox of the Exclusionary Rule

The Dropout Controversy:
Chester E. Finn, Jr. Dropouts and Grownups
Jackson Toby Coercion or Choice?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No. 97 (Fall 1989)

The Environment:
Joel Schwartz The Rights of Nature and the Death of God
Michael S. Greve Environmentalism and Bounty Hunting
Richard L. Stroup & Jane S. Shaw The Free Market and the Environment

Stanley C. Brubaker In Praise of Punishment
Herbert Stein Problems and Non-Problems in the American Economy
Bernard J. Frieden The Downtown Job Puzzle
Richard A. Guida The Costs of Free Information

Fall Books
Lino A. Graglia Democracy and Original Intent
Lawrence M. Mead The Limitations of Structural Analysis
Roger Starr No Calcutta
Leslie Lenkowsky Voluntarism's New Look
David Blankenhorn All in the Family
Brian Mannix Taking Care of Business
R. Shep Melnick Executive Power and Administrative Law
Caleb Nelson Odds and Oddities
Philip J. Costopoulos The Politics of Authenticity
Jeremy Fand Business Ethics and the Jews

No. 98 (Winter 1990)

Social Science and Black/White:
Richard J. Herrnstein Still an American Dilemma
Byron M. Roth Social Psychology's 'Racism'
Jan H. Blits & Linda S. Gottfredson Employment Testing and Job Performance

Emanuel D. Thorne Tissue Transplants: The Dilemma of the Body's Growing Value
Howard Husock Rediscovering the Three-Decker House
Seymour Martin Lipset The Work Ethic—Then and Now
Steven Kelman The 'Japanization' of America?
Robert F. Nagel The Myth of the General Right to Bail
Aaron Wildavsky Robert Bork and the Crime of Inequality
Edward J. Lynch Politics, Nonpartisanship, and the Public Service

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No. 99 (Spring 1990)

Charles Murray The British Underclass
Joel Schwartz Antihumanism in the Humanities
Robert C. Ellickson The Homelessness Muddle
Ben Bolch & Harold Lyons A Multibillion-Dollar Radon Scare
Thomas Sowell On the Higher Learning in America
George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman Understanding the Savings-and-Loan Debacle
Jack Citrin Language Politics and American Identity

The Discrimination Controversy:
Robert M. Hauser, et al. Understanding Black-White Differences
Richard J. Herrnstein On Responsible Scholarship: A Rejoinder

The Punishment Controversy:
Alexander E. Rawls Of Rawls, Responsibility, and Retribution
Stanley C. Brubaker Rejoinder to Rawls

No. 100 (Summer 1990): The American Congress

James L. Payne The Congressional Brainwashing Machine
Nelson W. Polsby Congress-Bashing for Beginners
Norman Ornstein The Permanent Democratic Congress
Fred Barnes Congressional Despots, Then and Now
Everett Carll Ladd Public Opinion and the 'Congress Problem'
Terry Eastland The Independent-Counsel Regime
Mickey Edwards A Conservative Defense of Congress
Gary L. McDowell Congress and the Courts

Congressional Micromanagement:
L. Gordon Crovitz Micromanaging Foreign Policy
Jeremy Rabkin Micromanaging the Administrative Agencies
Mackubin Owens Micromanaging the Defense Budget

Review Essay:
Walter Berns Locke and the Legislative Principle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No. 101 (Fall 1990)

Donald Kagan George Will's Baseball—A Conservative Critique
George F. Will The Romantic Fallacy in Baseball—A Reply
James B. Jacobs Imagining Drug Legalization
Robert I. Lerman & Hillard Pouncy The Compelling Case for Youth Apprenticeships
Irwin Stelzer National Energy Planning Redux
Irving Welfeld Our Nonexistent Housing Crisis
Laurence S. Seidman Reconsidering National Health Insurance
Julian L. Simon The Unreported Revolution in Population Economics

Fall Books
Matthew Miller Of Pushcart Vendors and Management Consultants
Richard John Neuhaus Redistribution: Selfish Socialism
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. The State of Harvard
Abigail Thernstrom Is Choice a Necessity?
Hadley Arkes The Perils of Legal Positivism
Allan H. Meltzer The Productivity Perplex
Diana Schaub Race and the Constitution

No. 102 (Winter 1991)

James P. Scanlan The Perils of Provocative Statistics
John H. Langbein The Inheritance Revolution
Daniel Patrick Moynihan Educational Goals and Political Plans
David Vogel Business Ethics Past and Present
David Popenoe Family Decline in the Swedish Welfare State
William Tucker How Housing Regulations Cause Homelessness
Julian L. Simon The Case for Greatly Increased Immigration

Review Essay:
Peter Skerry Individualist America and Today's Immigrants

Editorial Notebook:
Ben Wildavsky Small is Beautiful

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No. 103 (Spring 1991)

Why the Poor are Still With Us:
Lawrence M. Mead The New Politics of the New Poverty
Joel Schwartz The Moral Environment of the Poor
David P. Bryden It Ain't What They Teach, It's the Way That They Teach It
Neil Gilbert The Phantom Epidemic of Sexual Assault
George G. Graham WIC: A Food Program That Fails
Walter Olson Better Living Through Litigation?
Charles L. Glenn Controlled Choice in Massachusetts Public Schools
James L. Payne Limiting Government by Limiting Congressional Terms
J.S. Fuerst & Roy Petty High-Rise Housing for Low-Income Families

No. 104 (Summer 1991)

David Whitman The Great Sharecropper Success Story
David L. Kirp Textbooks and Tribalism in California
Nathan Glazer The Lessons of New York City
Lino A. Graglia One Hundred Years of Antitrust
Ross E. Cheit & Jonathan D. Youngwood How Not to Reform Auto Insurance
Summer Books
Jerry Z. Muller Albert Hirschman's Rhetoric of Recrimination
Suzanne Garment Scandal and Cynicism in Post-Watergate Politics
Don B. Kates, Jr. Telling the Truth About Guns
Terry Eastland The Letter of the Law or the Spirit of the Law?
Marc F. Plattner Rousseau's Legacy
R. Shep Melnick Are Bureaucrats to Blame?
Carl F. Horowitz The Communitarian Mind
Vincent J. Cannato Postmodern Populism
Ben Wildavsky Common Ground

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED